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ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

'Definite Progress' in Vienna Security Talks *[TASS]* 1
Charges of Treaty Noncompliance Rebuffed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20 Mar]* 1
Curbs on Third World Arms Sales Urged *[PRAVDA 18 Mar]* 2

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

NATO Doctrine, Strategy Revision Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 18 Mar]* 4

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

Reports, Comments Follow Baker's Moscow Visit 5
  Visit Seen in Postwar Context *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 5
  Prospects for U.S. Ties Viewed *[TASS]* 6
Baker's Visit With Opposition Highlighted *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 6
Analyst Views U.S. Assessments of Unrest *[TASS]* 7

Northeast Asia

Japanese View Kurils Vote as 'Hopeful Sign' *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 8
Japanese Group Visits, Discusses Kurils Dispute 8
  Arrives Sakhalin 19 Mar *[Tokyo KYODO]* 8
  Sakhalin Governor's Offer Rejected *[Tokyo KYODO]* 8
  Delegation Urges 'Phased Return' *[Tokyo KYODO]* 9
ROK Questions Soviet Ties With North Korea *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 15 Mar]* 9

Near East & South Asia

Mideast Sees Reemerging Arab-Israeli Issue 10
  Leads Postwar Agenda *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 19 Mar]* 10
  Settlement Plan Viewed *[Moscow International]* 11
  Flexibility Urged *[TASS]* 12
  No Resolution Foreseen *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 13
Potential Gulf War Repercussions, Threats Viewed *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA No 10]* 14
Committee Deplores Postwar Events in Iraq *[Moscow International]* 15

East Europe

Kvitsinskiy Interviewed on East European Relations *[PRAVDA 18 Mar]* 16

West Europe

Controversy Continues on Honecker's Moscow Trip 18
  Secrecy Questioned *[KOMSOMLSKAYA PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 18
  Legality Causes 'Sensation' *[IZVESTIYA 20 Mar]* 19

Prospects for Cooperation With Turkey Examined *[PRAVDA 14 Mar]* 19
Laptev Receives Europarliament Group 20 Mar *[TASS]* 20

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

20 March Session Proceedings Detailed *[Moscow TV]* 21
  Approves Law on Cabinet of Ministers *[TASS]* 21
  Approves Two New Cabinet Members *[TASS]* 22
Concern Voiced at Security Situation *[Moscow Radio]* 22

Political & Social

TASS Carries Preliminary Referendum Results 23
Paper Cites Gorbachev Aide on Referendum Vote *[IZVESTIYA 21 Mar]* 24
Deputy Medvedev on Referendum Results *[TASS]* 25
Officials Cited on New Draft Union Treaty *[PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 25
Bessmertnykh on Republics' Foreign Ministries *[Moscow Radio]* 27
Pavlov on Production Problems in Leningrad *[Moscow Radio]* 27
  Pavlov Comments on Current Issues *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 28
Prices Committee Chairman on Reform Measures *[TASS]* 29
Paris Paper Analyzes Cabinet Appointments *[LE MONDE 27 Feb]* 29
Deputy Prime Minister on Prices, Wages *[Moscow Radio]* 30
Third Appendix to Prices Agreement *[PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 32
Gorbachev's Conservative Tailspin Considered *[MOSCOW NEWS No 10]* 33
People's Deputy Foils Plane Hijack Attempt *[TASS]* 34
Attempt to Hijack Airliner Aborted *[TASS]* 34

Economic

Pavlov Conditionally Agrees to Fly to Vorkuta *[Radio Rossii]* 34
Silyev To Meet Striking Miners in Kuzbass *[TASS]* 34
Miners' Leaders Cite Political Aims *[TASS]* 35
57 Mines, Enterprises on Strike in Kuzbass *[Moscow Radio]* 35
100 Coal Mines Overall Remain on Strike *[Moscow Radio]* 35
30,000 Miners Walk Out in Ukraine *[AFP]* 36
TV Update on Mining Strikes *[Moscow TV]* 36
Vorkuta Mine Strike Spreads *[TASS]* 36
Realities of Price Reform Considered *[IZVESTIYA 15 Mar]* 36
Yazov Views Industrial Conversion *[Moscow Radio]* 37

Military

Moiseyev on Troop Shortages, Republic Armies *[Moscow Radio]* 38
Arguments Against Republic Armed Forces Voiced *[PRAVDA 14 Mar]* 38

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

New Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium Members *[Tallinn Radio]* 40
Estonian Minister on Land Law Provisions *[IZVESTIYA 15 Mar]* 40
Estonian Communists' Plenum Views Problems *[Tallinn Radio]* 40
Saboteurs Held After Failed Attempt on Riga Center *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 40
Deputy Alksnis Predicts 'New Political Force' *[Riga Radio]* 40
Latvians Visit Taiwan; ROC To Reciprocate *[Riga Radio]* 41
Latvia's Jurkans in Denmark; Protocol Signed *[TASS]* 41
  Discusses Protocol at News Conference *[Riga Radio]* 41

- Defense Personnel Attacked Riding Bus in Vilnius 42
  - Special Militia Said Involved *[Radio Vilnius]* 42
  - Further Details on Shooting *[Radio Vilnius]* 42
  - Reasons for Attack Reported *[Radio Vilnius]* 43
  - Pugo Promises Inquiry *[Radio Vilnius]* 43
- Sajudis Announces Protest of Military Actions *[Radio Vilnius]* 43
  - Targets OMON 'Murderers' *[Radio Vilnius]* 43
- Procuracy Charges Soviet Military, Pugo *[Vilnius International]* 44
- Lithuanian Security Dept Director Resigns *[Radio Vilnius]* 44
- Lithuania's Bickauskas on Moscow Negotiations *[Budapest NEPSZAVA 19 Mar]* 44
- Picketers Call for Returning Vilnius Buildings *[Radio Vilnius]* 45
- PRAVDA on Arrest of Lithuanian Defense Aide *[19 Mar]* 45
- Landsbergis on 'Hostile' Attempts To Hold Poll *[EKHO LITVY 12 Mar]* 45
- Landsbergis Meets With Lithuanians Living Abroad *[EKHO LITVY 12 Mar]* 45
- Lithuanian Paper Editors Appeal to Gorbachev *[EKHO LITVY 20 Feb]* 46
- Details of Lithuanian-Ukraine Treaty Reported *[EKHO LITVY 27 Feb]* 46

RSFSR

- Council Approves Draft Federative Treaty *[TASS]* 47
- Yeltsin Chairs Supreme Soviet Presidium Sessions 47
  - 20 March Session *[TASS]* 47
  - 13 March Session *[PRAVDA 15 Mar]* 47
- Communist Party Joint Plenum Resolution *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 15 Mar]* 48
- Democratic Russia Official on Referendum Results *[TASS]* 51
- Compensation Payments Begin for Increased Prices *[Radio Rossii]* 51
- Leaked Party Report on Yeltsin Rostov Speech *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 51
- Isayev Interviewed on Criticism of Yeltsin *[SELSKAYA ZHIZN 19 Mar]* 52
- Appeal Condemns Goryacheva Blacklisting *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 20 Mar]* 54
- Goryacheva's Media Access Questioned *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 11]* 55
- Polozkov in 'Most Difficult' Arctic Tour Meeting *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 16 Mar]* 55
- Food Supply Problem 'Extreme' in Komi SSR *[TASS]* 56
- Report on Karelian Supplies 'Flight of Fancy' *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 20 Mar]* 56
- Special Militia Unit Sent To Komsomolsk *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 56
- Square in Groznyy Named for Nikita Khrushchev *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 56
- 'Ideological Germanization' in Kaliningrad Decried *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 19 Mar]* 56

Western Republics

- Snegur Chairs Moldova Government Session *[TASS]* 57
  - ROMPRES Report on Session 57
- Moldova Leadership Meets Press on Referendum *[Bucharest ROMPRES]* 57
- Ukraine Communist Party Leader on Referendum *[TASS]* 58

Caucasus

- S. Ossetia Clashes Continue Despite Cease-Fire *[TASS]* 58
- Ingush Appeal for 'Statehood' Criticized *[TASS]* 58
- Georgia Government Decree on Local Elections *[VESTNIK GRUZII 28 Feb]* 59
- Georgian Decree on Abkhazian Elections *[VESTNIK GRUZII 28 Feb]* 59
- Georgia Accuses Foreign Media of 'Bias' *[TASS]* 59
- Manayenkov at Transcaucasus MD Party Meeting *[PRAVDA 19 Mar]* 60
- Armenian Cabinet Decision on Non-State Schools *[Yerevan International]* 60
- Armenian Supreme Soviet Censures Group *[Yerevan Radio]* 60

'Definite Progress' in Vienna Security Talks

LD2003211891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1224 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Smelov]

[Text] Vienna, 20 March (TASS)—Definite progress has been achieved in virtually all areas of talks on confidence-building measures and security in Europe. That description could be applied to the results of the second session of the new stage of this forum, which ended here today and in which the 34 CSCE states participated. The first stage ended just before the Paris summit last November.

An important result of the current session was the adoption of a document on exchanging information on military forces and plans to deploy basic systems of weapons and equipment. It is intended to safeguard "glasnost" in the process of strengthening confidence and security on the continent. It is significant that this so-called format, which covers all European countries, embraces not only weapons but also military personnel. Furthermore, despite certain difficulties, practical work to prepare a seminar on military doctrines has begun. The significance of this is particularly great in conditions where many states are rethinking military doctrines in view of the realities of the modern age.

A good deal of work was done at the last session for the practical implementation of the project for a CSCE communications network which is to supplement diplomatic channels. Although its development is lagging a little behind schedule, it has nevertheless been possible to refine the technical nature of the communications and a number of other questions.

In the opinion of Oleg Grinveskiy, the head of the Soviet delegation to the talks, the next stage is to seriously promote the concept of such confidence and security-building measures that would correspond to the change that has taken place in European political life and in the military and political situation on the continent. These measures in the framework of the confidence-security-disarmament triangle should cover completely new areas, with the aim not only of completing the dismantling of confrontational structures, but of really creating an irreversible level of trust, he said in conversation with a TASS correspondent. It is important that these measures should cover naval and air forces, and that the scale and intensity of military activity should be limited, he went on. The Soviet delegation has raised this question. It drew the attention of the participants in the talks to the fact that at a time when there are radical cuts in conventional weapons, the naval factor takes on a character that as a result of its significance can no longer remain outside the sphere of openness. Unfortunately, these proposals still remain without a constructive answer, although we propose so far confining ourselves to the simplest measures of trust, the Soviet diplomat added.

Charges of Treaty Noncompliance Rebuffed

PM2003155791 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[From the "Observer's Comments" column by Captain S. Sidorov: "New Report—Well-Worn Theme"]

[Text] Over the past few years, the U.S. Administration has regularly submitted to Congress a report "On the Soviet Union's Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." This year was no exception either: The latest report was examined on Capitol Hill.

The fact that it appeared somewhat later than expected is perhaps the only way in which it differs from its predecessors. Otherwise it is a typical—however sad it is to acknowledge this today—product of "cold war" times.

There are a number of nonspecific complaints in the report relating to the as yet unratified treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe, so I will not touch on them, especially since KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already voiced its opinion on this (see KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 February). As for the other "concerns," they are mainly accusations for the sake of accusations.

See for yourselves. The Soviet Union is, for example, charged with permitting the discharge of radioactive products when it carried out one underground nuclear test last year—incidentally, the United States carried out nine such explosions. The report acknowledges that the United States does not know for sure whether there was a violation or not; it will "pass judgment on this question after studying the information." Why then, one wonders, tell the whole wide world about it first? Why not do the opposite—investigate first—as logic would dictate?

The reason for the complaint is there on the surface—it has to affect a quite serious and sensitive area to produce the desired effect. Have you recognized the hand behind this? It is almost like that of Kozma Prutkov: "When you throw pebbles in the water, look at the ripples they form; otherwise it'll be a futile pastime!.."

If any reader thinks that clumsiness and ordinary bad manners are characteristic of anyone but the U.S. political elite, then here is another example for you. In his report at a UN forum in May 1989, a Soviet defense industry representative said that the Soviet Union had produced 450 SS-23's since 1978, including dummy and sectional mockups of this missile. The Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles encompassed 239 missiles—the number in existence at the time it was signed in December 1987. Some 72 standard-issue missiles with high-explosive fragmentation warheads were sold to Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the GDR before the treaty came into force. As for the rest, they were used for tests, instruction, and combat training—once again before the treaty began to operate.

Citing the Soviet representative's report, the administration said: The fact that the United States does not know for certain what has happened to the missiles not included in the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles illustrates the Soviets' unscrupulousness. We have once again been deceived, they say, let them now account for every missile.

But gentlemen! First, if you want to know this—I can understand that in general, although it has no direct bearing on the treaty—do as normal people do, set out your request or, better still, appeal to the joint working commission. Second, if you know how you can satisfactorily prove that missiles still exist after launches, share this with us, and tell us at the same time where the many hundreds of your Pershing-1A missiles that did not fall within the scope of the treaty have disappeared to.

Some of the problems broached in the report are strictly pro forma since these problems are, effectively, a closed subject now. For example, in accordance with the agreement reached, the Soviet side is obliged to eliminate the Krasnoyarsk radar, built in the past in violation of the ABM Treaty. This measure has already, in effect, been implemented—the Krasnoyarsk radar has been dismantled so that today it is harder to render it operational than to build a new one. The report's authors are well aware of that. Just as they are aware that the Americans' construction of ballistic missile early warning stations with forbidden parameters and outside U.S. national territory—in Greenland and Britain—is in contravention of the same ABM Treaty. The U.S. side describes this not as the construction of new but as the "modernization of old stations," which is not banned by the treaty. Then it looks as though a howitzer is not a howitzer, but a modernized slingshot.

In short, while proclaiming certain aims in the report, the administration is pursuing totally different, quite matter-of-fact aims. The report was submitted to Congress at a time when it had begun to consider the latest draft military budget. The report is to a considerable extent designed to whet the appetite.

I am afraid that the approaches and methods characteristic of the current document submitted by the U.S. Administration by no means promote confidence-building in Soviet-U.S. relations. I would further say that its appearance seems another indication that these relations are moving back from cooperation and partnership. To be honest, I would very much like to be mistaken.

Curbs on Third World Arms Sales Urged

91WC0080A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

[Article by Prof Aleksandr Migolatyev under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Strokes Added to the Portrait of the War"]

[Text] The war in the Persian Gulf is over, but we do not know everything about it yet. Only the news headlines, perhaps, have been written so far, not the history of this "biggest international conflict of the detente era." Its true driving forces, hidden springs, and possible consequences will emerge. But some personal conclusions suggest themselves even today.

Thus the problem of the weapons that were actually employed in the war or which were in readiness for use in the military theater would seem particularly important to me.

I recall that according to figures of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), in the period 1983-1987 the Near East accounted for 48.4 percent of the cost of imports of weapons, combat equipment, and munitions obtained by all countries of the "Third World" ($54.1 out of $111.7 billion). In recent years up to three-fourths of all arms have been exported to these countries. Consequently, to avoid a repetition of the conflicts in this and other regions, it is essential to adopt urgent and effective measures to limit exports of arms and military technology. Yet the war had barely ended before arms manufacturers, particularly in the United States, were already concocting new plans to increase military supplies to this region. Does this not reek of money?

The war in the Gulf also revealed the danger of using weapons of mass destruction and of the chemical and bacteriological contamination of the population and the terrain. And the proliferation of chemical weapons, this "poor man's nuclear weapon," needs, specifically, to be emphatically countered here. Operation Desert Storm showed, in addition, that many types of conventional offensive arms, missiles and bombs included or approached the destructive potential of tactical nuclear weapons. Is it not time to impose, through an international legal procedure, limitations on the qualitative upgrading of conventional weapons?

I turn from the military to the political aspects. In the United States, the vestiges of the "Vietnam syndrome" have been canceled out by the jingoistic-patriotic intoxication and admiration for American weapons. But is the price paid by the peoples (not only of Kuwait and Iraq) for this victory not too high? I personally very much doubt that there was optimum correlation of the main parameters of this military operation. After all, if, as Hegel put it, the end justifies the means, was it permissible, while rightly smashing the aggressor and his bunker clique and army of occupation, to deal so brutally with his people—an inheritor of the thousand-year Arab civilization and Muslim culture? May the "carpet bombing," destruction of shelters, and the use of the giant B-52 strategic bombers and the main battery guns of the battleship Missouri be considered justified even for the sake of liberating the victim of aggression? Is it not time to renounce the militarist "winners are not questioned" credo?

However, the most essential conclusion from the conflict, in my view, is the fact that we should aspire to the restoration of peace and security primarily through the use of political, economic, and other nonmilitary means. In this respect, given the importance of the resolutions passed by the United Nations and its Security Council, the latter bodies did not make proper use of their power. Traditional military approaches and instincts gained the upper hand, particularly when a realistic opportunity to halt the escalation of the armed violence had emerged. It seems to me that as a result, serious damage was done to the new concept of political thinking. We need to think about the creation of a universally dependable system of safeguards for the unconditional prevention of aggression, occupation, and annexation in any form and right at the start. Otherwise, the involvement of dozens of new states in armed conflicts will be permanent, and military triumph may once again become a permanent component of international life. This cannot be permitted.

NATO Doctrine, Strategy Revision Viewed

PM1903155991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 18 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[Correspondent B. Moskvichev report: "Half-Way to New Strategy"]

[Text] Brussels—NATO Headquarters recently has willingly talked about the bloc's politicization and stated its intention to review the principles of its strategy. It has appeared to optimists that the fate of a politicized organization incorporated within the new European architecture lies in store for NATO. Political observers are naturally increasingly asking what the bloc's new strategy will be like.

A high-ranking official has let it be known that the North Atlantic Alliance is half-way toward developing the new strategy. The whole spectrum of strategy is under review, ranging from the principle of "flexible response" to the doctrine of "reasonable sufficiency."

The definition of NATO's future role is based first and foremost on readiness to counteract "risk." The allies envisage the widest range of "risks," among which the USSR is still regarded in the bloc's headquarters as one of the most considerable, despite the Warsaw Pact's departure from the scene and a number of agreements concluded on cutting both strategic and conventional arms.

According to NATO political experts' estimates, there also exists a danger from East Europe, where political, economic, and ethnic problems remain unresolved. It is also essential to bear in mind all manner of "risks" from outside the North Atlantic Alliance's area of operation in regions bordering bloc countries. Potential danger also stems from Third World countries which possess modern weapons and are located near the allies' area of operation.

According to the drafters of the new strategy, it is essential to try to prevent the emergence of crisis situations in Europe in the present decade and be ready at the same time for operations in any conditions with the use of various kinds of armed forces, depending upon the situation.

To this end, and as part of the new military doctrine, it is intended to create an improved structure of bloc armed forces which will also possess rapid deployment forces. The question of the new strategy's nuclear aspect has not yet been completely developed. The actual interpretation of the principle of the use of nuclear weapons as a "final resort" remains to be defined.

The problem of the bloc's so-called area of operation remains unresolved. Today, as is well known, NATO Armed Forces' operations are limited to the territory of member countries. Now at NATO Headquarters, at the level of experts for the time being, people are starting to say increasingly that operations outside the traditional area are fully acceptable and are not prohibited. Consultations will be continued, but it is perfectly obvious right now that the United States and Britain intend to exert pressure on the allies to interpret the existing provisions more freely. This is opposed by France and Spain. They consider in particular that it is essential to continue consultations, but that assent must not be given to collective out-of-area operations.

Given this, a compromise will most likely be reached, experts stress. If a threat to the bloc's security emerges outside the area of its operation, the allies should, as happened during the war in the Persian Gulf, afford every opportunity (bases, transport, and material backup) to bloc members to contribute to the common success.

The position whereby an attack upon an ally is regarded as an attack upon the whole bloc remains inviolable.

It is expected that the new doctrine should have gone through every level by the end of May and be regarded as an official document which will be published for wider study.

United States & Canada

Reports, Comments Follow Baker's Moscow Visit

Visit Seen in Postwar Context

PM2003112391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Commentary by Anatoliy Karpychev under the "Viewpoint" rubric: "Let There Be Trust..."]

[Text] But still the world is in turmoil....

I had not heard such an abundance of distorted views on the future of perestroyka for a long time. "The 'Gorby' Myth Has Evaporated...", "The red marshals have lost the war and they know it...", "The USSR is a high financial risk country...", "Demonstrations as well as strikes in Soviet coalfields have reinforced the feeling among some people in the United States that Washington has gambled on the 'wrong horse' by continuing to maintain close relations with Gorbachev..."

It seems to me that there is considerable turmoil in the heads of foreign politicians, journalists, and business people. But never mind the foreign ones.... On the eve of the referendum I spoke to people on a picket line, where they were holding a picture of B.N. Yeltsin, and suddenly I felt ill at ease. There is more than enough fervor in public opinion—bordering on hatred—but the proportion of actual information is trifling.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker came to Moscow in order to obtain information firsthand. The newspapers did not hide the fact that he was going to try to "determine the alignment of forces in the Kremlin leadership" and the rivalry between the reformers and the conservatives and "clarify exactly what position Gorbachev holds."

The visit has another feature which you cannot ignore. These were the first talks with the Soviet leaders since the end of the war in the Persian Gulf.

We are well aware of how the victory is being received in America itself. They are proclaiming it from the rooftops as if it were Christmas. America is the greatest.... Its bombs, obeying laser guidance, fell precisely on target. Its losses in 43 days of war were just over 300 people, including those killed, wounded, and missing. In its own eyes America seems to be asserting itself once again as a superpower, a "hyperpower." I do not know what other cliches propagandists across the ocean are preparing.

Evidently our partners from over the sea will be tempted to pose as victors before the Soviet leaders. Particularly since we really are not on top form today. But after all, we are not the ones who were conquered, for them to speak to us in the language of ultimatums, as some people are trying to do. Naturally I do not mean Baker. What could the secretary of state have gotten out of his trip to Moscow? It seems that the "pause" in the dialogue has ended. This is very important. Second, he received exhaustive information.

There is a noteworthy detailed analysis of events in our country in the report on the meeting between the guest and the USSR President. It would be useful not just for J. Baker but for all of us to familiarize ourselves with it. Society turned out to be too sluggish to take calmly to changes on such a large scale. We were not careful when we geneated premature and indeed vast expectations. After all, it is no secret that some people thought that a new happy life would be bestowed on us from above.

Another important aspect of the conversation: the difficulties confronting the USSR President and the reserves the opposition has at its disposal. Both the difficulties and the reserves come down to one thing: social tension, and the market situation. The opposition is making use of this in order to stir up the masses, and the leadership should relieve this tension by its actions and improve the situation.

I have to mention the USSR President's words: It is dangerous when a political position is reduced to mere opposition. This is destructive. To come to a general conclusion, the stability of Soviet-American relations also depends on a correct understanding of the situation in the USSR. Attempts to cast a shadow on our cooperation should not be observed at state level. Such attempts are being made in both the USSR and the United States.

Who would have thought that today the interpretation and the state of our internal affairs would be so closely linked with international affairs. How important it is to understand one another. I would add here—trust one another.

Nothing has changed in the attitude to Soviet-American relations on the Soviet side. These are the USSR President's words.

In his turn, in order to put straight various distorted views about the administration's policy, J. Baker stated on the U.S. President's behalf that the Soviet leadership is the partner of the United States, that many people in the United States sincerely wish perestroyka success, and that this is important not just for the Soviet Union but also for the United States and the whole world.

Rather a lot is hidden behind these outwardly ordinary assurances. The war brought a perceptible chill into our relations. It was as though it was overshadowing all the vital processes that culminated in Europe in the brilliant Paris charter. Like it or not, the war again suddenly started giving priority to crude military force and destructive might instead of the common sense and dialogue characteristic of our new political thinking. This demonstration of force immediately provoked and entailed suspicion and hostility—and not on our part.

Right away the Soviet public made the following criticism: Why have we harnessed ourselves so tightly to the "war chariot"?

Indeed, we have not forgotten the reaction to our peace plan to settle the conflict—people said: Why does Gorbachev need this? Some said: The USSR President should be awarded another Nobel Prize if this peace plan works. Others inquired sharply: "What is he trying to do—snatch victory from the United States without having the necessary trump cards?"

Evidently superior military hardware, which sows death, is seen as a trump card.

Evidently today we can talk about an American "Persian Gulf syndrome." If not controlled, it could come to play an uneviable role. It can already be seen in a number of opinions concerning postwar building and in the reaction to events in our country. Wittingly or unwittingly the "Persian Gulf syndrome" is a position of strength, a war, if you like, which cannot be considered a good thing even to punish an aggressor.

...I have not broached a number of problems that were being discussed in Moscow. Of course, we need the summit that was postponed. Of course we need to sign extremely important agreements. On strategic offensive weapons. On conventional weapons. All the same, I favor first and foremost understanding one another, trust. The rest will come.

Prospects for U.S. Ties Viewed

LD2003130291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0731 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS commentator Pavel Vasilyev]

[Text] Moscow, 20 Mar (TASS)—The talks of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, completed in Moscow the other day, were expected to give answers to some questions which have accumulated in Soviet-U.S. relations. The fact that questions do crop up is quite natural and needs no dramatization. But, at the present extremely crucial stage of world development, it is highly desirable that answers should be given to them quickly.

Will Soviet-U.S. cooperation not fall victim to the euphoria which seems to have possessed many people in the United States since the successful completion of Operation Desert Storm?

Does the United States not find itself tempted to secure for itself the status of sole superpower, setting its sights on weakening the USSR internally, and on helping the destructive forces? What are the prospects for cooperation between the two countries in the cause of arms reduction and limitation? Will their efforts in this area be crowned with the signing of a strategic arms treaty? Will there be a pause in the USSR-U.S. dialogue?

These and other similar questions reflect a real concern for the fate of relations which determine so much in the present-day world.

Judging by the detailed report of James Baker's meeting with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev, and by the statements of the U.S. secretary of state and the USSR minister of foreign affairs in contacts with the press, during the visit the sides endeavored to maintain a positive tone. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the two countries' cooperation, after a difficult test in the period of crisis in the Persian Gulf, should continue, without permitting any marking time or pauses.

In order for cooperation to continue, however, there also needs to be clarity with regard to the U.S. attitude to the internal processes in the USSR. James Baker, who had various contacts and meetings in Moscow, including with representatives of the Baltic republics, at the same time, definitely gave it to be understood that the partner in dialogue on the chief issues, which he came to Moscow to discuss, was the Soviet leadership and President Gorbachev.

Evidently, by no means everyone in the U.S. leadership is inclined to believe that following the conflict in the Persian Gulf they can cope alone with the leading role in the Middle East and in other regions. The secretary of state, one must assume, was convinced during his tour of the Middle East about how difficult it will be to realize the new opportunities that have emerged now for a settlement in this region. The Soviet Union has its own possibilities in the area, its own levers of influence, and its traditional partners. The United States recognizes this. One can expect, at least in the Middle Eastern region, that far from there being a pause in Soviet-U.S. cooperation, there are prospects for stepping it up.

The ministers also made a statement on their readiness to assist in solving problems in Central America, in particular in El Salvador. There are certain reassuring signs as regards an Afghan settlement.

Unfortunately, matters remain on which positions evidently failed to be finally established at the talks in Moscow. Among them are the concerns which have arisen with regard to the conventional weapons treaty, as well as the recent technical problems of the strategic offensive weapons treaty. The next few weeks will show whether there are grounds for apprehensions that these problems will become political. This should not be allowed: there is too much at stake.

Baker's Visit With Opposition Highlighted

PM2003152191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 91 p 1

[I. Kadulin report: "They Probably Ate Something..."]

[Text] It has become known to us that when he was visiting Moscow, U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker made an extremely important gesture which was not covered in official accounts in Soviet newspapers.

Despite the traditional U.S. line supporting the "Gorbachev phenomenon," on this occasion the secretary of state invited some "particularly important" political opponents of the USSR president to dinner—Moscow City Soviet Chairman Popov, Leningrad City Soviet Chairman Sobchak, and the disgraced academician Shatalin.

But the real sensation was a dinner invitation for leaders of republics that have declared their intention to break away from the Union. "The Honorable Mr. James Baker III" sent an invitation to Georgian leader Gamsakhurdia, Georgian Premier Sigua, and Armenian Premier Manukyan.

Incidentally, all those who were invited came to dinner.

Meanwhile Richard Nixon, accompanied by one bodyguard, was due to arrive in Moscow 18 March without much publicity. Who, we wonder, will he invite to lunch?

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed us that Mr. Nixon's visit is of a private nature, and he is organizing his own program for his stay.

Analyst Views U.S. Assessments of Unrest

LD2003115991 Moscow TASS in English 1135 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS political analyst Sergey Kolesnikov]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS— When a song about "forebodings of civil war" hit the Soviet charts and a book portraying a military coup in cold Moscow became a bestseller one or two years ago, few believed the dire forecasts could come true.

Today, politicians are openly talking about the threat of a civil conflict. Although most deny it is possible, it is a duty of soberminded people to warn about the consequences—political, economic, and military—of a domestic conflict.

Western analysts are also discussing the possibility of a civil war in the Soviet Union.

On March 18, George Church in an article in TIME magazine wrote that "there is nothing strange in the idea".

Church quoted senior American intelligence officials as saying that there is a "very real" possibility of widespread disorder in the Soviet Union against the background of economic difficulties and splits in political and military structures during "sovereignisation".

Assessments, conclusions and forecasts are a normal part of studying the policy of a partner in international affairs, especially since American sovietology schools have made an important contribution to the understanding of the past and present of Soviet society and the drawing up of a realistic policy with the Soviet Union.

One can agree or argue with such evaluations. One thing draws particular attention in Church's article, however.

"American intervention in a Soviet civil war? The thought sounds even crazier than - oh, say, a suggestion last August 1 that the U.S. might send half a million soldiers, sailors and aviators to the Persian Gulf to fight a war against Iraq," he writes.

"But around the Pentagon and the CIA, the question is by no means dismissed out of hand: circumstances can be foreseen in which the dilemma would at least need to be addressed," Church writes.

It is hard to guess to what extent this suggestion reflects the actual intentions of western ruling circles. U.S. leaders have repeatedly reiterated their adherence to non-interference in Soviet domestic affairs recently.

Leading U.S. politicians, including Secretary of State James Baker who visited Moscow a few days ago, were understanding about the difficulties the reforms faced.

Hopefully, the suggestion in the article is not enough ground for far-reaching conclusions.

Watching developments in the Soviet economy and analysing the opposition's foiling of any constructive steps by the Union leadership, inexplicable in terms of common sense, and devastating labour disputes, foreign politicians are alarmed with the situation and with what could happen in the near future.

Conclusions are of course made for domestic purposes. The above quoted article in TIME cites U.S. national security adviser brent scowcroft, who believes that "given.... The turmoil in the Soviet Union, this is not the time to decide that there is a completely new era and a U.S. presence can be removed from Europe". Destabilisation in the Soviet Union is thus becoming a serious geopolitical factor, influencing the balance of forces in the world.

There is also another dimension to the topic of "civil war in the Soviet Union" discussed in the western press. Some publications on the situation in the Soviet Union often give similar recommendations to western politicians.

They aim to convince Western ruling circles of the necessity to concentrate on contacts with the opposition, use the power and influence of the state to pressure the Soviet government, or even "punish" the Soviet Union for "bad behaviour".

Many Soviet authors in Soviet newspapers and in interviews with western mass media go out of their way to convince the west to cut support for the country's constitutional leaders and look at those who, elbowing others aside, try to legalise their international status.

Some are even ready to say: "come and own us".

Against such a background, slips, like the one in the American magazine, are not surprising. We are left to guess whether U.S. intervention could be a possibility in our land if prescriptions suggested by some rallying speakers are realised.

Or does our society have the ability to move down the reform road without further escalation of tensions, and especially without civil conflicts?

Northeast Asia

Japanese View Kurils Vote as 'Hopeful Sign'

PM2003155591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 91 p 3

[Report by correspondent N. Tsvetkov: "It Is Better to Live in the Land of the Setting Sun; inhabitants of the Southern Kurils on the Problem of the 'Islands of Contention'"]

[Text] Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu has expressed his approval of the results of our referendum, emphasizing that the Soviet people had reaffirmed their confidence in their government. The Japanese were just as interested in a topic which seems very parochial to us—the way the voting went in the most remote of our islands, which in Japan have come to be called the "northern territories"—as they were in the question of whether or not the USSR was to continue to exist. There, alongside the main question, the voters were offered the chance to express their views on the possibility of handing over the islands of Kunashir, Iturup, Shikotan, and Habomai to Japan.

According to preliminary returns coming in from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, the majority of the islands' inhabitants rejected this idea completely.

"That is nothing to worry about," the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs said in reaction to this. "We consider such a result to be completely natural."

It does not bother the Ministry of Home Affairs that 80 percent of the Southern Kurils' inhabitants express their opposition to meeting the Japanese demands. The Japanese stance remains unshakable. In Tokyo they call it a "hopeful sign" that around 20 percent of the voters expressed a different view.

Japanese Group Visits, Discusses Kurils Dispute

Arrives Sakhalin 19 Mar

OW1903185491 Tokyo KYODO in English 1440 GMT 19 Mar 91

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Soviet Union, March 19 KYODO—A mission from Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) arrived in Kholmsk on Tuesday evening for a three-day visit to the Soviet Far East island of Sakhalin.

The mission, headed by Koko Sato, a member of the House of Representatives, arrived on a chartered ship from Hokkaido.

The delegation arrived in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk by car after Sato held talks with Sakhalin officials in Kholmsk.

The focus of the visit is the dispute over four islands off Hokkaido held by the Soviets but claimed by Japan.

The LDP delegation is scheduled to discuss the territorial issue with Sakhalin officials on Wednesday and Thursday.

Japan has long called for the return of the islands, Etorofu [Iturup], Shikotan, Kunashiri [Kunashir] and the Habomais, seized by the Soviets at the end of World War II.

Sakhalin Governor's Offer Rejected

OW2103072391 Tokyo KYODO in English 0502 GMT 21 Mar 91

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhlinsk, Soviet Union, March 21 KYODO—The Governor of Sakhalin Province proposed on Wednesday that the province jointly manage the four disputed islands off Hokkaido with Japan as a free economic zone, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) officials said.

An LDP mission headed by acting party Secretary General Koko Sato turned down the offer of V.P. Federov, governor of the Soviet Far East island.

The governor told the delegation that under the Soviet Union's present social situation, no Soviet leader can manage politics on personal opinion, making it difficult for President Mikhail Gorbachev or Russian President Boris Yeltsin to solve the issue with Japan by individual instruction.

The four disputed islands are under judicial supervision of Sakhalin Province of the Russian Federation.

It is impossible for the Soviet Union to return the controversial islands to Japan without the approval of its people, including residents of the four islands, he said.

A referendum held among residents of the islands earlier in the week saw a large majority oppose their return to Japan.

Fedorov was quoted as saying that if a national referendum on the issue is held in the Soviet Union, the whole country will oppose the return of the islands to Japan, and this could have an adverse influence on bilateral relations.

The governor, who is regarded as being loyal to Yeltsin, said the idea of setting up a free economic zone in the islands is the only realistic measure to settle the issue.

Sato, also a member of the House of Representatives, rejected the proposal, saying he doubts whether residents of the islands know the facts about their history. The Soviet Union seized the islands in the final days of World War II.

Sato said hearing the opinions of residents was not enough and the Soviet Union should have the courage to return the islands to Japan. Fedorov refuted that by saying returning them is tantamount to political suicide in the Soviet Union.

Over 80 percent of voters on the Soviet-held island of Etorofu [Iturup] rejected the idea of its return to Japan in a nonbinding referendum held on Sunday.

More than 70 percent on the three other islands claimed by Japan also responded in the referendum that they did not approve of reverting to Japanese sovereignty.

But 44.1 percent on Etorofu indicated they would prefer to remain on the island even if it was ceded to Japan.

Meanwhile, A.P. Aksynoov, head of the Sakhalin People's Assembly, told the mission he hopes its trip to Sakhalin would pave the way for a successful visit to Japan by Gorbachev in mid-April.

Delegation Urges 'Phased Return'

OW2103124391 Tokyo KYODO in English 1125 GMT 21 Mar 91

[Text] Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk, Soviet Union, March 21 KYODO—Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on Thursday proposed a phased return to Japan of four Soviet-held northern islands, showing a major departure from Tokyo's decades-long call for an en bloc reversion.

LDP Deputy Secretary General Koko Sato, leader of an LDP delegation visiting the Soviet Far East province of Sakhalin, filed the proposal during three hours of faceoff talks with A.P. Aksymouv, head of the Sakhalin People's Assembly, LDP officials said.

The LDP plan contradicts the Foreign Ministry's position demanding an en bloc return of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan Islands, and the Habomai group of islets, located off Japan's northernmost main island of Hokkaido.

The territorial dispute is widely reported to be the focus of summit talks between Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Tokyo in mid-April. Japan has long called for the return en bloc of the islands which the Soviet Union seized immediately after World War II.

Sato's proposal calls for a phased return of the four islands and Japanese economic assistance in return, on condition that the Soviet Union recognizes Japan's sovereignty over the territories, the officials said.

Aksymouv expressed his personal support for Sato's proposal, but told Sato that the government of President Mikhail Gorbachev is hardly likely to accept it. The four disputed islands are under the judicial supervision of Sakhalin Province of the Russian Federation.

Sato, putting forth the four-point plan to the Sakhalin official, proposed that Japan is ready to declare the territories a nonmilitary zone.

It also proposes giving permanent resident status to Soviet residents who wish to stay in the territories or bearing emigration costs for those who wish to leave the islands.

One of the closest aides of former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, Sato also proposed that Japan extend a wide variety of assistance to Sakhalin to help it promote technological development and civilian livelihood, officials said.

While expressing personal support for Sato's package, Aksymouv told the Japanese that residents on the islands and the Soviet people will oppose it.

Aksymouv told Sato that Gorbachev is facing such domestic problems as the moves for independence in the three Baltic republics and coalminers' strikes.

The Sakhalin official was quoted as saying Gorbachev's future would be precarious if he agrees to or shows support for Japan's demand for the return of the islands.

Sato's proposal urges the Soviets to return Shikotan and the Habomais first, and promise to turn over the other two later, delegation sources said.

In the 1956 Japan-Soviet joint declaration, the Soviet Union agreed to return Shikotan and the Habomais once a peace treaty is concluded but retreated from that position four years later because of the signing of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

Sato, who is also a member of the House of Representatives, came to Sakhalin on Tuesday as head of a four-member LDP mission visiting until Friday.

ROK Questions Soviet Ties With North Korea

PM2003133191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Mar 91 First Edition p5

[M. Georgiyev commentary: "Double Standards"]

[Text] Events in the Baltics, continuing conflicts in other republics and regions, and constantly hyped rumors about the imminent assumption of power by the "colonels" in the Soviet Union have apparently greatly dampened the burning desire displayed by some Western politicians to "help Gorbachev" and "assist perestroyka."

Readiness for this turn of events is evidently also the explanation for the rather tough terms on which loans are granted to the Soviet Union. While it can obtain certain amounts of disposable hard currency, Moscow is nevertheless obliged to use a substantial proportion of these loans for clearly defined purposes: the acquisition of very specific commodities from very specific suppliers. Moreover, the actual supplying of credit is often made conditional (not always directly and openly) upon our compliance with a whole series of political conditions.

For example, triumph at the warmer climate in U.S.-Soviet relations certainly used to be the loudest voice in the general chorus. "Radicals" even went as far as intending to abolish the Jackson-Vanik amendment: a law which deprived the Soviet Union of the right to most-favored-nation status in trade on the grounds that Moscow restricted emigration. Because, according to various estimates, some 150,000 Jews alone left for Israel last year, U.S. business gave the "go-ahead" for cooperation with the Soviet Union. But... the situation has changed again. All because of the wave of rumors about growing anti-Semitism, Lithuania, Latvia, Shevardnadze's "warning," and, finally, the "parade of sovereignties," which becomes increasingly ostentatious as more attention is paid to it abroad. So now local princelings are urging foreign investors not to waste time and money on helping Gorbachev and his supposedly doomed programs but to send money directly to regional and local authorities.

You get the impression that our country has lost so much self-respect that it is no longer even capable of reacting properly to the West's doubts about whether to give or not to give. Moreover, this attitude to us is infectious. South Korea is now trying to dictate its political terms to the Soviet Union, although the new partners' "honeymoon" is not yet really over.

According to foreign observers, Seoul was shocked by USSR Deputy Prime Minister Yu. Maslyukov's statement that "the Soviet Union will continue to supply the DPRK with military equipment for defense purposes." A chill immediately sprang up in relations between the two countries. The Republic of Korea's deputy foreign minister summoned the Soviet ambassador in Seoul and expressed his "feeling of regret." The South Korean press was quick to respond, describing this announcement as a "slap in the face" on the very day that Seoul had given assurances of economic aid worth $3 billion.

Will we now receive these South Korean billions? Or are we going to be "punished" again, like naughty schoolboys? If the promised credit does not materialize, what then?

It is hard to agree with Pyongyang's view that our restoration of normal relations with the Republic of Korea will have a negative impact on the settlement process in the Korean peninsula. At the same time, we cannot help but be put on our guard by the tone taken by some mass media which try to present the results of the Soviet-South Korean summit talks in Moscow, for example, as a warning to Pyongyang, among other things. As far as we understand, our treaty relations with the DPRK are not going to be revised simply because they are not to Seoul's liking. We sometimes show far more tolerance in such matters.

For example, South Korea still has a law on state security under which private individuals are forbidden to make contact with North Koreans or visit "communist countries" without the government's permission. They are liable to imprisonment for breaking this law. It is interesting that people are languishing in jail but, for some reason, the "civilized world" does not see this as a violation of human rights and there are no loud protests about the absence of the notorious "freedom of movement." As we are accused of "closing" our society and fearing contacts with progressive Western democracy, what then should be the explanation for Seoul's fears and rigid prohibitions?

If South Korea is so concerned about the Soviet Union's continuing contacts with the DPRK in the military sphere, why does Seoul apply different criteria when it comes to its own programs for building and developing the armed forces?

Amid the euphoria of Soviet-South Korean rapprochement, certain facts, which it appears not to be the done thing to discuss openly, have apparently been "forgotten." For example, there are no Soviet or other foreign troops in the DPRK, whereas many thousands of U.S. military servicemen are stationed in the south of the peninsula. North Korea's implementation of its national nuclear program could, theoretically, create a threat to the region's security. But there are already U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea, which are a source of increased danger in the Asian-Pacific region as a whole.

As we can see, double standards in the assessment of one's own interests and those of others continue to persist in arguments of this kind. It would be very naive not to notice this.

Near East & South Asia

Mideast Sees Reemerging Arab-Israeli Issue

Leads Postwar Agenda

PM2003104191 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Report by IAN Tunis correspondent I. Menshikov: "Too Soon To Bury the PLO? Palestinian Problem Back on Agenda"]

[Text] "Hello, put me through to the leader. Abu-'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], there are reports that Bush is preparing to declare a cease-fire." It is possible that it was from this telephone conversation with his adviser Bassam Abu-Sharif which I happened to witness that Y. 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, first heard the news that had been so long awaited and at the same time was so alarming for him.

Long awaited because in the five months since the night when Iraq had seized Kuwait 'Arafat had been playing a very complex hand in this deadly game. A game which in the upshot cost the lives of four members of the PLO leadership, including that of one of 'Arafat's closest friends and comrades-in-arms, Abu-Iyad.

No one then embraced S. Husayn as tightly in front of the television cameras as 'Arafat, but nor was anyone as persistent in trying to persuade the Iraqi president to make a decision which might have helped to prevent war. In the final days before the expiry of the ultimatum alone he twice flew to Baghdad. It appeared that Saddam Husayn had begun to waver; 'Arafat returned to Tunis, had all kinds of contacts, and in 18 hours was back in front of the Iraqi president again. One word, and Algerian President C. Bendjedid will head for Washington. The hopes were not destined to be realized, however. The words that had flown round the whole world—"There will be no war"—were to remain just a cry in the wilderness.

But 'Arafat's alarm can also be understood. Not even a week passed after the armistice before the world again witnessed the settling of scores with those who for one reason or another the allies classed as having sympathized with Iraq. As the Palestinian leader had been expecting, the PLO became one of the main targets for persecution. For the umpteenth time the world shuddered at scenes of bloody reprisals against Palestinians. Only this time they were being filmed not in the Gaza Strip, but on the streets of liberated Kuwait.

What are the PLO and its 60-year-old leader being reproached for? Primarily the linkage of the Kuwaiti crisis to the Palestinian problem. As he frankly admitted to me in an interview, however, the Palestinians in the occupied territories and in the refugee camps, having already despaired of waiting for justice, demanded that he take this step. At the same time, the fact that the first point in all the Palestinian proposals for a peaceful settlement of the conflict was the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait is deliberately ignored.

Of course, the PLO lost a great deal. The decision of the "Common Market" countries to freeze contacts with the PLO leadership headed by its chairman was an extremely alarming signal. After all, it was on Europe that 'Arafat had always pinned his main hopes in his plan to win over the United States and Israel to a political solution of the Palestinian problem. U.S.-Palestinian relations are still "zero" and have now taken the form of a U.S. attempt to completely remove the PLO from any settlement in the region.

Is it not too soon to sound the requiem for the PLO, is this not just wishful thinking? "Reports of the death of the PLO are premature," American journalist Rita E. Hauser writes. It is difficult not to agree with her.

Despite expectations, calm and good sense reign at PLO headquarters. "For the umpteenth time our opponents are trying to discredit the PLO and its leadership in order to close the 'Palestinian file' forever," Bassam Abu-Sharif says. "Here they are losing sight of the indisputable truth that as long as the Palestinian Arab people exist the political organization expressing their desire for freedom and independence will exist also."

Marwan al-Kanafani, another political adviser to Y. 'Arafat responsible for the Western sphere in PLO policy, is even more optimistic. "The Gulf crisis graphically demonstrated that strategic interests link the United States and its allies with the Arab world, which possesses huge oil riches, to a greater extent than with Israel." If you ponder what can inwardly reconcile Arabs with the United States and its allies after all the horrors of the recent war, only one answer comes to mind—the just solution of the Palestinian problem on the basis of the corresponding UN resolutions.

The recent speech by President Mitterrand of France in favor of the swiftest possible solution of the Palestinian problem and the realization of the Palestinians' rights to a homeland and a national state shows that understanding of this is now growing in Europe. Traditional links and close economic collaboration with the countries of North Africa and the Near East demand the swiftest possible settlement of all mutual grievances.

However paradoxical it might appear, the Arab regimes which participated in the anti-Iraq coalition are even more dependent on the "Palestinian card" in the long term. "After the withdrawal of U.S. troops, our Arab friends may hang on longer than the Vietnamese, but not much longer," American expert J.E. Akins considers. For them to survive they must restore relations not only with the Arab public as a whole, but also with their own population.

Only time will tell how correct particular decisions by the PLO leadership were. But one thing is obvious—the Palestinian problem is back on the agenda, back at the center of the world community's attention, which is an extremely important point in itself.

Settlement Plan Viewed

LD2003172191 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Yuriy Solton commentary]

[Text] The Soviet Union has revealed the details of its plan for a settlement in the Near and Middle East contained in President Mikhail Gorbachev's message to the leaders of Arab countries. The United States Secretary of State James Baker familiarized himself with the plan during his visit to Moscow at the end of last week. Radio Moscow's commentator Yuriy Solton now considers some aspects of the Soviet plan:

Now that the war is over, it is clear that the Soviet Union has retained friendly relations with many Arab states and earned respect on the part of the members of the anti-Iraq coalition. Naturally, it cannot be indifferent to postwar settlement. The idea that peace cannot be established in the region by force is central to the Soviet plan. As a matter of fact, Moscow has warned everybody against any attempts to use the victory over Iraq for one's own selfish purposes.

Normalization in the region would be impossible without the observance of such principles as noninterference and the recognition of the rights of all countries of the region, including Iraq and Israel, to sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Soviet Union is convinced that a key role must be played by the countries situated in the region. This does not rule out the participation of those countries that are not directly linked with the region but have been making tangible contributions to maintaining peace and stability there.

One of the main lessons to be derived from the Persian Gulf crisis is that the arms race in the Middle and Near East must be curbed. In principle it would be worth cutting the military potentials to a size sufficient only for defense and in any case the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological—must be ruled out.

Moscow supports the idea of turning the Middle East into a zone free from such weapons. Iraq had the potential to produce weapons of mass destruction before the war, and Israel has it now. Other countries can receive such weapons, as well as tanks, rockets and aircraft, only from abroad. To prevent another armed conflict, the shipments of arms, in the first place of offensive weapons, to the countries of the region must be restricted.

The Soviet Union was one of the main sellers of arms to Iraq. Today Moscow has called for studying in earnest the possibility of balanced cuts in arms shipments to that region. Many countries, including the United States, have said they are for this. The facts point in the opposite direction, however. The United States is going to sell big amounts of sophisticated military hardware to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. The United States Defense Secretary Dick Cheney has told Congress that the United States cannot leave defenseless its strategic allies, including Israel, and that that is a goal far more important to it than an embargo on arms deliveries to the region.

Is this not fraught with the risk of another spiral of the arms race in the region?

One more important element of the Soviet plan: Moscow believes that foreign military presence in the region must be no higher than the level of 1 August last year. In case of a need for military support for the settlement and for the freedom of shipping in the Persian Gulf it will be possible to use naval forces flying the United Nations flag.

In general Moscow believes that the United Nations, which has proved capable of presenting a common front against any aggression, must also act as the main safeguard of the postwar settlement in the Middle East, including the Arab-Israeli part of the conflict.

Flexibility Urged

LD2003100491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1541 GMT 19 Mar 91

[By TASS international observer Yuriy Tyssovskiy]

[Text] As admitted by international observers, the victory by the allied coalition over Iraq has created favorable conditions for an offensive on a previously impregnable fortress, the Middle East problem. State figures in many countries are planning their actions proceeding from this. U.S. Secretary of State James Baker immediately after the victory in "the war of 100 hours" headed for the Middle East and visited Moscow and Ankara. At the same time, U.S. President George Bush had meetings with Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, French President Francois Mitterand, and British Prime Minister John Major. A postwar settlement in the Middle East region and a quick and comprehensive solution of its difficult problems were being discussed everywhere. To some extent Baker found mutual understanding at his talks with Arab leaders, which cannot be said about his contacts with Tel Aviv.

On 17 March an official spokesman for the Israeli Government announced that Tel Aviv is ready to discuss with the Syrian side any questions, including territorial demands, and to pursue a peace strategy vis-a-vis its Arab neighbors, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Syria. With each of these countries, he stressed, Israeli representatives are ready to sit at the negotiating table to make peace immediately and are prepared to get in contact with "the appropriate Palestinian representatives," but not with the PLO, with the aim of solving necessary issues.

Many interpreted this position, as it is now commonly said, with "reserved optimism." But only 24 hours later official Israel deemed it necessary to pour cold water on the hopes that had arisen. Moreover Yitzhaq Shamir, very rigidly disavowed the statement made by the "official spokesman." He declared meaningless any talks with Syria and also rejected the idea itself of contacts even with those "moderate Palestinians" with whom Baker recently met. Another "superhawk"—Ariel Sharon—promised to double the number of Jewish colonists on the occupied Golan Heights.

Such sharp eccentricities in Tel Aviv policy are making it increasingly obvious that the ambitious dreams of the U.S. President to ride on the white horse of victory into a peaceful Middle East could founder on the stubborness of a long-standing "strategic ally" in this region. It seems that Shamir, resticted by the armor of past stereotypes, is not open to persuasion.

The Israelis like to take their high-ranking guests to those "narrow" parts of the country situated near the borders with neighboring Arab states to demonstrate the "vulnerability" of Israel to attacks from outside. The U.S. secretary of state did not avoid this, either. I do not know what he told his Israeli counterparts concerning this, but their "security concept" itself has become hopelessly obsolete. The war in the Persian Gulf only confirmed this—the Iraqi Scuds, which fell on Tel Aviv, Haifa, and other towns of "the Promised Land," showed how vulnerable its population is in a modern war. If the problems of the Middle East, including the Palestinian one, remain unresolved, it will lead to another spiral of hatred and hostility and a possible appearance of new Saddam Husayns in the region who possess a more fatal weapon that Scuds. Advocates of "the hard line" in Tel Aviv should think it over in the first place. Peace and good-neighborliness and security guarantees—ultimately only they can provide normal conditions of life and calm for the Israeli people.

No Resolution Foreseen

PM2003161791 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

["Political Observer's Opinion" by Aleksandr Bovin: "Do No Harm!"]

[Text] People in Washington, just as in Moscow, realize that a steady, long-term stabilization in the Near East—stabilization which is probably more important to Washington (Israel! Plus oil!!) than to Moscow—demands that a way out of the Arab-Israeli conflict be found. Therefore the stopping of Baghdad's aggressive policy and the defeat of Iraq, in which the United States played the chief role, are important to the Americans not just in themselves. It is necessary to go further. At any rate, they believe that quite a wide passage has been created through the dense minefield of the Near East conflict. The first person to decide to take advantage of this passage has been U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker.

Let us give the secretary of state his due. He has done great work of some value. Taught by the bitter experience of his predecessors, Baker did not take with him a comprehensive, minutely detailed plan for a peace settlement. It is the task of the sides in conflict to achieve such a plan. Baker did take the main principle of a settlement—an exchange of territories for peace. Israel returns the occupied lands, and in exchange the Arabs conclude peace with Israel and guarantee its security. So as not to exacerbate the situation and pull the knot tighter, the secretary of state urged Israel not to construct settlements on occupied territory, not to expel Palestinians who participated in the riots, not to arrest them without trial, and to announce that in the future Israel does not rule out a withdrawal from the occupied territories if this will bring peace.

From the Americans' viewpoint, direct Israeli talks with the Arab states and Palestinians would be the best method of achieving a settlement. These, discounting the eloquence, were the contents of J. Baker's briefcase. A classic U.S. principle, so to speak, which has been used repeatedly....

I will now try to reconstruct Washington's ideas on the changes in the situation which have arisen since (as a result of) the Kuwaiti crisis and which are conducive to the search for lasting peace.

1. U.S. prestige and influence and, accordingly, the weight of its advice and recommendations have increased sharply. Baker had a right to reckon that his usual interlocutors would be more attentive and obliging.

2. Iraq is out of the game for a long time to come. Both as an aspirant to the leading role in the Arab world and as one of Israel's most zealous and implacable enemies. This, you might think, must mollify the positions of the Israeli "hawks" and strengthen the willingness to compromise.

3. The level of mutual understanding between the United States and Syria has risen—which could, in the long term, prompt Damascus into talks with Tel Aviv.

4. There has been an appreciable fall in the political stock of Y. 'Arafat, who supported S. Husayn unconditionally, even encouraging the use of Scud missiles against Israel. Disagreements and confusion have intensified within the PLO. In Kuwait, where Palestinians occupied a prominent place in public life, they are now being subjected to mass persecution and arrests. Some 5,000 Palestinians have already been expelled to Jordan. Hope has emerged in some quarters of depriving the PLO of its status as the Palestinians' sole representative and "bringing to light" new, more compliant and flexible leaders for the Palestinian movement.

5. Israel, by refraining from retaliating with bombing strikes against Iraq, displayed restraint and the ability to assess the situation from a long-term viewpoint. On the other hand, the Iraqi missile explosions on Israeli territory showed how ephemeral are the traditional ideas of the country's security; under modern conditions security does not mean an additional "slice" of territory but the ability to make a counterstrike. On yet another hand, after Israel went along with the Americans and did not muddle the cards of the anti-Iraq game, it is quite hard for Baker to pressure his Israeli friends.

In general, Washington had real grounds for believing that the ice had begun to crack and that, as J. Baker remarked, signs of a "new thinking" were being detected, that a "window of opportunity" was being opened slightly, and that both Jews and Arabs would allow themselves to leave the long-occupied trenches of the endless and senseless confrontation and to begin a businesslike discussion.

This has not happened. There is no denying that the United States has really never before had such powerful levers for influencing the situation as it has now. However, the inertia of the established relations and ideas has proved stronger even than the thorough shake-up caused by the Kuwaiti crisis. The "Desert Storm" is past. The sand has settled. Much is returning to the way it was before. Including, unfortunately, the mutual intransigence of Israel and the Arabs who surround it.

In Israel it was explained politely yet firmly to J. Baker that both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are inalienable parts of Israel and that the construction of settlements will continue. Israel will not talk with the PLO. As regards talks with "other" Palestinians and Arab states, Israel is ready to begin them tomorrow, but without any prior conditions.

In their turn, Palestinian figures from the occupied territories who participated in a meeting with Baker conveyed to him their own platform for talks, so to speak. To judge from a report in the AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT newspaper, it includes the following:

the granting to the Palestinian people of the right to determine their own destiny and to create an independent state; the implementation of the "peace program" adopted at the 19th Palestine National Council Session; the application of the norms of international law to the Palestinian problem and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; the fulfillment of the UN resolutions underlining the Palestinian people's national rights to independence and to determine their own destiny and prescribing the "annulment of all measures with regard to occupation, annexation, Judaization, and colonization";
the PLO as the Palestinians' sole legitimate representative.

Thus the positions of Israel and the Palestinians are incompatible. Consequently, there is no way out of the Israeli-Arab impasse in the foreseeable future. At any rate, I cannot see one.

Under such conditions an international conference creates only a semblance of diplomatic activity, because essentially it will not be able to resolve anything.

Theoretically the "Iraqi option" still exists—the use of force to fulfill the UN decisions. But this option is prohibited in practice, because it presupposes the absence of objections from the permanent members of the UN Security Council. I will venture to suggest that there will be no lack of such objections in this case.

What now? Israel will gradually rid itself of its immigrant mentality, slough off its theocratic skin, overcome its complex of superiority over the Arabs, and, on this basis, destroy the wall of hatred surrounding the country.

The Palestinians living in the occupied lands will continue the struggle. It would be immoral to dissuade them, to urge them to be submissive. But the calls for recalcitrance issuing from Palestinians who live hundreds or thousands of kilometers from Palestine are clearly equally immoral. The latter will continue their diaspora, filled not only with zeal for the interests of the Palestinian people but also with petty intrigue and squabbling, and seeking and replacing benefactors.

The Americans will consider Israel's maximum security one of the chief priorities in their policy and will push the Arabs to recognize Israel. West Europe will pursue approximately the same line, but accentuating the Arab states' interests, in words more often than action.

The Arabs will take a long and agonizing time getting used to the idea that Israel is firmly there forever and that, just by recognizing Israel's right to exist, it is possible to reckon on peaceful coexistence with it—which is also beneficial to Arab interests.

The Soviet Union will, I hope, continue equalizing and balancing its Near East policy, placing at its center not Palestinian, nor Israeli, nor U.S. interests but our interests and ours alone. Our interests require the restoration of diplomatic relations with Israel to be seen through to the end—without any reservations or conditions. Our interests demand even, mutually respectful, honest relations with the Arabs—without playing the game to lose and without giving in to them. Our interests demand firm support for the Palestinians' right to self-determination, but it must not be forgotten that this is, after all, their right and not ours.

It is the interweaving and interaction of all the enumerated and many other interests and foreign policy courses that constitutes the real picture of the Near East crisis. The overall development of the system of international relations toward the formation of a new world order will stimulate the accumulation of positive shifts in that region. History is slowly but thoroughly preparing the ground for peace to prevail in Palestine.

But, meanwhile, when approaching, let alone touching the wounds of the Near East, politicians must remember the Hippocratic oath: "Do no harm!"

Potential Gulf War Repercussions, Threats Viewed

91UM0476A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 10, 8 Mar 91 p 12

[Observer Gennadiy Gerasimov "At the End of the Week" column: "War in Pursuit"]

[Text] Recently in this column I maintained, citing authorities and agreeing with them, that wars are not won from the air and that ground transport is needed for the wings of victory. A difficult, bloody ground war, which it would be well to prevent, was coming in the Persian Gulf.

I confess the mistake in the forecast. I would note in mitigation that the author was in influential company here. The specialized DEFENSE AND DIPLOMACY publication, with the subtitle of "Journal for World Leaders," had written in the final issue for last year, for example: "While the air war may be won with relative ease, the ground battle will cause problems unless the United States has considerable armored power."

This power was amassed, but it was barely needed. The Iraqi "Guard" surrendered to journalists even.

All this came as a pleasant surprise. We would recall that General Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the internation coalition force, had himself constantly warned against euphoria and expectation of a easy victory.

Which he in fact obtained.

In the quiet that has descended it is time to ponder the lessons of the war.

First, to ponder the role of air defenses, particularly against missiles of a low-angle trajectory checking their flight against a terrain map embedded in their "memory," circumventing obstacles and moving accurately toward the selected victim. Fifty of the 51 sea-launched Tomahawk missiles fired at the start of the war hit their target. They cost over a million each, but the missile passed its baptism of fire, as did another, the Patriot, highly praised by the press. This antimissile missile shot down the Scud missiles like an accurate skeet shooter shoots down clay pigeons.

One further praiseworthy weapon is the high-speed antiradar HARM missile "taught" to locate and destroy working radar installations.

So the failure of Iraq's air defenses led to defeat. Are sufficiently effective air defenses possible today?

Second, the end of the war invites reflection also on the role of tanks in the future. For the reason indicated above large-scale tank battles did not eventuate. Nor did it even come to hand-to-hand fighting. The air attacks had the enemy on the ropes and had him groggy, as they say in boxing.

Third, the so-called "peace dividend" from an improvement in the world situation and disarmament negotiations even could prove casualties of the war. The NEW YORKER magazine wrote: "Saddam Husayn's aggression has, it would seem, made the world safe for a continuation of the Pentagon's astronomical budgets." Yet just two days prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait officials in the U.S. Defense Department had notified journalists of a plan for a 10 percent reduction in the military budget over the next five years. Secretary Richard Cheney and Colin Powell, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had presented to President George Bush proposals for a 500,000-man reduction in the armed forces by the mid-1990's. The outcome of the war will most likely make adjustments here.

The corporations connected with electronics are the biggest winners. During the war the Pentagon was already pushing Raytheon to speed up the shipment of Patriot missiles. The General Dynamics and McDonell-Douglas corporations manufacturing the Tomahawk missiles are quite happy. And so forth.

On the other hand, it is by no means obligatory from the viewpoint of military organizational development to race after quantity in respect of the weapons of new quality. It is simply that changes are coming in this development in the light of the results of the desert campaign.

They threaten a new ruinous twist of the arms race spiral. The expert Theodore Gold writes in the magazine WORLD LINK: "In a number of areas the achievements are so revolutionary that we can only make a very approximate guess at the consequences." He writes about the possibilities of the creation of missiles with inexpensive but powerful engines with an inertial guidance system based on a location-finding global satellite system affording an opportunity for the accurate destruction of the most remote targets. Gold even conjectures that the Soviet peace initiatives reflect primarily our "nervousness over the military consequences of the emerging technology gap."

But is military competition necessary in that "new world order" for the sake of whose creation Desert Storm officially burst?

Committee Deplores Postwar Events in Iraq

LD1903185391 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 19 Mar 91

[Text] Dear listeners, a statement by the Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity has been circulated in Moscow concerning events in Iraq. We have contacted by telephone the secretary of the committee, Anatoliy Iliyin, and asked him to acquaint our listeners with the text of this statement:

The statement says that members of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Movement in the Soviet Union have received with pain in their hearts the news emanating from Iraq.

In August 1990 the Soviet Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity deplored the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and warned that the Iraqi people would be the victim of that adventure. During the Gulf war the committee did its utmost to insure that the outcome of the war be of minimum harshness on the Iraqi and Kuwaiti peoples. It has, all along, invited both sides to search for peaceful solutions to the conflict. The war has now ended and the entire world has received with satisfaction the news of the liberation of Kuwait. Recent news from Iraq indicates that the sufferings of the Iraqi people have not ended yet. The suffering Iraqi people have the right to hope to develop their country democratically and to see that fundamental and inalienable human rights and freedoms are respected. They are once again faced with cruelty and bloodshed, however.

The Soviets express their deep sympathy with the Iraqi people and their confidence that peace, democracy, and good will finally prevail in the ancient land of Iraq.

East Europe

Kvitsinskiy Interviewed on East European Relations

PM2003150191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
18 Mar 91 Second Edition p 7

[PRAVDA interview with Yu.A. Kvitsinskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister; date, place not given: "Eastern Europe: What Comes After the Changes"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] At the recent session of the USSR Foreign Ministry collegium one item on the agenda was the countries of Eastern Europe. Why was it there?

[Kvitsinskiy] We are talking about countries which are our neighbors in the west and in the southwest. So relations with this group of states—for that very reason—must be of central importance to our foreign policy. Moreover, all these countries went through profound internal evolution during the tumultuous 1989-1990 period. They are not what they were even a couple of years ago. Times have changed. Although, of course, there is no question of the countries returning to the situation that existed in, for example, the twenties or thirties. I say this because there are many politicians there who were originally thinking along precisely those lines. It is an illusion. As you know, following the restoration of the French monarchy, many people also thought that everything would go back to what it was before. But, in fact, there never was a return to the conditions prior to the 1789 revolution, nor could there have been. History does not repeat itself; it marches on. Now we—on both sides—have to reflect on the fact that changes occur, but there are some basic things that have been established over the decades and have shaped the lives and outlook of millions of people, which will create a strong link between us and our neighbors, whatever the arrangement of internal forces.

Is that good or bad? It is good, of course. So our relations with these countries, for a wide range of objective reasons, have to be programed for good-neighborliness and cooperation. Of course, there have been and certainly will be many efforts to refute this objective necessity, to engage in political bargaining, to use the present crucial period to steal a march by using populist slogans and resurrecting old anti-Russian or anti-Soviet stereotypes. But I am sure there is no future in such efforts. History has sentenced us to be good neighbors and to cherish the assets of cooperation, trust, economic collaboration, cultural proximity, and interpenetration that have been earned over the centuries. Of course, a new policy is needed with regard to the East European countries, one that takes full account of the changes that have occurred. But it must be a constructive policy that incorporates all the positive elements from the past and is geared to the active exploitation of the vast potential for creating a qualitatively new architecture of relations with these countries. Our East European partners are also feeling an ever growing need for such an approach. In short, a well-thought-out and integral concept is needed for the development of relations with the countries of Eastern Europe in the new conditions. This was discussed at the collegium session.

[PRAVDA] What new things did the collegium have to say about these issues?

[Kvitsinskiy] Many interesting observations, assessments, and forecasts were made at the session. The debate was greatly enriched by the participation of Ambassadors Yu.B. Kashlev, B.D. Pankin, I.P. Aboimov, F.P. Bogdanov, V.V. Sharapov, and V.P. Loginov. They are all new to their posts, people with new views, enthusiasts. But the problems they face are complex ones, demanding unorthodox approaches, combined efforts by many departments, and very active work at all levels—from the top to the ordinary diplomat and executive. Indeed, the point is that relations with Poland, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia really cannot be categorized as purely "diplomatic." In terms of the extent of the involvement of broad strata of people in them—whether you take trade, scientific and technical, cultural, tourist or municipal links—they surpass, of course, the USSR's relations with many other countries. Consequently, any hiccups or problems in this area are soon bound to be felt in the domestic life of the participating sides and become acute questions of state policy. Therefore, for example, the question of what kind of new political treaties to have between the USSR and its neighbors on the western border has a most direct bearing on our country's security conditions, on economic affairs in the USSR, on the westward movement of our goods and citizens, and on normal cultural, scientific, tourist, and, indeed, our citizens' basic human contacts. Vigorous action is needed here, as the old treaty base does not correspond to the new conditions.

Or take the question of the transition to accountability and a freely convertible currency. An idea that is certainly essentially correct and necessary. But the question arises: Will the economic mechanism be fully operational straight away on this basis, when both sides have goods, but there is no convertible currency? Should one not be thinking of adaptive measures that can ensure a smooth transition and avoid destroying the ramified and very useful links, above all those involving coproduction? If they were destroyed in fact, the consequences could be dire. Incidentally, they are already beginning to be felt. In short, there is food for thought here for economic organs on both sides.

You have, so to speak, the common problems of the region. There is also a multitude of bilateral matters and problems that are equally significant and complex. What about, for example, the simple question of our troops passing through Poland on the way from Germany. The sides' positions on this subject diverge, but it absolutely must be resolved, on a mutually acceptable basis, moreover.

[PRAVDA] What can you say about the "demise" of the Warsaw Pact Organization?

[Kvitsinskiy] The Warsaw Pact Organization could not continue to exist in its old form, of course, following the profound changes that took place in Europe. This was clear during the previous Political Consultative Committee conference last June. It was then that a conscious and undoubtedly correct decision was made to wind down the organization's military structures as the process of the institutionalization of European security and cooperation develops. Since then German unification has happened and we have seen the signing of the "two-plus-four" treaty and the "grand" Soviet-German treaty, which guaranteed the final shape of the German borders and the special military-political status of GDR territory, set a numerical ceiling for the German Army of 370,000 men, and sealed a commitment to nonagression and nonassistance to an aggressor. A declaration was signed in Paris by 22 NATO and Warsaw Pact states to the effect that they will no longer regard one another as enemies. A treaty was concluded on conventional armed forces in Europe, which ensures the most radical reduction of them in the continent's history to agreed levels, combined with measures to make military activity in Europe "transparent."

On 25 February the Political Consultative Committee conference in Budapest took the following step: The Warsaw Pact military organization will be disbanded by 31 March. We, that is, the members of the Warsaw Pact, are, of course, a step ahead of NATO here. There are people who say that NATO is in no hurry to follow this example. One thing is certain, however: Our step is in line with the main trend that currently determines the development of affairs in Europe. Making forecasts in politics is, of course, a thankless task. It is obvious, however, that the processes taking place in the Warsaw Pact are bound to affect the structure and very nature of NATO, whatever the organization's Brussels headquarters may say or think about it. It must not be forgotten, either, that the process of the breakup of the NATO structures began much earlier than in the Warsaw Pact Organization. It was the NATO military organization that was the first to lose a member. France left back in the sixties. Look at the variety of approaches to the stationing of nuclear weapons adopted by the possessors of them in the organization, and, consequently, their strategic position and relationship with the center. It is just that NATO started before us and is therefore in a somewhat different position, but the roots of the processes occurring in the two organizations are certainly fundamentally of the same type, and they are bound to put forth shoots. Ultimately it is a matter of time and external conditions.

As for the future of the Warsaw Pact, as is known, many of our allies are quite definitely in favor of its disbandment in the not so distant future. I believe that one must take a calm look at this, not view what is happening from the standpoint of past years, but interpret the situation in the light of the new realities and the fundamental, timeless interests of our state. I do not believe that the Soviet Union's security strictly depends on the support of, for instance, the Hungarian and Czechoslovak Armies. I do not believe that in present conditions our defense of their western borders is essential to either them or us. All this offers the opportunity for the thorough transformation of the old relations within the framework of the Warsaw Pact, which is moving further along the road to becoming a political consultative entity. But, by and large, the future lies, of course, in a consistent shift of emphasis to bilateral cooperation.

[PRAVDA] How do you view the priorities in our relations with countries of the East European region?

[Kvitsinskiy] Of course, our policy has its priorities. They are determined both by current demands and by long-termm interests. I will begin with the economy. At the moment it is, perhaps, the most acute question in relations with all the countries in that region. The multifaceted and intensive links that used to exist are significantly out of trim, our balance of payments deficit is growing rapidly, we are significantly undersupplying energy resources and other products to neighboring European countries and, in turn, we are receiving considerably fewer goods that are essential to us than in past years, including consumer goods, medicines, and spare parts. The situation must be rectified through joint efforts, because hiccups in economic cooperation always migrate to the political sphere if not eliminated.

Another major theme is the switch to a new treaty base for our relations, including political and military. It is clear that this question is rather complex and multifaceted. Rapid processes of differentiation are taking place in the group of East European countries; each of them is redefining its interests and priorities and is seeking its place in the family of European countries and in the structures of cooperation at the general continental, regional, and bilateral levels. There is a whole series of problems which were pushed into the background in the old conditions and were, as a result, under control, but are now bursting to the surface. I will mention in this connection just the question of ethnic minorities, which is often found in direct proximity to such explosive questions as territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. By and large, as we shape the new treaty base of relations with our East European neighbors, we are not confronted with cheerless uniformity. Most likely, the volume, intensity, and purpose of cooperation will be different in each case, corresponding to the two partners' specific interests and their actual potential and objective position in the European landscape. For all that, the fundamental interests of our western borders must be insured, of course, and the algorithms of lasting, broad cooperation in as many areas as possible must be established for decades to come.

It is difficult, of course, to cover the whole question of priorities in a brief interview. I must mention another question which is being actively discussed in our press. Unfortunately, often those citizens who were engaged in active state and political work in former years and did a great deal to develop cooperation with the Soviet Union are now being unjustly persecuted, are being deprived of the right to work in their own profession, and are being subjected to moral terror. Needless to say, this does not tally with the pledges to ensure respect for human rights that all the coujntries involved in the CSCE process have made. Of course, these facts are not the best visitng card either for those who achieved national office wielding slogans proclaiming pluralism, democracy, and tolerance of dissidents, and then decided that all this can be forgotten. Sometimes people object to this, saying that there are also the emotions and demands of the political power struggle. But emotions are one thing; the law must be the law. Either it is one law for all, or no law at all. In short, the persecution of dissidents and the war against momuments and the memory of the past, and articles by zealous hacks, primed with the poison of russophobia and anti-Sovietism, sometimes impede the solution of the really urgent questions of progress toward a new level of mutual understanding and cooperation. The removal of this barrier is another of today's important priorities.

West Europe

Controversy Continues on Honecker's Moscow Trip

Secrecy Questioned

PM2003121991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 5

[Report by A. Korzun under the general heading "Is One Old Friend Better than Two New Friends?:" "A Patient by the name of Honecker"]

[Excerpts] The newspaper BILD was the first to publish the sensational news that E. Honecker had been brought to Moscow on Wednesday. On Thursday, the Western Group of Soviet Forces Command was forced to issue a brief statement: "Following a sharp decline in his state of health, and out of humane considerations, Erich Honecker has been moved to the Soviet Union for treatment." [passage omitted]

So why is Erich Honecker in the Soviet Union? Shortly after assuming his post, Foreign Minister (not health minister) Aleksandr Bessmertnykh prepared us for the arrival of this important guest by skillfully mentioning as early as December last year that Honecker needs constant medical care. It would seem, he needs this care in the very same country where people scrimp and save to scrape up enough hard currency to send child victims of Chernobyl to Germany for treatment.

Major Sergey Oprishenko, duty officer at the USSR Defense Ministry Central Military Medical Directorate, categorically declared that "Erich Honecker is not in military hospitals." I was given the same information by the duty officer at the USSR KGB Medical Directorate. At what used to be the Fourth Directorate's Central Hospital I was assured that "no patient by the name of Honecker" was registered with them.

Colonel Leonid Los, Western Group of Soviet Forces Press Center aide, told me from Germany: "I would advise you not to waste time looking for Honecker. His life is in danger."

Then I do not understand why we cannot ask the physician on the case just how seriously sick our foreign patient is.

Clearly the only possible justification for Honecker's urgent evacuation to Moscow is fear, on the part of those Soviet politicians who came to power in the years of great interstate stagnant admiration, of how he might testify in court. Remember the disclosures by another "former" ruler, this time Bulgaria's Todor Zhivkov, when he was in the dock. His revelations had major repercussions not just for Bulgaria but for Western countries, too.

As far as relations between the Soviet Union and the GDR are concerned, it seems to me that Erich Honecker could reveal information of unimaginable interest.

Citing the West German weekly WELT AM SONNTAG, AFP seems to suggest that Honecker "blackmailed the Soviet leadership," promising to testify in court to "the Kremlin's equal responsibility" for any charges brought against him and to produce documents to prove that he was directly carrying out Soviet orders on how to deal with fugitives.

It is not clear how much Honecker himself has gained by opting through emigration for a life sentence of secrecy in a nomenklatura guest house as opposed a life sentence in a prison in his homeland (the death penalty has been abolished in the FRG). Now, unfortunately, the issue is not his future but rather to what extent the arrival in the USSR of such a prominent object of investigation facing such serious charges may undermine our country's already greatly reduced international credibility.

One of Honecker's lawyers, Friedrich Wolf, suggested in an interview with the weekly BILD AM SONNTAG that his client was in Moscow thanks to the "existence of a secret treaty" between the two countries. Meanwhile, on the eve of his departure for the Soviet Union for talks, FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher gave Bonn's official view, saying that Honecker must be deported to Germany without delay, although admittedly he did not dwell on how this international scandal will affect relations between our two countries in the event of a refusal to comply with this demand.

On the other hand, Dieter Fogel, chief of the Federal Press Department, was more categorical in his statement on Berlin Radio, saying that Honecker's transfer to Moscow casts "a shadow over Soviet-German relations." Klaus Kinkel, federal minister of justice, hit the nail on the head when he stressed that "Soviet-German treaties are not agreements between two banana republics."

True, in world practice there are cases where asylum is offered to dictators from countries whose people have opted for a different path toward development, and naturally this inflicts considerable damage on relations between the states involved. But in the given situation, is it worth the Soviet Union altering its new, civilized relations with a united Germany by acting in the old and, alas, unforgotten ways, especially when the FRG has not yet ratified part of the intergovernmental treaties?

Maybe people will object to my argument by saying that we are talking about a sick man. Then there is no need for the doctors to avoid the press. Questions could be answered.

Legality Causes 'Sensation'

PM2003132391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by V. Lapskiy: "Fanning Passions; After Honecker's Sudden Move to Moscow"]

[Text] Berlin—The name of 78-year-old Erich Honecker, who you might think had been forgotten by everyone in the everyday troubles and political turmoil, is today once again on the lips of Germans. His name never leaves the newspapers' front pages.

As is known, until recently the former general secretary of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany Central Committee and chairman of the GDR Council of State was being treated in the Soviet military hospital in the small town of Behlitz near Berlin. His condition was grave. He was admitted there at the beginning of last April on strictly humanitarian grounds. Previously to this, driven from everywhere and without his own corner or roof over his head, he had been wandering from church refuge to church refuge together with his wife Margot, arousing compassion and bewilderment: Can a sense of vengeance really stifle people's reason?

On 30 July last year an international commission of experts examined Honecker and acknowledged that, for health reasons, he could not be arrested. It informed the then GDR Ministry of Health of that. The day before the unification of Germany GDR General Prosecutor Guenter Seidel passed the materials of the investigation into Honecker's case, which run to a total of more than 500 volumes, to FRG General Prosecutor Alexander von Stahl.

Last December Berlin justice organs issued an order for his arrest and trial: Honecker was said to be personally responsible for the killing of those GDR citizens who attempted to cross the German-German border, of whom there were 190.

After a while the Berlin court authorities demanded that Honecker be handed over to German justice. On 6 March the Berlin Court of Appeal confirmed the order for Honecker's arrest.

Then, a few days ago, a sensation: Honecker is in the Soviet Union. It followed from the brief report carried on Soviet television and received here that the worsened condition of the former general secretary necessitated specialized treatment, and he has now been admitted to a Moscow clinic. No details or commentary.

On the other hand, an avalanche of materials in this regard has swept through the pages of the Berlin press. They are certainly not all couched in the same key, and not every commentator calls Honecker's sudden move to Moscow a "flight."

Far harsher commentaries have appeared, however. The newspaper TAGESSPIEGEL, for example, writes: "Of course, it is necessary to show humanity toward an aged, sick man—but what kind of humanity? This question must be resolved by a German court in accordance with its own codes, not by Moscow circles, which wanted to use archaic methods."

Television commentaries underline the idea that the sending of Honecker to Moscow casts the first shadow over German-Soviet relations.

The government in Bonn has also reacted. This instance is a violation of international law and runs counter to the agreements concluded between the two countries, it declared, demanding Honecker's return to Germany without delay. Federal Government spokesman Dieter Vogel alleged that "there are forces in the Soviet leadership which would like to make the ratification of the German-Soviet agreements dependent on whether Honecker is handed over to German justice."

It has just been learned that Wolf, one of Honecker's attorneys, is making efforts to transfer his defendant's money to Moscow from an account which has been sequestered here. In all, there are 177,000 marks in the bank account. In addition, he is trying to send to the Soviet Union the Wartburg economy car belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Honecker. According to Wolf, his defendant does not intend to remain in Moscow forever but would like to move with his wife to Chile, where he has a daughter married to a Chilean and also grandchildren. The attorney described as "hypocrisy" the indignation of the German press at Honecker's departure for the Soviet Union: People in Germany "knew of the Soviet intentions and long ago tacitly approved them."

Prospects for Cooperation With Turkey Examined

91UF0564A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 91 Second Edition p 5

[Article by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "Black Sea Integration"]

[Text] **This word combination was heard recently in the Kremlin at the meeting of the presidents of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey. The official visit of the head of the 60 million-strong state is an excuse for recalling that, like our other southern neighbors—**

Afghanistan and Iran—Turkey was once one of Soviet Russia's leading partners in the international arena. Following proclamation of the republic, became for us virtually the friendliest foreign state. The centuries-old hostility of the two empires was replaced by truly good-neighbor cooperation.

In the 1930's the word "Europeanization," which was put into circulation by President Ataturk, was for the Turks just as much a code word as "five-year plan" was for Soviet people. Industrial facilities built with Soviet assistance had left fond memories of themselves half a century before Turkish companies embarked, as currently, on the construction in our country of hospital complexes and shopping malls. The USSR could be a profitable partner for Turkey in the building of highway bridges, the modernization of railroads and in other projects also. Commodity turnover between our states, which five years ago did not constitute half a billion dollars even, has now increased fourfold and could in the next two or three years amount to $5 billion.

Unprecedentedly propitious opportunities have now been revealed for cooperation between the two states. Both in connection with our perestroyka, which has made it possible to extricate Soviet-Turkish relations from stagnation. In connection with the fact that Turkey progressed sharply in its economic development in the 1980's. Some people are comparing this with the spurt put on by Spain after Franco; others, with the example of the "four Asian tigers," as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong are called. The economic growth rate in Turkey last year was over nine percent, which put it in first place among the 24 OECD members.

Turgut Ozal, the current president of the republic, is rightly considered the creator of the "Turkish model." It was he who founded the Motherland Party, which is currently the country's governing party and which has chosen as its emblem the industrious bumble bee. The program of economic reforms put forward by Ozal has stimulated private enterprise and secured the economy's dynamic growth. According to him, the country has in 10 years negotiated that rush stage of development which it took the West a whole century to accomplish. I share the opinion of the guest from Ankara that the practical experience of reforms accumulated by Turkey could be useful for the Soviet Union and is worth close scrutiny.

One further common feature links our country with Turkey. They are both located in both Europe and Asia. Consequently, have an equal interest in both European and Asian security and peace and stability in the Middle East. May the Black Sea, which washes the shores of two continents, unite us like the bridge over the Bosporus! The idea of the economic integration of the Black Sea states put forward by Ankara corresponds, in my view, to the spirit of the times, and it is gratifying that it has encountered support in Moscow.

Seventy years ago—on 16 March 1921—a friendship and fraternity treaty was signed between our states. At that grim time, when both peoples were experiencing profound revolutionary upheaval and clashing with foreign intervention, the Moscow treaty made a breach in the diplomatic blockade and was a model of fundamentally new interstate relations based on equality. I believe that the presidents of the Soviet Union and the Republic of Turkey have chosen the best method of commemorating this memorable anniversary, signing in the Kremlin a friendship, good-neighbor, and cooperation treaty. I believe that the interaction based on it will be a catalyst of Black Sea integration.

Laptev Receives Europarliament Group 20 Mar

LD2003170491 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—Chairman of the Soviet legislature's Council of the Union Ivan Laptev today received a delegation from the Europarliament, which is in Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Laptev told delegation members of the results of the first Soviet referendum on the future of the Union and stressed that the Soviet leadership by no means calls into question the constitutional right of each and every republic to withdraw from the Soviet Union. The thing in question is how to find a civilized solution to problems while proceeding from the supremacy of law.

Participants in the meeting exchanged views on the situation in the Baltic, where the Europarliament delegation is expected to travel from Moscow. Laptev told the delegates that the referendum in the Baltic republics was held in an atmosphere of open pressure and even direct terror: in many cases people were deprived of their legitimate right to express their will. "We regard it as a serious violation of human rights," Laptev said.

He also recalled that the Soviet legislature had passed a law on the procedure and the five-year term for leaving the Soviet Union. in the Baltic republics some people say the five-year term is too long. But attempts to accomplish the task faster lead to crises, the chairman noted. The feverish atmosphere brings about the revival of forces which can seek to manipulate the situation which is fraught with bloodshed, he said, the more so since laws have been promulgated in the Baltic which infringe on the rights of the indigenous population. These discriminatory enactments should undoubtedly be examined by international experts, Laptev stressed.

Europarliament Deputy Chairman Siegbert Alber, noting that no country should dominate another, said: "we believe that United Europe could provide an example to the Soviet Union which is going through difficult times now. Our experience has shown that the way to concord lies through the search for mutually acceptable solutions".

Supreme Soviet

20 March Session Proceedings Detailed

WA2103184591

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1845 GMT on 20 March carries a recorded account of the proceedings at the 20 March Supreme Soviet session in the Kremlin.

A correspondent briefly outlines the proceedings at the USSR Supreme Soviet session today. He says that a decision was taken on renaming certain Supreme Soviet committees.

At 1850 GMT Lukyanov, who is in the chair, hands the floor to Deputy Tsigelnikov, who asks to speak on behalf of the Kuzbass miners.

Deputy Tsigelnikov from Kemerovo Oblast says the miners' strike is a logical continuation of the strike 18 months ago. He says that public attitudes toward the striking miners have worsened since the original strike. He says the Kuzbass miners have not been making economic demands. Yesterday a delegation of the Kemerovo Oblast Soviet had a meeting with President Gorbachev. The conflict has entered a phase where it is very complex to resolve, he believes. Workers' committees in Kuzbass cities have called for support for the miners' political strike. Tsigelnikov brings to the session's attention certain proposals with regard to the strike that were discussed yesterday by a meeting of the Interregional Group of Deputies. He says that in his view there should be a proposal in the name of the Supreme Soviet that Gorbachev make a television address containing the specific measures that he is proposing and how much time he needs. Tsigelnikov proposes that the leaders of the Kuzbass workers' committees should be invited to Moscow for talks. He says that the miners demands are justified, and condemns a telegram that was sent to Kuzbass by USSR Vice President Yanayev.

At 1859 GMT Lukyanov reads out a request from two deputies that Anatoliy Malykhin, a miner who has been on hunger strike for eight days and is at present seated in the balcony with the deputies, be allowed to address the session. He then seeks the deputies agreement to give the floor to Malykhin.

Deputy Medvedev says that deputies should not get too emotional on this issue.

Comrade Malykhin, a representative of the Kuzbass miners, is invited to the microphone. He reads out an appeal which stresses the plight of the miners and their families. The country's leadership is not taking appropriate action, he complains. The top leadership is still subordinate to the CPSU Central Committee. The miners are demanding the resignation of the president and also the resignation of the government. The miners call on all the country's citizens to support them.

An unidentified deputy then comes to the microphone and stresses the need to remain calm. The country is in crisis. He says that the strikes are the work of extremists and those who do not want democratic change in the country. He says that the main beneficiary from the strike will be extreme reactionary forces in the party, and calls on the miners not to resort to extreme measures.

At 1909 GMT Deputy Golik says that Gorbachev has had a meeting with Kuzbass representatives in the form of Kemerovo Oblast Soviet deputies. Golik says that in a civilized society things cannot be resolved by strikes and hunger strikes. He defends Yanayev from the accusations against him. One cannot give in to the political demands of the strikers in a civilized society. Things must be resolved constitutionally. We must act calmly, he concludes.

Deputy Kucherenko condemns the government's silence on the strike which has now become protracted.

A Ukrainian deputy then speaks of the pain with which the country's agricultural workers view the situation in the country. He praises the patience of those in the countryside. He says he has never supported Yeltsin and condemns ambition.

Another deputy from the Urals is personally against the strike, but he nevertheless complains of the poor conditions in the country. Patience is at an end. He says that Gorbachev should present a detailed program on what the country can expect in the future.

Other deputies speak on the subject of the strike. Common sense must prevail, they conclude.

At 1932 GMT Deputy Lushnikov speaks of the situation at Inta in the Pechora coalfield. He attacks Travkin for his attitudes. There is no obstacle to talks on meeting the economic demands of the miners if they resume work. Everything needs to be resolved without emotion and without ambition.

Two deputies speak about the strike. The miners are not the only ones affected by poor conditions, they should show patience too, they point out.

Deputy Pupkevich says it is very difficult to find a way out of a political strike. Talks are the only way out, he opines.

Lukyanov concludes the discussion by saying that various proposals have been put forward by deputies. He suggests that a draft decision be prepared on which the deputies might vote on tomorrow. The report on the session ends at 1948 GMT.

Approves Law on Cabinet of Ministers

LD2003143791 Moscow TASS in English 1423 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—The Soviet parliament today adopted a law on the USSR Cabinet. The law determines the procedure of its activity, areas of competence and relations with other state agencies. Under the law the Cabinet is an executive and administrative body of the USSR. It is subordinated to the Soviet president and accountable both to the president and parliament.

The Cabinet is vested with the right to issue "decrees and orders obligatory for all agencies, organisations, officials and citizens on the entire territory of the USSR". They can be abrogated only by parliament and the president. Parliament can pass a vote of non- confidence in the Cabinet prompting its resignation. Two-thirds of the number of votes of all members of parliament is needed to pass such a decision.

The powers of the Cabinet listed in the law correspond to the draft Union treaty coordinated by representatives of the republic. The law says that "on matters in the competence of the Union, decisions related to the rights of republics are taken by the Cabinet in agreement with governments of corresponding republics and are binding for them."

Presenting the bill to deputies Yuriy Kalmykov, chairman of the parliamentary committee on legislation, said that the stipulation vesting the Cabinet with the right to exercise in some cases powers belonging to parliament have been removed from the bill as this caused sharp criticism. The Cabinet should be an executive body and should not assume functions of legislative authority, Kalmykov said.

During the debate some deputies suggested that the adoption of the law on the Cabinet be put off until the Union treaty was signed, but this proposal was not backed. There was an acute debate also on the matter of vesting the Cabinet with the right of legislative initiative which was possessed by its predecessor—the Council of Ministers. The parliament decided not to grant this right to the Cabinet since the head of executive, the president, had this right.

The list of ministries and agencies which was initially included in the law will be contained in a separate legal act which the parliament will consider next week.

Approves Two New Cabinet Members

LD2003174291 Moscow TASS in English 1714 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS legislative correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—The Soviet parliament today adopted the Law on the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, regulating the order of its operations, its powers, and relations with other government bodies.

Legislators continued to examine candidates for the Cabinet posts and approved the president's appointment of another two Cabinet members: Minister of Trade Kondrat Terekh (he retained this post since 1986) and Head of the Government's Office Igor Prostyakov (until recently—first deputy chairman of the Soviet Government's Bureau for Social Development).

Parliament has approved the appointment of about 30 ministers since last January when the government's formation began.

In the afternoon, lawmakers specified the list of Supreme Soviet committees and permanent commissions of the two chambers. They formed the parliamentary committees on industry and the power industry, transportation and communications, on the all-Union market and protection of consumers, as well as the committee on culture on the basis of appropriate commissions of the two chambers.

Lawmakers also changed the names of some parliamentary bodies.

At the end of today's session, deputies were informed of the situation, which emerged as a result of strikes at some coal mines in the country. The discussion on this issue will be continued tomorrow.

Concern Voiced at Security Situation

LD2003220991 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1629 GMT 20 Mar 91

[From the 'Legislative Diary' program]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] Here is a deputies' question to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, which was set forth by Deputy Rogozhina.

[Begin Rogozhina recording] Esteemed Comrade deputies: The question has been signed by a number of deputies. That is why I am reading it out. This is not a personal question of mine. Of late, from various extremist-minded groups of citizens, various political parties, and other public organizations and movements, calls are being heard aimed at overthrowing consitutionally elected organs of governments and dissolving the country's Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet. Crude pressure is being exerted on the deputies' corps, first and foremost of the USSR and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. Illegal actions are being prepared. For these purposes rallies, including unsanctioned ones, calls for political strikes and hunger strikes are being used. Such actions were undertaken several times in Moscow alone in the course of two weeks, in particular on 9 and 10 March. The largest action is planned for 26 March.

Instances have become more frequent of individual USSR and RSFSR people's deputies being subjected to insults and the threat of physical reprisals against them and the members of their families. Particular alarm and concern are arising in connection with the opening of the extraordinary Congress of Russian Deputies, which is scheduled for 28 March, and the sessions of both parliaments which are continuing in Moscow.

In connection with what has been set forth, and on the basis of Article 105 of the USSR Constitution, we are addressing the question to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, as to how specifically, and within what timeframe the USSR Government and the relevant bodies of state government intend to act in order to ensure the deputies' safety and the normal operation of the supreme organs of government of the country and of the republic. [pasage omitted] [end recording]

[Anouncer] The chairman passed on the above question to the government, which has to reply to it within three days.

Political & Social

TASS Carries Preliminary Referendum Results

LD2103101891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0850 GMT 21 Mar 91

[By TASS legislative correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Mar (TASS)—During the 17 March referendum, about 76 percent of Soviet citizens favored the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics, in which the rights and freedoms of people of every nationality will be fully guaranteed, Vladimir Orlov, chairman of the Central Commission for the Referendum, told a Soviet parliament meeting here today.

Official data will be submitted by the commission on the strength of official protocols in the coming days, Orlov said.

In the country as a whole, polling lists included the names of 184 million people. Voting lists for the election of USSR people's deputies in 1989 included 192 million names, Orlov said.

Of those on the lists, 80 percent went to the polls, Orlov said, emphasizing that "under conditions of the economic and political instability of society, the polling itself and the question brought up for the referendum did not leave the majority of citizens indifferent."

"As indicated by the polling results, people visualize the preservation of the Union and the territorial integrity of our power as conditions under which a worthy way out of the current difficulties is possible," he said.

Orlov gave the following data on the results of polling by republics:
The Russian Federation: 75.4 percent took part in the polling, with 71 percent answering the referendum question in the affirmative;
The Ukraine: More than 83 percent took part and over 70 percent answered yes;
Belorussia: 83 percent participated and almost 83 percent voted yes;
Uzbekistan: 95 percent participated and 93.7 percent voted yes;
Kazakhstan: 89 percent participated and 94 percent voted yes;
Azerbaijan: 75 percent participated and 93 percent voted yes;
Kirghizia: 92.9 percent participated and 94.5 percent voted yes;
Tajikistan: 94 percent participated and 96 percent voted yes;
Turkmenia: 97.7 percent participated and almost 98 percent voted yes.

In the autonomous republics the percentages of those taking part in the referendum and voting in favor of the preservation of the USSR are as follows:
In Bashkiriya, 81.7 percent participated and almost 86 percent voted yes;
In Buryatiya, 80 percent participated and 83.5 percent voted yes;
In Dagestan, 80.5 percent participated and 82.6 percent voted yes;
In Kabardino-Balkariya, 76.1 percent participated and nearly 78 percent voted yes;
In Kalmykiya, 82.8 percent participated and 87.8 percent voted yes;
In Karelia, 75.8 percent participated and 76 percent voted yes;
In Komi, 68 percent participated and 76 percent voted yes;
In Mari-El, 79.5 percent participated and 79.6 percent voted yes;
In Mordoviya, 84.3 percent participated and 80.3 percent voted yes;
In North Ossetia, 85.9 percent participated and 90 percent voted yes;
In Tatariya, 77 percent participated and 90 percent voted yes;
In Tuva, 80.5 percent participated and 91 percent voted yes;
In Udmurtiya, 74 percent participated and 76 percent voted yes;
In Chechen-Ingushetiya, 58.8 percent participated and 75.9 percent voted yes;
In Chuvashiya, 83 percent participated and 82.4 percent voted yes;
In Yakutiya, 78.7 percent participated and 76.6 percent voted yes;
In Karakalpakiya, 98.8 percent participated and 97.6 percent voted yes;
In Abkhaziya, 52.4 percent participated and 98.4 percent voted yes;
In the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, 20.6 percent participated and 87.3 percent voted yes.

Vladimir Orlov recalled that "authorities in some republics embarked upon a path of blocking the all-Union referendum. Central republican commissions failed to be set up in Georgia, Latvia, Armenia, Moldova, and Estonia." Voting in these republics was carried out with the assistance of constituency and polling station commissions, set up by the decision of local soviets, work forces, public associations at enterprises, establishments, and organizations, he said. "In these republics, the organizers of the referendum, despite bans and actions directed against them, wherever they could created conditions so that the citizens of the USSR could avail themselves of their inalienable right to decide their country's destiny," said Vladimir Orlov. He added that this made it possible to learn the will of a considerable number of citizens.

Vladimir Orlov reported the following preliminary data from republics where republican authorities decided not to hold the all-Union referendum, with the exception of servicemen, whose units are stationed on the territories of these republics:
In Georgia (South Ossetia) some 50,000 people voted;
In Latvia, about 500,000 voted;
In Lithuania, more than 600,000 voted;
In Moldova, more than 800,000 voted;
In Armenia (builders in Spitak), approximately 5,000 voted;
In Estonia, more than 250,000 voted.

"The absolute majority of those who took part in the voting in these republics replied 'yes' to the question in the referendum," said Vladimir Orlov. He also reported that Soviet citizens who live in 118 countries had also availed themselves of the right to take part in the referendum and that most to them also replied "yes".

"In all, the referendum and its results can be seen as a success of the Soviet Democracy, of those forces that link the destiny of their motherland and their personal fate with the preservation and unity of the Union. The referendum reaffirms the priority of human rights and liberties, irrespective of nationality," emphasized Vladimir Orlov.

Paper Cites Gorbachev Aide on Referendum Vote

PM2003235191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[G. Alimov article: "Referendum on the Country's Future"]

[Text] Grigoriy Revenko, adviser to the head of state, held a routine briefing at the USSR Presidential Press Service 19 March. The main subject was the all-union referendum held 17 March.

How is referendum being assessed in political terms? In the opinion of the USSR presidential adviser, it is an "unambiguous continuation of the policy initiated in 1985." It is a continuation of the policy of democratization and the leadership's desire to guide its policy on the people's will and, Revenko stated, on the creation on that basis of the grounds for ensuring that the reforms that have been begun receive additional impetus. "The referendum was not aimed at winning support for certain leaders or for their programs," the presidential adviser stated. "The referendum had a far more important aim—the country's future: Will it be integrated or fragmented?

How did M.S. Gorbachev react to the referendum results?

As Revenko put it, normally and calmly. We should neither exaggerate nor underestimate anything, he said. We believe (and this view coincides with the president's position) that the referendum requires that we immediately begin working vigorously. In the presidential adviser's opinion, all urgent questions can be boiled down to three positions. First, taking specific steps to develop economic reforms in the country. This refers to the stated aim of moving toward a market economy. "The only thing is that everything should be specific," Revenko said. "Ideologically everything has already been said." Second, we should immediately embark on further development of the Union Treaty. Otherwise, the economic reforms will find it very hard to make progress across the country. Third, this task could be formulated, Revenko believes, as a policy or, rather, as a right—we must ensure that the war of laws ends and that all of society starts functioning on a normal, legal, and constitutional basis.

The presidential adviser's opinion about economic reform: Revenko sees it as follows. He believes that we need to start implementing privatization measures. It is important, in his opinion, to consider measures for so-called small-scale privatization, since we cannot seriously believe that "Uralmash," for instance, could be privatized now. In the presidential adviser's opinion, privatization moves should be made not just at the center and not even just at republic level, but in oblasts and krays as well. Revenko is convinced that we need to move forward faster on all issues connected with land. We need to cut the Gordian knot, as he put it—the ownership issue: Who owns what, how property will be used, and how it should function. The question of social protection, from the spokesman's standpoint, should not be reduced merely to adding several dozen rubles to people's wage packets.

Who gained most from the referendum?

The journalists repeatedly returned to the question of how the referendum results will influence the correlation of forces in Soviet society. Revenko believes that the referendum could provide a boost to strengthen the opposition and the political struggle. It is unimportant that this will be a case of a minority opposing the majority, but such confrontation can be unambiguously forecast. He believes that if some people saw the referendum results as an incentive to use any methods on the basis of the position expressed by the majority, this would be ruinous for the country.

Were there any violations during the referendum voting?

On the basis of the information available to the presidential adviser, he replied quite frankly that there were. On the one hand, some people who wanted to vote "Yes" went to the polls several times. On the other hand, some people who wanted to vote "No" did the same. Revenko reaffirmed that there were very many violations in those republics where people were not allowed to hold the referendum.

Deputy Medvedev on Referendum Results

LD2103091691 Moscow TASS in English 0857 GMT 21 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 21 TASS—The results of the March 17 referendum showed the clear wish to preserve the Union, believes Roy Medvedev, deputy of Soviet parliament. However, these results do not mean that there is no need to work out a Union treaty and create a new USSR Constitution, he said in an interview published by the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA on Thursday.

Touching upon the results of the referendum in Moscow and Leningrad, Medvedev said that they were affected by the non- constructive stand of "democratic Russia" and its leaders for whom "their personal ambitions are more important than the acute problems of our present day life".

Medvedev believes that the results of the referendum should be thoroughly analysed. He said he had learned political lessons from it, since the referendum brought to light strong and week points in the work of party organs in localities, the role and place of other political groups in society and the attitude to the Union leadership and the policy of nationalities it conducts.

Officials Cited on New Draft Union Treaty

PM2103114391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 91 Second Edition p 3

[Interview with Professor B. Lazarev, deputy chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, and I. Muksinov, member of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, by O. Losoto and A. Chernyak under the rubric "Topical Interview"; first two paragraphs are introduction; place and date not given: "What's New in the New Draft?"]

[Text] The all-union referendum was an important event in the country's life. Soviet people expressed themselves regarding the future of the Union as a renewed federation of equal republics.

But what will the renewed Union be like, what contours of the Union are outlined in the new draft Union Treaty? That is described by our interlocutors: Professor B. Lazarev, deputy chairman of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee, and I. Muksinov, member of the USSR Constitutional Oversight Committee.

[IZVESTIYA] The public interest in the Union Treaty is understandable. A new version of the draft was recently published. What is new in it?

[Lazarev] I shall say immediately that the new draft differs substantially from the previous one, although it was made on its basis. We have succeeded in coordinating many remarks made by the republics. It is primarily the principle of the equal rights of republics that has triumphed. The Basic Principles already stressed that the Union is formed as the result of the voluntary association of equal republics, and article 1 says that the republics are the founders of the treaty "possess equal rights and have equal obligations."

Much that is new has appeared in article 5, "Demarcation of Powers in the USSR." The draft's compilers wanted both to see the Union as a real functioning federative state and to ensure the republics' independence. While the former is ensured by a more precise definition of the Union's powers, the latter is to be discerned in many of the draft's articles. Even the preamble acknowledges the declarations of state sovereignty proclaimed in the republics and comes up with the formula that the republics forming the Union "retain the right to the independent solution of all questions of their development" and "possess full state power." Article one states the republics signing the treaty have the right to leave the Union freely within the procedure stipulated by the treaty's signatories. I do not mention the fact that a very important new provision has been retained whereby the limits on the Union's rights are determined by the republics and it is the republics that "invest" the Union with powers.

The question of the subjects of the Union Treaty has also been resolved in principle. Whereas the first version still mentioned the "union" republics, albeit only once, it is true, in article 15, the new version contains no such mention but speaks of republics in general. I must say that we had to do a lot of work on that question.

[Muksinov] Incidentally, this question is not so simple. The USSR will be a Union of sovereign states, a Union of sovereign republics. The problem was to decide which of our country's republics should be deemed to be sovereign. Of course, it is a case of the former autonomous republics having proclaimed their state sovereignty. The former autonomous republics were long ago firmly integrated into the USSR's economic system. You only have to look at the subordination of industrial and construction enterprises in Bashkiria, Tataria, and Yakutia. These and other republics make a marked contribution to the development of the whole country's economic, social, and spiritual potential. It is now a case of integrating them into the political system of the USSR. That is why the recognition of the former autonomous republics as new subjects of the USSR is a natural phenomenon. Much has also been done for this purpose by the latest union laws adopted in 1990-1991. For the first time in our history the country's supreme organ of power began to treat the former autonomous republics as autonomous Soviet states. It is already clear that a situation is quite specifically arising where some former autonomous republics want to join the USSR directly, bypassing the union republic, and sign the Union Treaty independently. That fully accords with the declarations on sovereignty adopted in the republics and also with the principle of open access to the Union for all Soviet republics "both those existing now and those that may emerge in the future"—a principle already enshrined in the 30 December 1922 Declaration on the formation of the USSR.

The provision that the republics signing the treaty join the Union directly or as part of other republics, "does not encroach upon their rights and does not free them from their duties under the treaty," is a very important one. A major step in the democratization of our country's national-state structure is the norm to the effect that "relations between republics are regulated by the treaties and agreements between them."

[Lazarev] The question of sovereignty is a basic one. The new draft has succeeded in coordinating the interests of the republics. It was important to enshrine in the draft the sovereignty of the Union as a state. Then to ensure the sovereignty of the republics. Today some people understand sovereignty in an ideosyncratic way, as permissiveness, as independence from everything. That is wrong. Sovereignty is not anarchy but a system of specific obligations. The Union has not only rights but also duties toward the republics, as in turn the republics have not only duties but also rights with regard to the Union.

[IZVESTIYA] During the elaboration of the draft treaty was there a dispute about its name?

[Lazarev] Yes. Some people wanted to call the document the treaty on the union of sovereign republics, but when the concept of the state disappeared in the published version, obvious dissatisfaction was voiced. But let's put everything in the right place. What is a republic? It is a state. After all it is well known that there are two types of state—a republic or a monarchy. In addition the first line of the draft treaty says: "Sovereign states which are signatories to the treaty..." In the first section the basic principles state: "Each republic that is a signatory to the treaty is a sovereign state." So that there are no serious grounds for dispute here.

[IZVESTIYA] But which is higher—the Union Treaty or the USSR Constitution?

[Lazarev] The Union Treaty is the basis of the USSR Constitution and the constitution should not contradict the Union Treaty. Thus the treaty is above the Constitution. The republics are sovereign from the outset. They have united into the Union and invested it with the relevant powers. The treaty is a very important constituent document of the new Union of republics.

I want to return to the question of what is new in the new draft. It contains a whole series of new theoretical, very important practical provisions. The form of the Union itself, the aims of its formation, the definition of the subjects of the Union, and the powers of the center are changed.

[Muksinov] I want to add to this that the way the draft raises the question of the republics' relations among themselves is absolutely new. For the first time documents of this level include a provision that the republics which are signatories to the treaty build their mutual relations within the Union on the basis of equality, respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, noninterference in internal affairs, the solution of all disputes by peaceful means, cooperation, mutual aid, and the good-neighborly fulfillment of obligations under the Union Treaty and interrepublican agreements.

Until recently under the conditions of the strict sectorial system of management virtually all relations of any importance between republics, especially economic relations, were through union organs. Now much has been done to surmount that practice. Treaties and agreements are being concluded between republics and permanent intergovernment commissions for economic, scientific and technical, and cultural cooperation are being created. Permanent missions of some republics in others are being restored.

The definition of the basic principles of relations between republics in the Union Treaty will promote the intensification and development of the new democratic practice of horizontal relations between subjects of the USSR.

[Lazarev] I would also draw attention to the new duties of the republics which are signatories to the treaty directly enshrined in the draft such as the ban on the stationing of foreign states' armed formations and military bases on their territory and undertakings not to conclude agreements which contradict the aims of the Union or are aimed against the interests of the republics belonging to it. The republics, according to the draft, are full members of the international community.

[IZVESTIYA] So the draft Union Treaty has been submitted to the public. What are the next stages of work on it?

[Lazarev] The president has sent the draft treaty to the republics' Supreme Soviets. Its broad discussion at all levels has begun. As the draft says, the Union Treaty is adopted by the republics' supreme organs of state power and comes into force from the moment it is signed by the republics' fully empowered delegations. When the Union Treaty is opened for signing will be decided by the USSR Federation Council.

[Muksinov] In my view article 25 of the draft "appendix to the treaty" is very important. It states that the treaty has appendixes that will set out the procedures, mechanism, and deadlines for implementing the treaty's articles. The list of these appendixes and also the deadlines for preparing and signing them are agreed by the republics in the protocol as part of the treaty. It is supposed that we should set about preparing this draft and the appendixes themselves without delay. Of course, representatives of the republics should take the most active part in this work. It is no less important to determine the procedure for elaborating the new USSR Constitution. Article nine stipulates unambiguously that the USSR Constitution "is adopted by a congress of representatives of the states that are signatories to the treaty." We should also think about how to implement this provision. At any rate the treaty on the Union of sovereign republics will become a real, operating act when all mechanisms for implementing its content are determined.

Bessmertnykh on Republics' Foreign Ministries

LD2003184691 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1730 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Lately, individual USSR republics have started to emerge directly into the foreign policy arena, bypassing the center. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of these republics have started to become more active. Is the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs wary of this particular sort of competition? Our correspondent, Ashot Nasibov, posed this question during a conversation with USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksandr Bessmertnykh.

[Begin Bessmertnykh recording] I really welcome the republics' Ministries of Foreign Affairs becoming more active. It is possible that you have missed a piece of news that is very important to me; the fact is that we have set up a Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and we have already held a conference of these ministers.

I consider that the republics should start to work more actively. They have their specific interests, including their mutual relations with their neighboring states and with their diaspora, not only those situated in neighboring countries, and so on. They have their own economic and cultural interests as well as and political ones.

Therefore, there is no way that I am experiencing any sort of negative feelings. I support it completely. I even invite the republics to act in this way. In the new Union treaty you can see that the formation of foreign policy for the whole Union and for all of the federation is also envisaged as the joint product of work with the republics. This is very proper because we will then see all the interests of our power—not only the global ones, but all of the local ones. We will see the national interests of our Soviet Union in all their colorful variety, so to speak, so I am completely in favor of this. [end recording]

Pavlov on Production Problems in Leningrad

LD1803184391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 18 Mar 91

[Text] [Announcer] Comrade Pavlov made his first trip as prime minister to Leningrad today. Here is a report from our correspondent Matvey Frolov:

[Frolov] The prime minister began his day at the Kirovskiy Zavod association. This enterprise is one of the flagships of Soviet heavy industry. Tanks and tractors bearing the KZ trademark and the famous Putilov steel are well-known far beyond the limits of the city on the Neva. Because of conversion the Kirovskiy Zavod is now undergoing a rebirth. While continuing the manufacture of tractors it is faced with mastering new output needed by many industries in the national economy and by the population. Comrade Pavlov looked over the production facilities at the Kirovskiy Zavod and talked to designers and managers at the works and workers about prospects for the development of the enterprise.

Via a new route constructed across the Gulf of Finland—the structure protecting Leningrad against flooding—the prime minister travelled to Kronshtadt, the town of Russian naval glory. Here he looked over the town and met sailors. In the evening comrade Pavlov took part in a meeting at the Tauride Palace to which economic leaders, people active in science and technology, leaders of local soviet organizations and people's deputies had been invited.

There was also a short news conference at which I asked Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov following his short stay in Leningrad and his meeting with Leningraders—very short though this was—in his view what are the problems that he considers to be the most important ones to which especial attention should be directed at this time?

[Begin Pavlov recording] Leningraders today have concentrated within themselves two such key points. The first is insuring food supplies for the country's industrial centers. Here the problems can be seen quite clearly and no doubt ways of solving these problems should be looked for here. The second thing is the issue connected with conversion. I would say that this issue is far wider than simply the issue of changing the type of output produced by some particular enterprise or other. The fact is that this is concentrated and very compressed as far as the time-scale is concerned. In this sense an enormous slump in production is taking place. During just the past 2 years we have lost goods output of the order of 20,000 million [rubles] in industry alone. You yourself understand what the implications of this are: the implications affect the wages, they affect the people, the families, everything that is connected with it. A slump of that kind in the volume of production cannot help but give rise to a very substantial problem with lack of confidence on the part of large masses of the working people, and the most qualified working people at that. I would say, from the point of view of the working class, so to speak, and the technical intelligentsia. These problems are very complicated and evidently they are also connected with the fact that new means have to be sought for the organization of the management of production at this stage, including conversion. And here it seems to me to be very important to find new forms of organization both of production and of state administration. [end recording]

Pavlov Comments on Current Issues

PM2003140191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "V.S. Pavlov's Visit to Leningrad"]

[Text] Leningrad, 18 Mar—USSR Prime Minister V.S. Pavlov has paid a one-day visit to the city on the Neva. He gave an impromptu press conference immediately on arriving at the airport.

"Leningrad is a city in which many defense industry enterprises are concentrated," V.S. Pavlov said, answering Leningrad journalists' questions about the purpose of his visit. "Problems bound up with its conversion are particularly acute here. Moreover, this is a very large economic complex that has suffered the most grievous blows as a result of breaches of economic ties, and has been felt first and foremost in food supplies. I would like to establish the economic causes of the prevailing situation."

Asked whether the union government has a Soviet economic recovery program, he observed that he disagrees with certain assertions about the economy's utter destruction. The fact that it is dogged by stoppages and works under great pressure, a matter of special concern to the Cabinet of Ministers, is another matter.

The following figured among the questions: Is another exchange of bank notes being prepared?

"I can say quite openly that we do not intend to change any bank notes," V.S. Pavlov replied. "Many people think that a very bad situation obtains regarding money circulation. I would like to cite figures which I have not referred to anywhere else before: In the last 2 months we have for the first time reduced money supply in the Soviet Union—by 1.6 billion rubles [R] in cash—not counting the money withdrawn in connection with the replacement of large-denomination notes."

The itinerary of the head of government's one-day working visit was very packed. He visited the "Kirovskiy Zavod" tractor-building association, where he inspected a number of shops and saw new models of "Kirovets" tractors and minitractors being prepared for batch production plus other equipment designed to meet the national economy's needs. The association leaders shared their thoughts on the progress of conversion and the social problems produced by it.

The prime minister visited an experimental production unit which was still producing military equipment until quite recently. A meeting with the association's workers was held in Shop No. 203—the main assembly line. An absorbing and at times trenchant discussion ensued on not just the problems of production and the social situation of the plant workers, but on the development prospects of the economy of the entire country and ways of overcoming the crisis. The workers and the head of government did not shirk difficult problems, discussing the fundamental issues of price formation, production profitability, and pay.

"We will not start with a reform of prices," V.S. Pavlov told workers. "On 20 March we will start the transition to payment of compensation and reviewing wages and only then will we start introducing new prices. We have never said that R60 is the compensation ceiling. This is the minimum, the rest will be fixed by the enterprises themselves."

Questions were put about the empty stores and the shortage of food. The government head stated that the current crisis has deep roots. Suffice it to say, he observed, that for many years a considerable amount of what the country produced was spent on defense. Enormous attention is therefore now being paid to conversion and finding new ways of organizing the economy.

The production of tanks and self-propelled guns has been wound up at the "Kirovskiy Zavod." The production of turbines for the submarine fleet has actually been cut back. The former capacities are now used to produce road-construction equipment, forestry machinery, and other machinery essential to the national economy. However, given the change in prices for components and semifinished and raw materials, all production has become loss-making and the enterprise has been forced to take out long-term credits.

These and other problems were discussed during a thorough conversation held at the plant administration between the prime minister and leaders of the city and oblast, leading specialists of the tractor-building company, and representatives of the association's social organizations. In response to a request from the Leningrad City Soviet V.S. Pavlov gave assent in principle to major Leningrad associations' going over to a joint-stock form of mangement. The head of the Cabinet of Ministers stressed that in market conditions the collectives themselves should produce a profit on the basis of contract prices and fairly divide it, neither forgetting those who have retired on pension nor neglecting the needs of the region.

Fundamental questions concerning the relations between major Leningrad enterprises and ministeries, the development of the social sphere, and the granting of extensive economic initiative to the collectives were raised during the conversation.

In the afternoon V.S. Pavlov visited Leningrad flood-protection complex facilities and gave a press conference in the city of Kronshtadt. A meeting was then held with leaders of city industrial enterprises at the Tavricheskiy Palace at which questions concerning the region's economic and social development were broached.

The prime minister left for Moscow late in the evening.

Prices Committee Chairman on Reform Measures

LD2003165491 Moscow TASS in English 1610 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Vladimir Isachenkov and Yuriy Sizov]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—Soviet Cabinet members today attended a news conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry press centre. They described the forthcoming pricing reform as the "major and most important decision" in the range of measures by the Soviet Government during the transition to a market.

Soviet newspapers today publish President Mikhail Gorbachev's decree, according to which new state retail prices and tariffs for transport and communications services will be introduced beginning on April 2.

Three kinds of prices will be introduced in accordance with the decree, including fixed prices for consumer goods in mass demand, regulated prices with the set upper limit for cars and some other expensive goods and free prices.

Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Prices Vyacheslav Senchagov said free prices will be set for 30 per cent of the goods turnover, while 15 per cent of prices will be regulated.

Compensation will be paid before the price rise, and it will amount to 60 roubles a month. The population will receive back 85 per cent of the amount of the price rise.

Senchagov noted that the reform should allow to reach a rough equilibrium between the demand and supply. Unsatisfied demand of the population, amounting to some 160 billion roubles, should be cut by 90 billion roubles. In addition, the population will begin actively using estimated 50 to 100 billion roubles accumulated at their homes.

Naturally, a balance could be reached quicker in "expensive" sectors of the consumer market (automobiles, furniture and home appliances), and it will take much more time to reach such a balance for meat and butter.

The sphere of free price formation will gradually expand, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Shcherbakov said, while fixed prices will be kept for a small range of basic necessities. The government is planning to take a range of wide-scale measures soon, aimed to develop market relations.

Shcherbakov said "credit and interest policy will be changed and measures will be taken to give more freedom to production enterprises".

Shcherbakov said the government clearly understands the unpopularity of the pricing reform and its social consequences. At the same time, he resolutely declined a supposition that the price rise could lead to the resignation of the government.

"If we resigned after carrying out the reform, it would be a betrayal of those who trusted in the government," he said. "This is a major step, but other unpopular measures should also be taken."

Paris Paper Analyzes Cabinet Appointments

91UN0996A Paris LE MONDE in French 27 Feb 91 p 24

[Article by Michel Tatu: "The 'New' Soviet Government Characterized by Continuity"]

[Text] After more than two months of reflexion, on Monday 25 February Mr. Gorbachev designated 23 members of his "cabinet of ministers" led by Valentin Pavlov. After Thursday the USSR Supreme Soviet will have to decide on the composition of this cabinet, which is characterized by great continuity.

No major change appears to be featured in the list submitted by the Soviet president to his Parliament, which goes to join the previous appointments approved in January: two first deputy prime ministers (Doguzhiev and Velichko) and two deputy prime ministers (Laverov and Maslyukov) were designated at the time, as well as the figures who made their way back to the key ministries in charge of order: Marshal Yazov at the Defense, Mr. Kryuchkov at the KGB, and Mr. Pugo at the Interior Ministry.

Today we see another representative of the military-industrial complex back at the vice presidency: Mr. Lev Ryabev, who held the same job with Mr. Ryzhkov since 1989, after having served almost his entire career in the military nuclear sector. Vladimir Shcherbakov, who since 1989 has been presiding over the State Committee for Labor and Social Affairs, has also been promoted to deputy premier of the government, the same as Mr. Fyodor Senko, an old agriculture boss of Byelorussia and the only newcomer in this category of leaders.

Two technology ministers appeared as well: Mr. Genadi Kudriavtsev at the Ministry of Telecommunications and Vyacheslav Chernoivanov at the Ministry of Agriculture. Both, however, are old pillars of the same ministries: Mr. Chernoivanov, notably, served throughout the perestroyka as vice president of Gosagroprom, the super ministry that Mr. Gorbachev entrusted to his old Stavropol associate, Mr. Murakhovsky, and whose failure was universally recognized.

Altogether, 17 of the 23 members announced on Monday were simply shown back to their posts, while some of them were even survivors of another era: Mr. Nikolay Konarev, the minister in charge of railways since November 1982, was once again proposed—in spite of the vigorous criticism he earned all these years because of the increasing paralysis of the rail system. Aside from Marshal Yazov, who has been in place for four years, two other ministers have been in the same post since 1985.

Several Pending Portfolios

Several portfolios still remain to be distributed—notably that of foreign economic relations (currently held by Mr. Konstantin Katushev), health, education, military industry, and other industrial sectors—unless several of these ministries are to be scrapped or regrouped with others. We note in particular the absence of any appointment in the oil and nuclear industries, as well as construction. Also awaited with curiosity is the fate reserved for the State Committee for Industrial Supplies, the famous Gossnab which, with its enormous apparatus, became a symbol of the system of "administrative command."

Note, however, that this system can very well survive a lightening of the federal government. Cuts in the number of ministries certainly continue, since Mr. Pavlov announced that the new cabinet will consist of 55 members—including the prime ministers of the 15 republics—or 40 holders of federal portfolios. This is progress compared to Ryzhkov's cabinet formed in the summer of 1989, which featured 57 ministers and 60 members altogether (with the deputy prime ministers without portfolio), not counting the representatives of the republics.

However, in itself this number does not represent a decentralization criterion: The Stalinist government, the prototype of the discredited system, didn't feature more than 34 federal ministers at the time of the dictator's death, plus 13 council chairmen and deputy chairmen. At the time of Krushchev's fall in October 1964 there were only 41 ministries altogether, more or less the same as what Mr. Pavlov now promises.

In fact, it was mainly during Brezhnev's reign, under the effect of new technologies requiring new branch ministries, that the administrative inflation took off: Within 20 years the number of ministries doubled, from 47 in January 1966 to 88 in 1981 and 93 in 1984, during Chernenko's interregnum. That was the "golden age" of the *nomenklatura*. But it will require more than this kind of reshuffle to deprive the said *nomenklatura* of its power and to reform the Soviet economy in depth.

Deputy Prime Minister on Prices, Wages

LD2003175191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1408 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Interview with Vladimir Ivanovich Shcherbakov, USSR deputy prime minister by correspondent Valeriy Kiosa on wage and price reform—recorded]

[Excerpt] [Shcherbakov] It is a matter of the first stage, a very important stage, the improvement of the whole system of price formation and wages for the population. The reform of prices—one way or another—has already started, regardless of our wishes. The USSR Government did not adopt the resolution on raising prices on foodstuffs or on a whole series of industrial goods, today being sold at augmented prices. Nevertheless, reform has already taken place; therefore, delaying the general reform would, in essence, simply mean delaying the population's compensation. The main conclusion to be drawn from this is that the government has had to embark upon this measure. Such a decision was made, in agreement with all the republics, and the payment of compensation should commence as from today.

Retirees, children, and workers in budget departments should be the first to receive these payments. The preparatory work for this has been carried out by us. Yesterday, we carried out a random check on all workers in the social sphere, in communications, and those in banking and finance bodies; and on the whole, they all said that, for the most part, they are ready.

[Kiosa] Won't there be a repeat of what happened on the first day, when fifty- and hundred-ruble notes were exchanged, when many structures—particularly those far from Moscow—turned out not to be ready, and this caused great aggravation for society?

[Shcherbakov] On the whole, we have learned from the sorry experience we acquired during the exchange of the fifty- and hundred-ruble notes. Accordingly, instructions have been given to the banking system, to the system for social provision, to the financial system, and the system of the postal and communications bodies—since pensioners receive their money, for the most part, by post; instructions of this nature were given. Of course, if the pensioners immediately grow alarmed that they will be forgotten and they go to the cash desks, then of course there will be lines. Therefore, we have asked all those working in the social services and post offices to draw up timetables to show when and how all of this will be done, and to calm the population by telling them that everyone should recieve this compensation between the 20th [of March] and 2d [of April], before prices are increased.

We have distributed money to the various postal departments in advance, and we have prepared for this. The system has drawn its conclusions from what went before.

[Kiosa] What are the principles of the population's compensation for the forthcoming rise in prices?

[Shcherbakov] The first thing is that we are establishing the limit to which prices can be raised within state trade and from state resources. No one should trade at prices which are higher than these, either in the Baltic republics, or in Moscow, or in Leningrad. We will apply tax and financial sanctions against anyone who imposes higher prices.

The second thing is that 85 percent of all money which we will receive from this operation of raising prices will be targeted toward the payment of compensation to the population. Further, there will be differentiation according to socio-demographic groups of the population. Take workers for example, they will receive R60; pensioners R65. Students will receive an increased grant, so the normal grant for someone at a higher educational establishment will be R120 and for a good student it will be R150. Correspondingly, the grants for those at polytechnical institutes will be reexamined.

A section of the funds will be directed toward raising wages for doctors, teachers, those who work in the cultural sphere, in archives, social workers, along with a number of other categories.

[Kiosa] By approximately how much will wages be increased? And the main thing, when will this take place—during these two weeks, or is it possible this will take place later?

[Shcherbakov] We do not want to take any ill-considered steps regarding raising wages, so we are taking a measured approach to this. In raising wages in all these spheres, we would like to first and foremost show preference for those who work best of all and most of all. Therefore, new qualifying categories are being introduced here which did not exist before. We are rejecting such concepts as senior workers and are moving on to categories by qualification, such as happens in our industry.

There is a special person with his knowledge and work experience, with his ability to work, and he should be specifically evaluated regardless of how long he has worked—be it five years or 20. Of course, work of this type will slightly delay the introduction of new conditions for paying wages in these industries. We think it will take place in the course, perhaps, of a month. In order not to delay compensation, we have agreed with the ministries and the trade unions that we will do the same as for the rest of the country. All workers in the cultural sphere, in education, the health service, and others—everyone will immediately be paid by their individual ministries as will be done at the enterprises. They will all be paid R60, and at the same time, work on recommending workers will go on. The moves taking place here are very important, and the average wage for this category of people will increase by approximately 70- 80 percent.

[Kiosa] By what technique is this compensation to be paid, and what will happen?

[Shcherbakov] All working people will immediately receive from their individual departments R60. And on the whole, the first payments will be paid by the individual departments in the period it takes them to do so—perhaps a month, perhaps two. Then they must be brought into line with the salary scale. All of these increases for pensioners, doctors, teachers, and particularly the increases for working people will be the minimum increases. If the republics or the local soviets have the money, then they can embark upon a greater increase in wages. We are freeing all enterprises, giving them the chance to transfer to a totally different way of paying wages. Now we are removing all the upper limits for additional payments, raises, and prizes. A person earns and can earn as much as it is possible for him to earn. At state enterprises we are reducing the tax on profits from 45 to 35 percent. We are examining the whole system of income tax for the population. You know that today the first taxes begin from R100 and upward of that. We take 13 percent. Now the lower limit is being raised from R100 to R160. And today from R700 and upward there is a progressive tax on income. Now we are raising this limit to R1,000. It should be particularly noted that these compensation payments and increases in pensions, allowances, and grants, and the payment of this R60 to working people is all being done, taking into account regional coefficients. [passage omitted:]

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Third Appendix to Prices Agreement

PM2003142391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

["Appendix No. 3 to the Agreement of the USSR and the Republics": "Domestic and Imported Goods Appended to the List of Consumer Goods To Be Sold to the Population at Contract (Free) Prices"]

[Text]

Light Industry Goods
Linens and linen goods, table cloths, bedspreads, and other goods sold by the piece (apart from production and technical output)
Fabrics made of natural silk and of silk mixture and articles made from them, silk furnishing fabrics, bedspreads, pillowcases, table cloths, door curtains, velvets, (apart from production and technical output)
Pure wool fabrics (apart from special purpose fabrics) and articles made from them, furnishing fabrics, blankets made from camel hair and angora, plaids, bedspreads, pillow cases, and door curtains
Jacquard and crepe woven cotton clothing fabrics, marquisette, voile, cambric, muslin, denim, and articles made from them with a weight of more than 400 grams/square meter, velvet and velvet goods, and also furnishing fabrics, bedspreads, pillowcases, table cloths, and door curtains
New fashionable goods made from cotton, part-wool, and chemical fibers
Nonwoven terry and sewn toweling, clothing, shirting, and decorative fabrics
Curtain material apart from fabrics of the simplest structures
Knitting and embroidery cotton thread and natural silk sewing thread
Leather footwear for adults: pattern and sports shoes for masters of sport and for active leisure
Synthetic sports and active leisure footwear for adults
Adult knitwear from pure wool yarns no. 45 and no. 52 made from imported fashioned yarn and mohair
Carpets and carpet products
Natural and synthetic leather fancy goods (apart from special purpose goods and goods for children)
Textile fancy goods (apart from special purpose goods)
Collars for adults made from valuable types of natural fur
Imported high quality sewn and knitwear articles, footwear, and leather fancy goods for adults
Twine and cord
Fabrics and goods using methanite [metanit]
Domestic-made natural leather clothing

Cultural, Consumer, and Household Goods
Timepieces
Personal computers and pocket calculators
Refrigerators with a capacity of over 250 liters, 2-3 compartment refrigerators, and freezers
Semiautomatic and automatic washing machines
Semiautomatic and automatic "zig-zag" sewing machines and knitting machines
Vacuum cleaners, floor polishers, and other electrical household goods
Electrical and radio measuring instruments
Ballpoint and fountain pens
Phonograph records (excluding children's records)
Telephones
Movie and still cameras (excluding children's goods)
Water heaters and heating apparatus and machines
Wooden and metal household goods
Paper goods (excluding educational writing goods and goods for children)
Mirrors
Plastic goods
Stainless steel crockery
Horticultural and gardening tools
Hardware and locks
Household chemicals
Sports goods
Music goods
Category 2 radio receivers, sound recording and sound reproducing sets (radio receivers, radiophonograms, and other goods)
Motorcycle and automobile accessories (excluding children's goods)
Construction machines for individual use
Brushes
Handmade arts and crafts products, souvenirs, and badges
Jewelry and metal fancy goods and manicure sets
Toiletries and other fancy goods
Sanitary ware
Spare parts for electrical and radio goods and other sophisticated culture, consumer, and household goods

Foodstuffs
Smoked sausage products
Ice cream
Rich bakery and bread roll products, rusks, crusty rolls, pretzel sticks, horn-shaped and crescent-shaped rolls
Pancake and potato flour
Confectionery goods (apart from caramel)
Nonalcoholic drinks and mineral water

Rabbit meat
Live fish
Groats of enhanced nutritional value
Starch
Tea with vegetable additives
Imported tobacco products

Note:

Union republics' governments can augment and refine the above list within the scope of their jurisdiction.

Gorbachev's Conservative Tailspin Considered

PM1903155091 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 10, 10-17 Mar 91 p 3

[Chief editor Yegor Yakovlev article: "Gorbachev at 60: A Balance Sheet"]

[Text] Mikhail Gorbachev is 60. This has not been turned into a pompous celebration as was the case with all previous Soviet leaders. Gorbachev remains true to himself.

Sixty years is an important and emotional occasion, I know this well because I was born almost the same year Gorbachev was. Much as I want to express some frank and sincere words of thanks to him, I can't. I can't revive those feelings I had when I used to talk with him one-on-one. I can't bring myself to indulge in vivid descriptions of his meetings with us, authors and journalists.

It would be disrespectful of me to gloss over the 60th anniversary of the person who has dominated all your thoughts and influenced your actions to such a great extent. Gorbachev recently remarked: "I'm not one of those who yesterday warmed themselves by one campfire, and who are warming themselves at another today, and feel equally fine." While he is welcome to take pride in this quality of his, he must recognize the right of others to basic human values.

I wish it were possible to roll back time. Let's suppose it's March 2, 1929. If this were the date of birth of Mikhail Gorbachev, the son of a Stavropol peasant, instead of March 2, 1931, what would have I written in his 60th birthday, i.e., March 2, 1989?

Something like this. People older than myself may take pride in the fact that Nikita Khrushchev was their contemporary. People of my generation can be proud that Mikhail Gorbachev is ours. He had courage enought to launch democratization in a country prepared for anything but democratization. He was the first leader in our post- revolution history to find support among intellectuals. The road he took at all times remains unchanged, despite all attending difficulties and the need for difficult manoeuvring. Those trying to put the country back on the road leading to its tragic past are met with a strong rebuff. That, of course, makes me think of Nina Andreyeva's immortal anti-perestroyka article. I would have concluded my congratulatory piece by saying: the new society's state structure will be formalized in the coming elections of people's deputies of the USSR, the first ever democratic and free elections. Such words came easily in March 1989.

But it's March 1991 now. Today I can only use a couple of phrases from this imagined congratulatory article. The rest requires questions marks. Does he find support among intellectuals? Has the road he is on remain unchanged? Are those who are trying to put the country back on the road leading to its tragic past being rebuffed? I read the newspaper version of Gorbachev's recent address to scientists and cultural figures in Belorussia and keep asking countless questions.

Gorbachev claims the process of democratization will be continued. But with whom? He is not happy with today's democratic movements. If it's not Yeltsin, then it's Popov...All democrats are officially being referred to as "so-called". Gorbachev bemoans "the evolution the democratic movements have gone through, after their propitious beginning...Slogans that used to be used to provide inspiration for these active perestroika forces have largely been emasculated, altered and used as covers for other far-reaching objectives which were **in a number of cases conceived by foreigners in foreign research centres. This means that these solutions suit other people, not me or you."** I have underlined this because some careful hand deleted these words from the published report. Also deleted was the statement that democrats "are in a hurry to carry out plans they have been concealing very carefully". But words once said on TV can't be withdrawn from the ears of the listeners. In short, the accusations, and actions which these accusations logically call for, are all too painfully familiar. A mere breath of freedom proved enough to undo the slogans and put the word "democrats" in inverted commas.

Politicians are constantly being analyzed and criticized. People always want to understand other people, including Gorbachev. The nascent democratic forces in an undemocratic country have failed to become the mainstay of perestroika. But what should the father of perestroika feel when the last words in glasnost for him are the suppression of free speech on TV and radio by Kravchenko, and Prime Minister Pavlov's economic policy?

Having made a sharp turn towards conservatism and coercion, Gorbachev is, no doubt, confident he will be able to reverse this strategic turn, forced on him by circumstances. All pilots whose planes enter a dive hope they can pull out of it. Not all succeed. As never before, I'd like to be proven wrong.

People's Deputy Foils Plane Hijack Attempt

LD2003185391 Moscow TASS in English 1700 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—A Soviet people's deputy prevented the hi-jacking of an airliner on March 14, the IZVESTIYA newspaper reports in today's issue.

The deputy, Nikolay Sazonov, was among the 89 passengers aboard the YAK-42 aircraft, which took off from Moscow's Domodedovo Airport on the morning of March 14 en route for Naberezhnye Chelny.

Soon after the take-off, Sazonov, who was traveling from Moscow to his constituency ahead of the March 17 referendum, noticed that a passenger had walked up front and was trying to roughly push his way through to the crew cabin door while two air hostesses were vainly trying to bar his access to the door.

Sazonov rushed to their help and tried to restrain the man armed—it was found out later—with a knife and a gas container. Other passengers helped Sazonov and the attacker was overpowered. Meanwhile, the crew returned the craft to Domodedovo, where militiamen were awaiting its touchdown.

At the airport, 20-year-old Arsentiev, a jobless resident of Saratov, admitted that he intended to threaten the crew and make them fly the craft "somewhere abroad".

Criminal proceedings have been instituted and the investigation is underway.

Attempt to Hijack Airliner Aborted

LD2003192291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1755 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Samara, 20 Mar (TASS)—Passengers on a TU-154 aircraft flying from Orenburg to Moscow will obviously forgive airport workers for the slight delay to their flight. Workers at the Middle-Volga directorate for internal affairs dealing with transport, together with the KGB directorate for the Orenburg oblast, today prevented an attempt to hijack an aircraft here.

Half an hour before take-off they arrested A. Khabarov, unemployed, and Yu. Sukhin, an electrician at the local machine-building factory. As became clear, they were intending to force the aircraft to fly to Alaska by threatening to blow it up. They tried to carry an explosive mixture onto the plane in a fruit juice container. The criminals had even drawn up several versions of notes to the crew, planning to dictate their conditions, depending on the way events developed.

They confessed their intentions when they were detained. The court is to decide the degree of their guilt.

In this case, the customs checks came out on top. Perhaps this information will give some comfort to airline passengers who are alarmed by the numerous attempts to hijack planes.

Economic

Pavlov Conditionally Agrees to Fly to Vorkuta

LD2003215191 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 2050 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] A government telegram from Moscow signed by USSR people's deputies from the Pechora coal field was received in Vorkuta today. It says that an accord has been reached with Pavlov, the country's prime minister: On condition that all mines work, he will fly to Vorkuta and Inta to consider existing problems on the spot.

Silyev To Meet Striking Miners in Kuzbass

LD2103114691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0931 GMT 21 Mar 91

[By TASS legislative correspondents]

[Text] Moscow, 21 Mar (TASS)—This evening Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev is to arrive in the Kuzbass for talks with striking miners in one of the USSR's biggest coalfields. As a TASS correspondent was informed by Valentin Sergeyev, head of the information department of the republic, the aim of the trip by the head of the Russian government is to resolve some of the economic demands of the miners.

Valentin Sergeyev also reports that Yuriy Skokov, first deputy chairman of the republican Council of Ministers, has flown to Vorkuta, in the north of Russia, for talks with miners.

The head of the information department emphasizes that the meeting with miners "is not a one time action, and is not an attempt to persuade the strikers, but to resolve their economic problems."

Bella Denisenko, who represents one of the Kuzbass constituencies in the Russian corps of deputies, spoke at the session of Russia's legislature today, a briefing on the progress of the strike and the demands of those taking part in it. According to her, it will not be possible to meet the economic demands of the strikers as long as the USSR president is in power. The miners are demanding the resignation of the USSR president, the dissolution of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet, and the "transfer of power to a soviet of a federation of sovereign republics."

The people's deputy demands that a vote of no confidence in the leadership of the USSR be put on the agenda of the current session of the Russian parliament and of the extraordinary Third Congress of Russian People's Deputies that opens on 28 March.

Miners' Leaders Cite Political Aims

LD2003145891 Moscow TASS in English 1448 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—The Soviet coal industry is gradually grinding to a halt, with the number of striking miners in various regions of the country growing. The miners are making both economic and political demands.

During a meeting with journalists on Tuesday, representatives of miners' strike committees and leaders of the Independent Miners' Trade Union said they were not going to resolve the acute social and economic problems by peaceful means.

Speakers said that the strike movement was a political one and aimed to press for the Soviet president's resignation, the disbandment of the Soviet parliament and changing the Soviet Government, as power and executive structures cannot help miners, neither they can [as received] lead the country out of the deadlock.

"Political problems should be resolved by political means and within the framework of the constitution. Ultimatums and diktat can only lead to stirring up passion, economic anarchy and political instability," Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Lev Ryabev said in an interview with the TRUD newspaper, published today.

Ryabev noted that the Soviet Government takes all responsibility for implementing obligations under the former government's resolution 608. Ryabev said work on linking wages of workers in the coal industry with the level of prices in the country is being finished. The government has prepared a bill on indexing wages, he said.

"I am against stepping up confrontation. I understand that it is absurd to stir up tension. I call for mutual understanding and tolerance," Ryabev said.

57 Mines, Enterprises on Strike in Kuzbass

LD2103082991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0700 GMT 21 Mar 91

[Text] According to the data of the council of strike committees of the Kuzbass, this morning 57 enterprises in the basin were taking part in the political strike. Forty mines, four mine construction directorates, one assembly directorate, and three open cast mines are not working. Five mines are working at the request of the town workers' committees. This information is from the SIBINFORM agency.

100 Coal Mines Overall Remain on Strike

LD2103145891

[Editorial Report] Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian at 1316 GMT on 21 March carries a four-minute report by correspondent Yuriy Krotokov from a session of the Collegium of the USSR Coal Industry Ministry in progress in Moscow. An unidentified studio announcer questions Korotkov. Krotokov describes the meeting's agenda, which includes discussions of ways to ensure supplies of coal to the Far East, the safety of mine transportation and the 1992 state prizes. Miners' strike issues were not examined, Korotkov notes. Two telephone conferences were held today, he says, and coal associations from Kuzbass and Rostov Oblast took part. Fifty-seven enterprises are standing idle in Kuzbass today, including 40 collieries, four mine-building directorates, one assembly directorate, and three open-cast mines. Five mines are working at the request of the city's workers' committees to maintain vital supplies to the city, he adds.

The announcer asks: "What is the overall number of mines standing idle in the country? Do you have such data?"

Korotkov answers: "You know, everything is here cloaked in darkness; it turns out as though it is some kind of secret. I tried to learn about it from those in charge of the Coal Industry Ministry: Shchadov, Korkin, Fesun, Sukhov, and other responsible officials. Yet, I failed to achieve anything. As the duty officer at the Coal Industry Ministry told me today, Minister Shchadov forbade these data to be given to anyone at all.

"True, at the Central Council of the Coal Industry Workers' Trade Union I was told that approximately 100 mines are on strike today, approximately 100, although the other trade union, the Independent Trade Union of Miners, places the figure at 125 mines."

The announcer follows up: "Did you try to get to the bottom of this and obtain an interview from those in charge of the Coal Industry Ministry?"

Korotkov responds: "Naturally, repeatedly so, but, just imagine—Mayak has, for two weeks now—that is to say last week it was my colleague Ilya Skigin and this week me—we cannot achieve an interview with Shchadov or any of his deputies. Incidentally, I came to sense that the attitude of those in charge of the Coal Industry Ministry toward the strikers is hardly fatherly."

Korotkov goes on to outline the demands of the miners. They differ from region to region. He says: "The political demands of Kuzbass miners remain the primary ones. You are aware that they demand the USSR president's resignation and the resignation of the Union government and the dissolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The strikers insist on a meeting with the highest leadership of the country. That is why several Kuzbass miners have been on a hunger strike in the Rossiya Hotel for several days. Meanwhile, rather active talks are currently under way to organize contacts. Currently, for instance, the USSR Supreme Soviet session, following its lunch break, is now, and I mean right at this moment, discussing this question in view of yesterday's speeches by Kuzbass miners in the parliament. Apparently, a decision will be adopted making it incumbent on both sides to enter into talks. There is a supposition that the government has agreed to examine the social and economic demands put forward by the strikers, but, naturally, the political demands remain in doubt."

Korotkov concludes the report by mentioning the plenary session of the Central Council of the Russian Trade Union of Miners and Metallurgists.

30,000 Miners Walk Out in Ukraine

AU2003172591 Paris AFP in English 1652 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Excerpts] Moscow, March 20 (AFP)—Thirty thousand Soviet miners were on strike late Tuesday in 62 Ukrainian mines, the unofficial news agency INTERFAX reported Wednesday. Seven mines out of 13 were on strike in northern Russia near the city of Vorkuta, according to the Vorkuta strike committee president Viktor Kolesnikov.

Miners were striking in five pits in the region of Inta, also in northern Russia, according to INTERFAX. [passage omitted] The unofficial news agency INTERFAX said Monday that 50,000 miners were on strike in Russia, including the Siberian miners, and in the Donbass region of the Ukraine.

The strike was apparently being observed with varying degrees of strictness, with some mines operating a rotating strike and others providing a minimum service for security reasons. Different regions were putting forward varying demands.

The inter-regional union issued a list of five demands being made by all miners, including the resignation of Mr. Gorbachev, the dissolution of the Congress of Deputies, and the resignation of the Soviet Government.

The miners have ignored several calls to return to work. Numerous pro-democracy movements have organised strike funds to support the miners, who receive no pay during the strike. One of these, the Russian Federation of Independent Unions, has collected 200,000 rubles (around 350,000 dollars at official rates), according to one of the organisation's leaders, Vladimir Bogreyev.

TV Update on Mining Strikes

LD2003214191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Mar 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] According to TASS, all 12 mines in Chervonograd did not work today. But in response to the appeals of local authorities miners are sending coal out to the Burshtyn state regional electric power station and Dobrotvor thermal power stations which supply electric power to the region.

A total of 27 out of 122 mines in Donetsk Oblast are taking part in the strike. The miners' strike is tangibly affecting the results of work in related industries, and the miners' deliveries of coal fell short by about 600,000 tonnes.

Vorkuta Mine Strike Spreads

LD2003193691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1900 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[Text] Vorkuta, Komi Soviet Socialist Republic, 20 Mar (TASS)—Miners of the town of Inta have jointed the striking miners of the Polar Vorkuta. Along with the "Intinskaya" mine, that went on strike on Tuesday, all the four other mines of the "Intaugol" concern stopped extracting coal today. for the time being, fuel is being dispatched to consumers from store-houses, although in smaller amounts than normal. The stocks will last for no more than a few days.

Ten of the 13 mines in Vorkuta still continue to take part in the strike in different forms and degrees. Five of them are completely idle—they have stopped both extraction and dispatch. The striking miners insist on direct talks with Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov.

Realities of Price Reform Considered

PM2103161191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Article by Yu. Rytov under the rubric "Statistics and Our Comment": "Ahead of the Price Reform"]

[Text] As the USSR State Committee for Statistics affirms, the retail price index for goods and services reached 105 percent last year. This included the figures of 104.2 percent for food products and 106.2 percent for industrial goods. I think that most of our fellow citizens received this information with bewilderment. Prices rose only 5 percent? And that is all? We all go to the stores and the market and we can see with our own eyes how much everything costs!

I have no desire at all to accuse the statistical organs of juggling with facts. Everything is done "scientifically." In order to record state prices, 1,030 sample goods were chosen (380 food products and 650 industrial products). The value of the output of cooperatives and individuals is recorded on the basis of 47 items. And the production of the city cooperative trade organizations on the basis of 30 items. The prices of kolkhoz [collective farm] trade are monitored on the basis of 105 products in 264 cities. Furthermore, "black market" prices have recently started being recorded. Taking the latter into account, the reports note, the consumer price index was 106.8 percent last year compared with the previous year. This includes 107.8 percent for goods and 105.0 percent for services.

The problem is, however, that these statistics probably do not fully take into account the increase of retail prices in a number of republics and regions made on the decision of local organs. And the main point is that the scale of "black market" operations has clearly been understated. Specifically, according to official estimates, the population paid 5 billion rubles [R] extra for nonfood goods acquired through unofficial channels last year. But it is obvious to anyone that this amount should be increased by a whole order of magnitude.

After all, speculation has now reached incredible proportions. You can meet "businessmen" at the doors of any store, who openly and insolently offer goods that are naturally not available on the counters, at five times the price. But never mind the speculators! Even quite respectable citizens are not embarrassed to sell one another articles—at a profit—that they bought on coupons or picked up by chance.

And prices on the "black market" bite, and how! Even official information testifies that you can obtain virtually all types of food and nonfood goods at speculative prices, which are many times greater than state prices (two to six times). The price of medicines is especially high—on average 19 times the state price.

An inquiry carried out in December of last year enabled us to reveal the "black market" prices for many specific types of goods. A kilogram of sausage, in particular, cost around R22. A jar of salmon caviare cost almost R50. A bottle of vodka—around R24. The prices of industrial goods are also appalling. A man's winter coat would cost you around R1,410 on the "black market." Walking shoes would be almost R270. A bookcase—R370. A color television set—R2,200, and a "Zhiguli"—R40,600...

One might ask: Who can afford such prices? Our so-called highly paid citizens? I doubt it. Yes, one-tenth of the country's population now has an average per capita income of over R250 a month. But even with that kind of money, you will not have a ball on the "black market." For example, a woman earning R250 (net!) can save the money needed to buy a light overcoat (R741) in three months. But to do that, she would have to give up eating and drinking and not spend a single kopek on other things during those three whole months!

Even some specialists are now making gestures of helplessness and saying: How did we manage to get into this mess... But we got into it very easily, by continuing to ignore real economic laws and replacing them with far-fetched optimistic schemes. If demand exceeds supply, then prices will rise! This is an immutable rule of economics. And even the "leader of all peoples" [Stalin] was well aware of it and unfailingly made use of it. To ensure that money supply did not exceed the volume of goods, he regularly resorted to so-called voluntary loans. And, having thus cut earnings, he displayed concern for the people's well-being and slightly reduced prices...

We have fallen into a financial trap and we must break the vicious circle. Galloping inflation (according to official figures it was almost 20 percent last year) demands additional monetary compensation. But pouring out extra money strengthens inflationary processes. So where is the way out?

In order to answer this question, let us first try and establish what a future increase of retail prices heralds for us. Given the size of the planned compensation (85 percent of the total amount of price increases), the population will not suffer very much from such an action. But will the quantity of goods on store shelves increase? Hardly. And what difference does it make to us how much nonexistent sausage costs?

On the other hand, another phenomenon can be quite clearly foreseen. The "black market" will immediately react to the reform with a new price spiral. The fight for access to scarce goods will take on even more desperate forms. And no ration cards or coupons will be able to protect the population: A sizeable proportion of these will change hands and will move into "shadow" circulation.

It has to be regretfully recognized time and again that we are hopelessly late with the reform of retail prices. Given a relatively saturated consumer market, it would have put everything in its proper place and blocked the way to inflation. But now?

Now its sense is only in regulating financial flows in the production sphere, approaching—even if only by one step—a civilized relationship between purchase, wholesale, and retail prices, and creating additional incentives to expand the output of goods. And of course even in this case the game is worth the candle. And yet you do not have to be a prophet to realize that it will take more than just one year to saturate the consumer market.

To return to the question of how to break the vicious circle. There is probably only just one possible answer here. To comply with real economic laws regardless of the entire gravity of the current situation. You cannot achieve market relations if you ignore the law of value. Consequently we must expand the sphere of application of free prices more boldly and resolutely. Only consistent steps like these are capable of securing the switching of free capital into the sphere of the production of "liberated" goods, and attracting enterprising people here. Thus the base of the "shadow" economy will be constricted and the "black market" will gradually lose its customers.

Yazov Views Industrial Conversion

LD2103084391 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Yazov, member of the Security Council, visited Leningrad today. He visited a training motor rifle unit, met with deputies of the Leningrad city soviet and held a brief news conference. Replying to journalists' questions on coversion, the defense minister said:

[Begin Yazov recording] Leningrad is a city where, from [Tsar] Peter's time, the shipbuilding has developed. It is not very difficult, in my view, to redirect the whole shipbuilding industry that worked on defense toward manufacture of some other vessels and ships that could work for the national economy. I think you agree with this. Regarding such giants as the Kirov works, which manufactures tanks, we do not need tanks now. We do not order tanks from the Kirov works. It will produce the tractors K700, K700M-1, and other modifications. But there is another matter. There was and is a design office at the Kirov works with people who are highly qualified. Is it worth abolishing this body? I think it is not. Such talented people as Comrade Popov can work in the machine-building industry as well. Regards many other associations in the field of radio electronics, they can all be adjusted. Leningrad, in the end, is a city of mathematicians, a city of electronics engineers. I think we can find other applications for their work. Up to now, the law on conversion has not been brought to every enterprise. Conversion, on the whole, is an expensive business. It is not possible to use the same machine-tool on which metal 30, 40, or 50 mm thick was bent according to the shape of a hull of a submarine for different production. It is not so easy. It seems that something needs to be altered. Whole new lines need to be made at these factories and these enterprises. It is necessary to have flexible technology. It is also necessary to preserve what is here. It is a crime to throw these machine-tools away, but it is necessary to install something so that people can be retrained quickly and what is necessary can be done. [end recording]

Military

Moiseyev on Troop Shortages, Republic Armies

LD2003145991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1200 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Interview with Army General Mikhail Alekseyevich Moiseyev, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces, by Captain Second Rank Vaycheslav Rusinov, place and date not given; from the "Armed Forces and Society" program—recorded]

[Text] [Moiseyev] We set up a system of a continuous alert duty to ensure a high level of operational readiness. To this end, all the necessary forces and means have been earmarked in all types of armed forces and combat arms. In addition, operational readiness is being carried out in accordance with the plan during which various tasks are being practiced in conditions close to those of combat. They include all kinds of training—shooting, driving combat vehicles, flights, sea trips—during which combat skills are being developed and necessary experience in handling weapons and combat equipment is accumulated. As for equipment and weapons, they are very complicated. It is necessary to work hard, until one is on his last egs, to master such equipment. Of course, while we are strong and combat effective, we need not be afraid of anybody, and we will be reckoned with.

[Rusinov] It would be quite appropriate here to recall the following truth: The Army must be engaged in efficient operational readiness for the Army to be really combat effective. Can you manage to do it to the full?

[Moiseyev] You are right. For the Army to be combat effective, it must be engaged in operational readiness every day and every hour. Unfortunately, we cannot do this as much as we would like. There are many reasons for this. First and foremost, we are significantly under strength because of the failure to fulfil the plan for conscription to the armed forces. That is why our soldiers and officers have to be on duty in interior details quite often instead of being engaged in scheduled combat training and, as a result, they are overworked. There are other reasons as well. I will name some of them: the point is that apart from the external function, which I have already mentioned, the Army has to carry out a number of internal tasks that are not characteristic of the Army at all—to build houses and various economic sights, build roads in the non-chernozem zone, help with the harvest, and take part in eliminating the consequences of industrial accidents and natural calamities. Of late this list has been extended by the functions of protecting citizens' constitutional rights and protecting state interests within the country. We try to bring down the percentage of those who have to interrupt their combat training by looking for internal resources and through better management. On the whole, our troops and fleets have modern equipment for combat training. We are still short of good equipment for training pilots and tank operators, gunners-operators, and visual aids with regard to equipment and weapons. Those that were developed are being produced in insuficient quantities.

[Rusinov] Plans have appeared of late in various regions of our country for setting up republican armies. What is the attitude of the general staff of the USSR Armed Forces to the idea of setting up a parallel army within the framework of a single state?

[Moiseyev] Negative. The general staff has given several explanations in the press on this issue. I also expressed my attitude to the setting up of republican armies. I would like to confirm once again that there must be single armed forces in our state, well trained, equipped with modern technology, and constantly ready to protect their homeland from any external infringements.

Arguments Against Republic Armed Forces Voiced

PM2003124391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

[Interview with Army General G. Salmanov by Colonel P. Palchikov; date and place not stated: "Who Needs National Barracks?"]

[Excerpts] [Palchikov] Grigoriy Ivanovich, a question frequently asked at the moment is: Does this or that union republic need an army? What do you say about this?

[Salmanov] I will say bluntly that the adoption of decisions in a number of Baltic, Transcaucasian, and Moldovan republics and in certain Ukrainian oblasts to form national military units contravenes all-Union legislation. Their adherents, however, often refer to the USSR's historical experience. [passage omitted].

[Palchikov] With the adoption of the USSR Constitution in 1977 union republics lost the formal right to have military ministries and military units under their jurisdiction. But not a decade had passed before calls started being heard once again to form regular national armies.

[Salmanov] I think that in conditions of economic chaos, the rupturing of economic and contract relations between enterprises, continuing interethnic and other conflicts accompanied by deaths among the innocent population and servicemen, and acute political struggle between various groupings, certain forces are trying to win the Armed Forces over to their side. Or at worst to neutralize them or split them up along national lines.

There is much that is unclear and even absurd in certain republics' proposals to form regular armies or a national guard, allegedly to protect their sovereignty. You can't help wondering: For what true purposes are they needed, against whom are they intended to be used, what official status will these military units have...?

The USSR is a major nuclear superpower. It is no secret to anyone that nuclear weapons as well as tactical and ballistic missiles, nuclear artillery shells, and stores of other ammunition are located on many republics' territory. But it is not clear to me how the republics intend to "divide" the Strategic Rocket Forces, space units, strategic bomber force, submarines, or surface ships.

[Palchikov] Just who will have his finger on the strategic missile launch button in such a situation?

[Salmanov] Who indeed? Assuming that national republic armies became a reality, then an increase in the membership of the "nuclear club" would likewise become a reality. In that case the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed by 141 states, would be wiped out at a stroke.

[Palchikov] It is clear to many people that maintaining a modern army will cost any state a pretty penny. You have to be plain blind not to see what a heavy burden this will put on their already strained budgets and on the shoulders of working people.

[Salmanov] I agree with you. But there are other, no less important problems. From my viewpoint, given a potential enemy's possession of the latest weapons it is simply impossible for any sovereign republic to provide guaranteed defense with its own forces.

But this is still far from all. Republics will need not only ground forces but also border units, reliable air defense, their own aircraft, and in a number of cases a navy too. This will need to set up a cadre training system, a reserve... Which of the promoters of their own armed units has thought about this?

[Palchikov] It would be more sensible to utilize republics' resources for creating normal social welfare conditions for officers, warrant officers, and members of their families who lack proper quarters. Especially as troops stationed in East Europe are returning home.

[Salmanov] Yes, but not only for these purposes. Because we are all well aware of the lamentable state that education, culture, and medicine are in, of how many people are living on the poverty line. Why not give some thought to pensioners, orphans... I want to stress once more that currently the vast majority of union and autonomous republics will not be able to afford the burden of autonomous military expenditure.

Even if we allowed the USSR Armed Forces to be split up along national lines we could not avoid trouble. Interethnic conflicts in the Transcaucasian republics are not abating, blood has been spilled in Moldova and in the Baltic region... Who can guarantee us that national military units and armed groups of militants will not become a blind tool in the hands of extremists or hostages to their bourgeois nationalist aspirations? Citizens living in our state must always remember that we have only one motherland...

Baltic Republics

New Estonian Supreme Soviet Presidium Members

WA2103172691

[Editorial Report] Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian at 1800 GMT on 18 March carries a two-minute report on the Estonian Supreme Soviet electing a new presidium, during which Peet Kask, chairman of the vote-counting commission names the seven elected presidium members as Vladimir Lebedev, Ignar Fjuk, Ulo Uluots, Tiit Kabin, Liia Hanni, Heino Kostabi, and Vitaliy Menshikov.

Estonian Minister on Land Law Provisions

PM1803120191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report from an IZVESTIYA, TASS, SIBINFORM, POSTFACTUM, INTERFAX, REUTERS, and UPI roundup: "Land Being Returned to Former Owners in Estonia"]

[Text] Juri Raidla, minister of justice of the Estonian Republic, has expounded the main provisions of the republic draft law on land which has been examined at a session of the government. POSTFACTUM reports that Raidla declared, in particular: "Land will be returned only to those owners or their heirs who are capable of cultivating it and, at the same time, no monetary compensation will be paid to heirs."

Raidla reported that the draft law provides that land may be in private, municipal, and state possession, while corporate bodies may only lease land. The initial price of land will be set by the state, but then it will depend on supply and demand. The law will be brought into force in stages. During the first three or four years problems associated with the return of land to its former owners will be resolved. Then its sale will begin.

Estonian Communists' Plenum Views Problems

LD2003172591 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1800 GMT 19 Mar 91

[Text] A plenum of the Communist Party [CP] of Estonia Central Committee has taken place, with First Secretary Enn-Arno Sillari presenting a report.

According to Sillari's evaluation, the party program adopted a year ago was evidently too optimistic. The CP of Estonia holds that the decline in the economy and the sacrifice of social guarantees in the name of our own statehood is unthinkable and pointless. In order to find optimum solutions, it is essential to proceed from both socialist principles and real life. The CP of Estonia recognizes the equality of the two parallel communist parties. The plenum noted that the CP of Estonia Central Committee recognizes the 3 March referendum results and the will of the majority of the population to create an independent Republic of Estonia.

The CP of Estonia Central Committee set up 10 committees for organizing its work. They held their first meetings there and then.

Saboteurs Held After Failed Attempt on Riga Center

PM2003143991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 1

[Report by correspondent K. Makaryan: "Checks Made, Bombs Found"]

[Text] Riga—It is not hard to imagine what would have remained of Riga's "Dinamo" sports center had the 19 explosive devices totaling 15 kg not been successfully discovered in time.

The explosive involved, with four times the yield of TNT, was concealed in a pile of coal next to ... the central heating boilers in the boiler-room. The saboteurs were also found. Two explosions that happened in Jurmala last December also turned out to be their work. The team consisted of a serviceman from a Riga military unit, his cousin, and two of the cousin's buddies, one of whom already had a criminal record. As you have no doubt already guessed, the serviceman had obtained several tens of kilograms of explosive without any particular difficulty. Satisfied with the results, they drank to their success all night long and toward morning decided to get on with the more serious task of bombing.

On that occasion their target was a cooperative store, under the door of which a charge was placed. But it was so powerful that not only was the door blown out, but one of the store's walls was also destroyed, and glass flew from the windows of the house opposite. It is not known how long the "terrorists" would have been on the wanted list if the Jurmala militia had not succeeded in picking up the saboteurs' trail in the course of successfully exposing a series of thefts. It was in this way that they discovered one cache of explosives in the pile of coal, and a second of 25 kg in one of the men's apartments.

As for the most recent, particularly destructive explosions (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 7 March) and similar ones with a political coloration, their perpetrators have yet to be found. As R. Aksenoka, chief of the Latvian Republic Prosecutor's Office Investigating Administration for Important Cases, was telling me, there is every reason at the moment for claiming that one and the same well prepared professional group is at work in these cases.

Deputy Alksnis Predicts 'New Political Force'

LD1903214691 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0530 GMT 19 Mar 91

[Text] Viktor Alksnis predicts that a new political force will emerge in the USSR. Yesterday in a television interview in the "Good Evening" program, the well-known conservative representative, USSR People's Deputy Colonel Viktor Alksnis, stated that in his opinion the two current brightest political figures in the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, will leave the political stage in the near future, giving way to a new, third political force. Alksnis also indicated that there could be very great sympathy for this third force in the ranks of the Army. The new, third force, Alksnis thinks, will be neither Communist nor democratic. In any case, the third force will favor a strongly united, even imperial type of state, where economic reforms will be implemented using strong political power and effective coersive mechanisms. Alksnis also indicated that in the event of the state being on the verge of collapse, the Army could intervene to delay this process.

Latvians Visit Taiwan; ROC To Reciprocate

LD1403173391 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1600 GMT 14 Mar 91

[Text] A news conference was held today at the Republic of Latvia's Council of Ministers. Maris Gailis, general director of the Department of Foreign Economic Ties, and Ojars Kehris, chairman of the Economy Commission of the Republic of Latvia's Supreme Council, talked about their official visit to Taiwan.

The LETA news agency reports that they had meetings with the Taiwanese deputy minister of foreign affairs, the minister of economy, and other government representatives and businessmen. The results of the visit should be considered as positive, Maris Gailis noted. In Taiwan there is great interest in the Baltics, including Latvia and the Taiwanese government is ready to make capital investments in Latvia. The amount could be considerable—up to $74 billion. He said that in the view of economists of that country, Latvia may in time become a commercial center and serve as a bridge in commerical cooperation between East and West.

In April and May our republic will have visits from Taiwanese delegations.

Latvia's Jurkans in Denmark; Protocol Signed

LD1803215991 Moscow TASS in English 1919 GMT 18 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Sidorov]

[Text] Copenhagen March 18 TASS—Latvia's Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans today arrived in Denmark on a two-day visit at the invitation of that country's Minister of Foreign Affairs Uffe Elleman-Jensen.

During the meeting, the two ministers signed a working protocol, which stresses the fact that Denmark recognised Latvia in 1921 and did not recognise its incorporation into the Soviet Union. The sides expressed hope that talks between the Soviet Union and Latvia on independence would begin soon.

According to the protocol, Denmark and Latvia intend to expand fields of cooperation in full accordance with the treaty they signed in November 1990. The first meeting of the working group, set up under the treaty, will take place shortly. Denmark undertakes to continue financial assistance to projects facilitating the deepening of cooperation between the two sides.

Latvia and Denmark agreed to maintain contacts through the information bureau of the Baltic republics in Copenhagen in order to expand cooperation.

In addition, the protocol stresses that Denmark and Latvia will establish diplomatic relations as soon as it becomes possible.

Discusses Protocol at News Conference

LD2003205891 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1830 GMT 19 Mar 91

[Text] We have already informed you that a protocol was signed in Copenhagen yeterday on cooperation in economy, culture, and education between Denmark and the Republic of Latvia. It was signed on behalf of Latvia by Minister of Foreign Affairs Janis Jurkans, who returned to Riga a couple of hours ago. At the news conference held at the airport he said the following:

[Begin recording] [Jurkans] This is the first inter-state protocol in which we are speaking about our relations, such as we have had them since 1921. It is declared in this protocol that Denmark recognized Latvia is an independent country in 1921, and has never recognized the incorporation of Latvia in 1940, and that the Government of Denmark follows with great satisfaction the endeavors of this democratically elected government in restoring our actual independence. The protocol also enumerates those points on which we shall cooperate with Denmark in the near future. [Word indistinct] last year we concluded one such protocol on economic and technical cooperation.

[Reporter] An agreement has been reached that both sides will form cooperation groups and such groups will meet in the future in order to begin to talk more specifically about what you said, yes?

[Jurkans] (?Well), at the present moment there are a great many such specific aspects there. One of them is the following. A fund has been established by the Government of Denmark for the support of democratization in east Europe. A certain amount in this fund has also been allocated to the Baltic states.

The following specific matters will now be done. Well, Danish specialists will help us in drawing up projects which we shall submit to the European Community's commission, which will correspondingly either accept these projects that concern transport, technology and financial relations, either they will accept those projects or not, if not [as heard]. If they accept, if those projects are of such a standard, then Latvia will have all the opportunities for receiving very concrete material assistance from the European Community.

You know, prospects depend to a very great extent on how much we ourselves are able to become organized here, because in meeting today the leaders of the Nordic Council, it was clear that we must (?after all) ourselves work in their direction, and we must present proposals, we should not wait for those people to come to us and offer themselves to us. We must work on specific projects, and those projects must be ready. We must know what we want, and we must know very specifically. This means that our government and our ministers, ministries must work on projects, and these must be distributed.

I had time during these two days to read a lot of the Western press, and to meet Western diplomats. Today I had an opportunity to meet the president of Iceland. I would like, by way of putting everything together, (?I want also) to state today that those who are shaping the foreign policy of the Soviet Union understand that the question of the Baltics is a separate question and will have to be tackled on an international scale. The activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also the utterances of the leaders of the Soviet Union, in conversations with the representatives of the Western governments, testify to this.

I would like to say that, on the one hand, our prospects in the international field are quite good. Well, I returned with a kind of optimistic view on our foreign policy prospects and certain successes in the future, but, of course, as you will understand, all that will largely depend on the development of the situation in Moscow.

The month of March will, (?however), be very significant and decisive for all of us, both in internal and external policy. [end recording]

Defense Personnel Attacked Riding Bus in Vilnius

Special Militia Said Involved

LD2003200191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Unfortunately, once again we must speak about an unpleasant matter. There were shots fired once again in Vilnius, there is bloodshed, maybe even casualties. An unpleasant incident happened about two hours ago in Vilnius. The OMON [special purpose militia detachment] is rampant once again. So far we do not have complete information. A radio report is being prepared. But here, in the Supreme Council, Rita Dapkute has information.

[Dapkute] At about 1900 there were telephone calls, and we would like to thank people for following military movements so closely. People started phoning to say that automatic weapon shots were heard at the Cvirka monument. From witnesses and from men of the country's defense department, who escaped from there, we compiled the following report:

Men of the border service of our country's defense department—it is not clear whether there were six or seven of them—were going by bus from Salcininkai. They passed [word indistinct] street along the Lyda road and near the gas station they were signalled to stop by a car carrying the OMON men. They did not stop and continued their journey, disregarding the signals. At the Lietuva cinema the OMON men started shooting into the air and then at the bus. They hit the tires and windows, and the country's defense department men collided with a trolley-bus at the Lietuva cinema. In brief, they continued their journey, but since the tires were damaged, they collided with a tree. These six or seven men then left the vehicle. At about 1945, one of them managed to come to the legislature. He has a shot wound in his thigh, and is now being taken to the hospital. It seems that another two men escaped to the country's defense department. They are not injured. So at present we know the whereabouts of three of them, and they have the beret of one of their colleagues, which has been shot through. This is not a good sign, but we know the fate of three of the men. The fate of the other three or four is unknown.

Further Details on Shooting

LD2003201491

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian at 1908 GMT on 20 March carries a report by correspondent Zenonas Miksys in Vilnius on the incident involving shooting by Special Purpose Militia Detachment [OMON] forces in the Lithuanian capital.

Miksys begins the report by saying: "A very unpleasant and unexpected incident occurred here, in Petras Cvirka Street. The registration number of the bus was 1410-LEO. The back window is broken, damaged by shots. There are many people and youths who saw this unpleasant incident."

Several voices are then heard complaining that no one has the right to shoot in the city center. They came here after the incident, but heard shots.

A female voice says: "There were injured people. Two of the injured were lying here." A male voice goes on: "Two people were lying here, they dragged them away. They did not let anyone near, they blocked the street, but there were many shots."

Later another male voice says: "They searched the bus and took something away." Another man says: "They were OMON. They were shooting with the same automatic weapons as on 13 January. There were 15 or 20 shots." Another man adds: "They loaded the bodies and took them away." A female voice is heard saying: "It seems that they shot one their own men."

Reasons for Attack Reported

LD2103102691 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0800 GMT 21 Mar 91

[Text] As we reported yesterday afternoon, the special purpose militia detachment [OMON] shot at a bus belonging to the border defense of the Republic of Lithuania at about 1900 in Pylimo Street in Vilnius.

Seven people were on the bus; three of them were wounded. Two of the wounded were detained and taken to the military commandant's office of the City of Vilnius. They were released after midnight at about 0215. Military Procurator Ushinin gave instructions to Military Commandant Belous to release the arrested men, but Belous handed the men over to Moscow's henchman, Procurator Petrauskas.

Petrauskas maintains that the only reason the bus was stopped is that OMON was informed that weapons were being transported on the bus.

Petrauskas later admitted that no weapons had been found. One of the detained workers at the border defense is in the hospital. He has serious injuries to the head and a broken rib.

Petrauskas did not allow first aid to be given to the injured.

Pugo Promises Inquiry

LD2103152491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 1300 GMT 21 Mar 91

[Excerpts] The nighttime excesses of OMON [Special Purpose Militia Detachment] continue. Here is Audris Azobolas, press attache of the Republic of Lithuania's Supreme Council:

[Azobolas] I would like to quote, to repeat what was said by Audris Butkevicius, general director of the country's defense, who assessed yesterday's bloody provocation. He said that it was a clear provocation that the organizers had hoped—hoped and still hoping—would create an armed conflict between the sides and that the conflict would expand [words indistinct] in order to bring in the troops and to finally implement the plans which they started in January. [passage omitted]

Vice Premier Vaisvila telephoned USSR Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo in Moscow and expressed his deep bewilderment and concern at what had happened, at the shootings in broad daylight. Pugo said that he knew nothing about it but promised to send his representative to Vilnius to clarify the situation and to investigate. [passage omitted]

Sajudis Announces Protest of Military Actions

LD2103121191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 21 Mar 91

[Summary] The SAJUDIS NEWS AGENCY reports that the special purpose militia detachment and the KGB provocations in Lithuania are becoming more and more insolent. Arrests of leaders and officers of the State Defense Department, shooting in the center of the city, and the stockpiling of military equipment makes it appear as if the CPSU is organizing a repeat of January's events.

Today at 1330 [1030 GMT], the Lithuanian Sajudis invites the residents of Vilnius to a protest at Savivaldybe Square, the former Chernyakhovsky Square, next to the CPSU branch at the Lithuanian Central Committee.

Targets OMON 'Murderers'

LD2103173491

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian at 1446 GMT on 21 March carries as five-minute live report by correspondent Zenonas Miksys from the scene of a protest gathering near the offices of the pro-Moscow CPSU in Vilnius.

Miksys says: "Could we, the people of Lithuania, imagine that in the capital city of the Republic of Lithuania, Vilnius, where the first breeze of spring has been felt, explosions and volleys of fire from automatic rifles would be heard in the morning and the evenings, like Baghdad or the cities of Kuwait."

Miksys reports Vilnius residents are too frightened to walk the streets of the city in the evening or drive a car. Recently, the Special Purpose Militia Detachments, the OMON, have committed violent attacks on people, he says.

Miksys gathers comments from people gathered opposite the offices of the pro-Moscow CPSU branch in Lithuania.

One speaker declares: "We came here because murderers from the OMON units are killing our people" "I would like to tell these people who are sitting behind these covered windows over there that they must not try to say this is not their plan. If this is not their plan, let them declare officially that they have nothing in common with the OMON. Then, we will have a different point of view."

Juozas Tumelis, chairman of the Lithuanian Sajudis council, says: "They have tormented us for 50 years. Now, once again, a great torment for our nation is starting. During the post-war years, the edges of our forests were covered with the corpses of our fathers, brothers and sisters. All of Siberia is paved with the bones of our brothers, sisters, fathers and grandfathers." "However, common sense and moral strength is on our side. Our determination for freedom, democracy and independence is on our side. That's how it was and that's how it will be." Miksys concludes the report by noting that Lithuanians can win through their voices and their words.

Procuracy Charges Soviet Military, Pugo

LD1903232191 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 19 May 91

[Text] The Lithuanian General Procuracy has instituted 27 criminal proceedings this year, involving crimes committed by the Soviet military. According to Deputy Procurator General Gedgaudas Norkunas, each case includes ten episodes of criminal activity and banditry. Gedgaudas Norknas confirmed that recently he had authorized institution of criminal proceedings against USSR Internal Affairs Minister Boris Pugo.

The deputy procurator general explained that, following the previously instituted criminal proceedings against the Soviet Internal Army Special Designation Unit's Chief Makutinovich, that unit's provocations continued, and Minister Pugo was advised of the fact; however, he did not initiate any action concerning this. According to the Lithuanian deputy procurator, it became apparent that everything was being done with Minister Pugo's knowledge. Criminal proceedings have been instituted against him, in accordance with Paragraph 178 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code, concerning excesses in service authorizations.

Lithuanian Security Dept Director Resigns

LD2103112291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 21 Mar 91

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Here is another decree [by the Lithuanian Government]. This decree satisfies the request by Mecys Laurinkus, director general of the State Security Department of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, to release him from this post as of 20 March.

In another decree, Viktoras Zegelis, deputy director general of the State Security Department of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania, was given the task of carrying out the duties of director general of the State Security Department of the Government of Lithuania as of 21 March.

Lithuania's Bickauskas on Moscow Negotiations

AU2103120991 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 19 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with Egividius Bickauskas, permanent Lithuanian representative to Moscow, by Szerdahelyi by telephone from Moscow on 18 March; first paragraph is introduction: "Restless Tranquility in Vilnius"]

[Text] We telephoned Egividius Bickauskas yesterday, following the Union referendum. Bickauskas referred to the situation and mood in Lithuania as restless tranquility. Bickauskas believes that Vilnius is ready for negotiations, and that the Kremlin might also be ready for talks now.

[Szerdahelyi] We do not yet know the results of the referendum that will determine the Soviet Union's future, but most people will probably have voted "yes." What does this imply for Lithuania?

[Bickauskas] Lithuania had nothing to do with this referendum, and Lithuanians hardly have anything to do with the Soviet Union. We carried out our own opinion poll in time, and Lithuanians voted for a free and independent country. Regardless of that, those Lithuanians who wanted to, could take part in the referendum on Sunday, particularly in the arms factories and barracks under Moscow's control, and they could even vote in train stations and at the airport. As far as I know, at the most, a few thousand people went to the ballot boxes. We really cannot harbor any illusions, given that the "yes" votes of the three greatest republics already strengthen Gorbachev, but this will not deter us from our goal of a negotiated settlement.

[Szerdahelyi] It can be seen as particularly significant that U.S. Secretary of State James Baker recently spent an hour talking to the permanent representatives of the Baltic republics in Moscow. What can you tell us about the subject of these discussions?

[Bickauskas] The only thing I can tell you is that James Baker confirmed that the United States definitely believes that Mikhail Gorbachev should hold substantial talks with the Baltic countries. This might not be tangible support, but at least it represents moral support—although it is impossible to foresee when concrete negotiations can actually be initiated. I still feel that Moscow is obstinately self-confident. This is illustrated by the fact that Moscow sent 2.5 million voting slips to Lithuania for the referendum on Sunday....

[Szerdahelyi] What is the situation like in Lithuania at the moment?

[Bickauskas] The public mood is extremely tense; perhaps the atmosphere is more restless than it has been for months. Maybe this is because the troops stationed in Vilnius are continuing to show their strength through their unaltered presence. There is a smaller or larger conflict almost every day; it is particularly the younger generation that finds it difficult to tolerate this "gendarme state." For example, on Saturday, a patrol shot a 14- year-old schoolboy in the leg, and the circumstances have not been clarified yet.

[Szerdahelyi] Could we speak of some kind of an economic blockade?

[Bickauskas] There can be no freedom without economic independence! That is why it would be particularly important to start negotiating on everything with Moscow as soon as possible. Our factories can only work at half steam, our shops are empty, and we will probably have to introduce a serious price increase in a few weeks' time. At this stage, we can only dream of an independent Lithuanian economy and a currency of our own. Compared to that, it is a true miracle that we already have a Lithuanian postage stamp—although the stamp is only valid within Lithuania....

Picketers Call for Returning Vilnius Buildings

LD2003180791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 1300 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] A picket started this morning on the initiative of the Lithuania-Russia Society in front of the Soviet Union's Procuracy in Moscow. Its aim is the liberation of the Lithuanian radio and television building, the press palace, the television center, and other buildings presently occupied by the Soviet Army, Communists, and komsomol members.

The picket will last several days. Among its participants are deputies of the Moscow City Soviet, employees of the Lithuanian radio and television, and many Muscovites supporting Lithuania in its striving for independence.

PRAVDA on Arrest of Lithuanian Defense Aide

PM1903165191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 Second Edition p 1

[Report by correspondent Yu. Stroganov: "It Happened One Night"]

[Text] Vilnius—There has been a big reaction to this incident, which happened at night after the referendum. Members of the Special Purpose Militia Detachment [OMON] detained a car in which they found a driver and passenger, A. Butkiavicis, general director of the Lithuanian Republic's territorial protection department, both of whom were armed.

The investigation will show what brought them here and where their weapons came from. But here is what V. Shurupov, deputy chief of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Department, said.

We received a number of phone calls from people reporting that armed groups of thugs were planning to snatch referendum documents at voting precincts. Lookouts watching to see which people and vehicles came to the precincts were noted and in some places detained. The lookouts had even filled in a special log, which was confiscated. This frightened people. Preventive measures had to be taken...

At about 0100, when people began carrying referendum documents out of the Vilnius district commission building, one OMON member spotted an approaching "Vosmerka" [type of automobile] bearing an official license plate. He recalled that the plate was from a different vehicle—belonging to the Lithuanian Voluntary Society for the Promotion of the Army, Aviation, and Navy Central Committee—which is being sought. The driver was carrying a Belgian Browning. The passenger—A. Butkiavicius—was carrying a fully loaded prewar Walther with a cartridge in the barrel. In the same car there were also nine boxes of Makarov pistol cartridges, which also fit a Browning, a Margolina pistol, a hunting rifle, an optical sight, and... the vehicle's own state license plates.

Landsbergis on 'Hostile' Attempts To Hold Poll

PM2103113391 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 12 Mar 91 p 1

[Statement signed by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, in Vilnius on 7 March: "Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium Statement"]

[Text] Despite the fact that the Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium and Government clearly set out its attitude to the 17 March 1991 USSR referendum in its 22 February 1991 statement, USSR state organs, with the help of CPSU organizations, are actively trying to stage the referendum in Lithuania. As a result of their interference and pressure certain self-governing soviets and leaders of enterprises under so-called Union jurisdiction have decided to organize the referendum in violation of Lithuanian laws.

The Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium states that this activity by certain self-governing bodies and enterprise leaders promotes the infringement by the USSR and particularly the CPSU of Lithuanian sovereignty and territorial integrity. These activities deserve to be condemned and punished. Moreover, the decisions by self-governing soviets or the directives from officials on the basis of which attempts are being made to implement the resolutions of another country's state organs are illegal and cannot be carried out.

The Lithuanian Supreme Council Presidium issues this warning to self-governing organs, officials, and leaders of enterprises and organizations, and ppeals to them to stop this hostile and criminal activity which is damaging to the state. We call on citizens not to take part in the CPSU's political intrigues, not to whip up tension, and not to get drawn into provocations aimed at attempting to alienate Lithuanian society. The proper attitude to these actions is not to heed them and not to participate in them.

[Signed] V. Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council
Vilnius, 7 March 1991

Landsbergis Meets With Lithuanians Living Abroad

PM2003163991 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 12 Mar 91 p 1

[ELTA report: "Strengthening Ties With Communities"]

[Text] Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, met 9 March with a large group of leaders of Lithuanian communities and organizations abroad. Lithuanian representatives from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Estonia, Latvia, the Ukraine, Moldova, Poland, Leningrad, Moscow, and other areas took part in the meeting.

The meeting discussed questions of strengthening ties with Lithuanian communities and organizations, preserving the Lithuanian legacy, and the problems of Lithuanians living outside the republic who want to return home.

Lithuanian Paper Editors Appeal to Gorbachev

91UN1098C Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 20 Feb 91 p 1

[Appeal to USSR President and CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev by a group of editors from the republic newspapers of Lithuania: "Appeal to M.S. Gorbachev"]

[Text] **A group of editors of the republic newspapers of Lithuania sent a letter to the USSR President and CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.**

The letter says:

It has been more than a month since paratroopers supported by tanks and armored personnel carriers seized the House of the Press in Vilnius. Journalists, clerical employees of a publishing house, and printers were ejected from their work stations within minutes in the rudest manner.

Therefore, more than 400 journalists have been deprived of normal working conditions. Newspapers and magazines of reduced sizes have been published belatedly, which is a breach of our obligations to subscribers. The editorial offices have suffered tremendous losses.

As we have learned, the military action was undertaken on the initiative of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, with the support of the CPSU Central Committee, with a view to "taking custody of CPSU assets." However, the rights of journalists as people were egregiously violated in the process. They were thrown out of the building under guard, as if they were criminals. Legal order was violated; in particular, the laws on the press of both the Republic of Lithuania and the USSR were flouted. We cannot but interpret this action as abandonment by the CPSU of the freedom of speech and pluralism of views that it proclaims, as an attack by conservative forces on the freedom of the press, and as the imposition of censorship by means of a lockout.

As far as the assets of the CPSU are concerned (the building, equipment, TV sets, radio equipment, cassette recorders, telephone sets, and so on), all of them are being shamelessly stolen now. According to preliminary calculations, losses have already come to about 2 million rubles.

It is not our intention to analyze in detail the economic, political, and moral aspects of highway robbery. We appeal to you, esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich, in your capacity as USSR president, whose duty it is to uphold and defend the constitutional rights of citizens and organizations, to review what has happened and punish those who are guilty severely.

We, the editors of the affected publications, demand that:

—the organizers of the bloody action apologize to the collectives of the editorial offices and the publishing house that operated in the House of the Press, and restore the situation as of 10 January. Their actions should be evaluated by the courts;

—the labor collectives and individual journalists, workers, and clerical employees be fully compensated for losses inflicted on them.

We ask you, esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich, to do everything in order to prevent a repetition of such shameful actions in the future.

We hope that these issues will be resolved very soon.

The letter was signed by the editors of the newspapers: KURIER WILENSKI—Z. Balcewicz, VALSTIECIU LAIKRASTIS—V. Butenas, LIETUVOS RITAS—G. Vainauskas, AITVARAS—L. Drazdauskaite, EKHO LITVY—V. Yemelyanov, VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI—V. Zeimaitas, TIESA—D. Sniukas.

Details of Lithuanian-Ukraine Treaty Reported

91UN1094A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian 27 Feb 91 p 1

[Article by ELTA special correspondent Jonas Bagdanskis: "Events in Lithuania: Assessments, Reactions, Opinions"]

[Text] Kiev, 25 Feb—A meeting took place today at the residence of the Ukrainian Government between authorized delegations of the Lithuanian Republic Government and Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Government. Details of a treaty signed almost three months ago on bilateral trade, economic, and cultural cooperation were discussed at the meeting.

Each of the parties has projected preliminary sales to the other this year of goods in the amount of almost 900 million rubles (in new prices). This means that Lithuania is counting on obtaining from the Ukraine almost one-tenth of all production purchased from the USSR, including products we especially need for ferrous and non- ferrous metallurgy enterprises, metal working, and chemical industry enterprises, as well as a significant amount of consumer goods and certain food products. In accordance with forecasted levels of industrial and agricultural production, leading functionaries of the Ministries of Economics, Trade, Material Resources, and Agriculture have coordinated with their colleagues from the Ukraine trade turnover volumes and procedures for supply and accounting acceptable to both parties.

The Protocol on Trade and Economic Cooperation in 1991 was signed by Deputy Prime Minister Vytautas Pakalniskis, of the Lithuanian Republic, and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers Viktor Urchukin, in the name of the Ukrainian SSR Government.

RSFSR

Council Approves Draft Federative Treaty

LD2003192791 Moscow TASS in English 1857 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondents Lev Aksyonov, Yuriy Kozmin and Andrey Surzhanskiy]

[Text] Moscow March 20 (TASS)—The draft federative treaty and the participation of the Russian Federation and its member republics in signing an all-Union treaty were today discussed at a meeting of the republican Council of the Federation.

In addition to the Russian parliament President Boris Yeltsin, the Council includes presidents of the parliaments of autonomous republics, regions and areas, as well as representatives of territories, regions and cities of republican subordination.

The draft federative treaty stipulates that "a federative treaty will divide powers between federative bodies of authority and members forming the Russian Federation."

The document envisages that the republics forming the Russian Federation "unite with other sovereign states in the Soviet Union, delegating some of their powers to the union."

The meeting approved the draft federative treaty after its discussion. It was decided to send the document for the consideration of councils of all levels.

There was a stormy debate on the participation of Russia and its member republics in an all-Union treaty. A working group, which had drafted a union treaty, had consisted of representatives from many autonomous republics, members of the Russian Federation.

The meeting debated the following question: Does the direct participation of their representatives in signing an all-Union treaty mean their secession from the Russian Federation?

However, the debate showed that not a single autonomous republic is interested in Russia's split.

The meeting came to the following conclusion: "A Union treaty will be signed, on behalf of the Russian Federation, by a plenipotentiary delegation of the Russian Federation, consisting of delegations from national-state and national-territorial entities, as well as representatives from administrative-territorial entities."

Republics forming the Russian Federation, remaining equal members of the Russian Federation, independently decide the question on their participation in a union treaty."

The document, approved today by the meeting, says that relations between the Russian Federation and its members are regulated by a federative treaty.

However, the final say on the signing by Russia of a union treaty will be made by the republican Congress of People's Deputies to open in Moscow on March 28.

Yeltsin Chairs Supreme Soviet Presidium Sessions

20 March Session

LD2003224691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1815 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow, 20 Mar (TASS)—A session of the Presidium of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet took place here today under the chairmanship of Boris Yeltsin, the press service of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet reports.

A report was heard about the Russian Government's measures to switch the republic's economy over to market relations, presented by Ivan Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers. In accordance with the results of the discussion, it was decided to take cognizance of the report and to instruct the Presidium of the Republic's Council of Ministers to put the finishing touches to the proposals for measures to switch the RSFSR's economy over to market relations, bearing in mind the comments that had been made. The measures drawn up by the Council of Ministers are to be presented to the people's deputies at the Third (Extraordinary) RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies.

Also considered at the session was the progress of work on the draft federative and Union treaties.

13 March Session

PM2003131391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Press Service report: "RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Session"]

[Text] A scheduled session of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium was held in the RSFSR House of Soviets 13 March. The session was chaired by RSFSR Supreme

Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman V.M. Isayev.

The session discussed the results of official visits by working groups headed by RSFSR People's Deputies G.I. Zadonskiy, A.A. Kotenkov, Ye.A. Tarasov, S.P. Shustov, and S.N. Yushenkov to the Chuvash SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Khabarovsk Kray, Voronezh Oblast, Moscow Oblast, and Nenets Autonomous Okrug. It devoted special attention to questions concerning work with RSFSR legislation at the local level and to cases of this legislation being "blocked" by leaders of soviets at various levels who also hold posts in the party. The adopted resolution indicates the need to more strictly monitor implementation of legislation and resolutions passed by Congresses of RSFSR People's Deputies, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, and its Presidium, and to speed up the process of preparing and submitting to the RSFSR Supreme Soviet for discussion draft legislation, and also draft changes to a number of laws on the basis of proposals made at local level.

There was an exchange of opinions connected with the presentation of the RSFSR Law "On Enhancing Social Guarantees for Working People."

The session discussed progress made in implementing the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Resolution "On Measures To Ensure the Holding of the USSR Referendum and the RSFSR Referendum on 17 March 1991." It adopted decisions aimed at ensuring that everyone living in the RSFSR will have a real opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to take part in these referendums.

The session also discussed other questions concerning the republic's state life.

Communist Party Joint Plenum Resolution

91UN1109A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Mar 91 First Edition pp 1-2

[Resolution of the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party of 6 March 1991: 'On the Tasks of Communists for Stabilizing the Sociopolitical Situation in the Republic']

[Text] 1. The sociopolitical crisis in the republic continues to worsen. The level and quality of the life of the people is declining and the threat to the citizens' safety is increasing. The situation contains the danger of a social explosion. It is being provoked by forces working to seize power, to eliminate the soviets, to split the state apart, and to restore bourgeois policies. Anticommunism has become the ideological banner for some of them.

While supporting the main ideas and conclusions of the report, the plenum regards the most important political task of all organizations of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party to be the preservation of civil peace, the achievement of nationwide harmony in the republic, and the emergence from the critical socioeconomic and spiritual crisis.

For a successful solution to this problem, party organizations must unite with trade unions, workers, peasants, and youth, veteran, and women's organizations, and call for help from all party and social movements that are in favor of restoring constitutional order and maintaining the integrity of our Union state.

2. The plenum calls upon Russian communists and all citizens of the RSFSR to express their opinion about preserving the Union on 17 March 1991.

It is necessary to actively explain to the party committees and local party organizations the political significance of the USSR referendum and its immense importance for the fate of the country, the peoples of Russia, and Russians living outside the territory of the RSFSR. A broad public movement should be developed for the speediest signing of the new Union treaty and improvement of interethnic relations.

The plenum thinks that in this stage, party committees and organizations must place questions related to the development and adoption of the new RSFSR constitution at the center of the attention of communists and all workers. The most energetic propaganda work must be done concerning the draft prepared by the group of RSFSR people's deputies who are communists. Discussion of this should be organized in the party committee plenums, meetings of communists and labor collectives, and in the places where the citizens reside, and active support should be drummed up. We must resolutely unmask attempts on the part of antisocialist forces to change the social system, eliminate the power of the soviets through partial changes in the existing RSFSR constitution, and also to push these ideas through the draft of the work group of the constitutional commission of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

3. All units of the RSFSR Communist Party must take energetic measures to provide for constructive work of the communist deputies. Party groups (factions made up of communists) must be formed in soviets at all levels. Through them we must coordinate the work and increase the responsibility of communist deputies, above all for carrying out the expressed will and orders of the constituents and for implementing the CPSU socioeconomic policy in the interests of the people. Every communist deputy must participate actively in the work of party groups (factions) in the soviets.

Party committees must provide for sociopolitical support of the initiative of deputy factions of communists and help deputies in preparing drafts of legislative acts and decisions. The tactics for their actions must be developed energetically at sessions and congresses of people's deputies, and they must move more resolutely toward contacts with other parties and social movements to jointly influence the solutions to personnel problems in management and executive power organs. The activity of communist deputies should be actively publicized through the party mass media, their positions should be explained, and the labor collectives and population in the places of residence should be informed about the results of the work of the labor collectives.

Control commissions of party organs in conjunction with party committees and primary party organizations must provide a fundamental assessment of the activity of the communist deputies who are not fulfilling their promises to the voters and, through their lack of initiative or incorrect actions, are undermining party authority. In this case it is necessary to raise the question of recalling these deputies.

4. The Central Committee and Central Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party makes it incumbent on all party organizations to render all kinds of support for measures for stabilizing the socioeconomic situation in the country proposed by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers.

The plenum is in favor of having communists—RSFSR people's deputies, leaders and party committees of organs of state and economic administration—act as initiators of the implementation of extraordinary economic measures:

—the restoration of the destroyed republic structures for coordinating the activity of industrial enterprises and construction organizations, the arrangement of economic ties, and the observance of contractual discipline;

—the renewal of state regulation of the development of the economy which provides for the basic national economic needs of the republic and the country;

—the organization of the development of state long-range and current plans for the economic and social development of the RSFSR with the inclusion in them of republic programs adopted by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies.

These measures should be regarded as a necessary prerequisite for overcoming the general deficit, preventing further decline of public production, and creating a market infrastructure.

5. The plenum confirms its support for the directive of the 28th CPSU Congress for forming a multistructured economy, which provides for equal legislative rights for all forms of ownership and management and precludes any forms of exploitation of humans.

Party organizations must take control over the withdrawal of the state from property ownership and make sure that this process takes place within the framework of legislative regulation with a clear idea of the mechanism, scale, and sequence of its implementation. We must insist on direct participation by the labor collectives in the withdrawal of the state from property ownership and resolutely prevent administrative coercion in this matter.

The primary party organizations, raykoms [rayon committees], gorkoms [city committees], kraykoms [kray committees], and republic committees of the Communist Party must in all ways support management personnel of enterprises and organizations, on whose shoulders the conditions of the crisis of management structures, the lack of balance of the economy, and the disintegration of economic ties have placed exceptionally difficult tasks. It is necessary to render them support in organization and material and technical support for production, strengthening of technological and labor discipline, training and retraining of personnel, and improvement of the moral and psychological climate in the collectives.

6. The primary cause of party organizations and all communists should be participation in increasing the output of industrial consumer goods, improving the food supply and consumer services for the population, and increasing the volumes of housing and cultural-domestic construction. Communists who are RSFSR people's deputies, taking into account the state tax and price policy, must prepare a complex of legislative acts that envision economic incentives for enterprises producing consumer goods.

Programs for the development of the social and cultural sphere, housing construction, and increased production of consumer goods, which were developed previously and enjoyed mass support from the workers, must be restored. Taking into account the changing situation in the economy, the corresponding adjustments must be made to these programs.

It is necessary to support the efforts of defense enterprises for setting up production of equipment for producing consumer goods and developing services. Communists working in the central economic organs of the country and republics must solve the problem of financing scientific research and experimental design work for creating equipment for the food, light, and medical industries.

We must make sure that during the course of conversion we do not forfeit the country's defense capability or the scientific and technical potential accumulated at enterprises of the defense complex. We must recall that the armed forces require constant attention and constant concern from society as well as the provision of modern weapons and combat equipment.

7. The plenum expresses a great deal of concern about making sure that the program adopted by the extraordinary RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies for the restoration of the Russian rural areas and the development of the agro-industrial complex and the priority it has assigned to the advancement of agriculture are actually realized. We are not providing for equivalency of exchange between industry and the agrarian sector, and the material and technical support for the agro-industrial complex has deteriorated sharply. The unrestrained growth of prices of industrial products and

resources and the differences in services and construction lead to further destruction and impoverishment of the kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] as well as a deepening of the food crisis.

Party organizations and committees at all levels and all communists must prevent actions directed toward the destruction and elimination of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, head up healthy forces, and direct them toward unconditional advancement of agriculture. It is necessary to take measures to strengthen the union of the working class and the peasantry and return to the programs for patronage assistance from industrial enterprises to agriculture, which were developed in each labor collective and in each city and region.

8. In their work for implementing the CPSU's social policy, party organizations must devote special attention to the most vulnerable segments of the population—pensioners, women, youth, and children.

The party committees in conjunction with the soviet organs are obliged to be concerned about providing for the stable operation of enterprises of light, the textile, and the food industry, which provide for mass employment of women, and not allow unemployment in these branches of the national economy.

It is necessary to participate actively in the development of youth social programs, having envisioned concrete measures for the creation of conditions for youth to start out during the transition to the market economy.

9. Republic committees, kraykoms, obkoms, gorkoms, and raykoms of the party must develop plans of action for organizational and political reinforcement of party organizations in keeping with the decree of the January (1991) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission as well as the decisions of the present plenum. In March of this year, discussion of related issues must be completed in the plenums of party committees and primary party organizations.

Primary attention must be devoted to work for enlisting in the CPSU politically active, respected workers, peasants, economic leaders, engineering and technical personnel, scientists, cultural figures, and journalists. The practice of holding conversations with communists must be expanded. Taking advantage of individual approaches, the process of departure of members from the party must be actively brought to a halt. At the same time it is necessary to deal according to principles and actively get rid of those who, while in the ranks of the CPSU, work against it and are trying to destroy the party from within. Communists must be held more strictly responsible for prompt and complete payment of their party dues.

Members of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission and members of primary party committees and control organs must be instructed to rely mainly on direct work with primary party organizations and above all with those that have ended up in a difficult situation and are continuing to relinquish positions. They should be given assistance in restoring the influence of communists on the affairs and situation in the collectives. Where necessary we must restore the structural party units, especially in the shops and brigades. We must show constant concern for strengthening the membership and improving the activity of primary territorial party organizations.

The role of city and rayon party committees in the life of their regions must be restored on a new and democratic basis. All organizational-political work should be devoted to the task of strengthening the influence of party organizations on the course of perestroyka processes and not end with intraparty affairs and discussions. It should be considered impermissible for factions to be organized within the party or for them to publish their own newspapers.

10. The plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission makes it incumbent on party committees of all levels to step up ideological-political work in the primary party organizations and with the population in their places of residence. They must constantly study the sociopolitical situation and predict its development. Measures must be taken for a radical renewal of forms and methods of party propaganda, political information, and training of communists. At the same time, it is necessary to expand the practice of direct communication with the labor collectives, various groups of the population, military subdivisions, and their political organs.

The commissions of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party must pay more attention to scientific interpretation of the practice of the renewal of the society and develop the preparation of proposals from the RSFSR Communist Party for the new Communist Party Program. Scientists, specialists, and the creative intelligentsia should be invited to participate in this process. Collectives of party scientific and educational institutions located on the territory of the republic should be requested to engage more actively in the development of a strategy and tactics for the political and ideological activity of the RSFSR Communist Party.

The Central Committee Secretariat must implement the necessary measures for overcoming the fact that the mass media ignore the activity of the RSFSR Communist Party. We must resolutely speak out against slanderous attacks and deliberate distortions of its political positions. We must accelerate the creation of our own information base. Party committees must energetically resolve problems of the development of the party press and its material and personnel support.

11. The plenum considers it vitally important to take advantage of all forms of work for strengthening the unity of the CPSU. For these purposes it is necessary to develop horizontal bilateral and multilateral ties with all Communist Parties of Union republics, and also to conduct dialogue with Communist Parties that have

declared themselves independent. The Politburo and Secretariat of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee must set up a system of permanent consultation with the executive organs of the Communist Parties and display initiative in carrying out coordinated political actions. Republic, kray, oblast, city, and rayon organizations of the RSFSR Communist Party must establish regular contacts with local party organizations of republic Communist Parties.

The plenum considers it necessary to expand the independent ties of the RSFSR Communist Party with foreign political parties. We must render moral support to communists of the countries of Eastern Europe and resolutely oppose the outbreak of anticommunism.

The plenum expresses its firm conviction that communists will display a great deal of organization, discipline, solidarity, ideological unity, and party comradeship in the struggle for stabilizing the sociopolitical situation in the republic, reinforcing ideas of socialism and the integrity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and ensuring Soviet Russia's development along the path of socioeconomic progress.

Democratic Russia Official on Referendum Results

LD2003203191 Moscow TASS in English 1947 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Agabekov]

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS— Members of the coordinating board of the Democratic Russia Movement have said that the question put to the national vote in the March 17 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union failed to receive enough support in the major cities in Russia and beyond.

Speaking on behalf of the movement at a news conference here today, Moscow Council Deputy Vladimir Boxer said "a majority voted in favour of preserving the Union only in places where information blackout and the dictate of local party committees prevailed."

In Moscow, for example, a fraction above 50 per cent of voters cast their ballots in favour of the Union. However, in many places, including districts adjacent on Moscow, the number of supporters of the Union amounted to 80 per cent.

Boxer told the news conference that the Democratic Russia Movement acted during the referendum in conjunction with representatives of Russian entrepreneurs, the workers' movement, intellectuals—this alliance took shape at a meeting of democratic forces on March 9 this year" [no opening quote as recieved].

According to Boxer, the decision of the overwhelming majority of citizens of the Russian Federation that the president of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic should be elected by the people is the referendum's most important result. It expresses, Boxer said, popular support of the state sovereignty of Russia and the policy of Boris Yeltsin, who was the first to announce that he would run in the elections to the post of Russia's president.

Compensation Payments Begin for Increased Prices

LD2003142491 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1349 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Compensation payments to the population begin today in connection with the increase in retail prices. The total sum of money set aside for compensation will amount, as far as Russia is concerned, to 146 billion rubles [R]. During the first stage, payments will be made to all those employed in accordance with a special register and subsequently the payments will be incorporated in their wages. Moreover, the limit of the population's untaxed income and the level of income above which a progressive tax begins to be levied will be increased by R60.

Leaked Party Report on Yeltsin Rostov Speech

PM2003142191 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 2

[Unattributed report under the "Without Comment" rubric: "Not To Be Read by Outsiders"—first paragraph is introduction]

[Text] USSR People's Deputy V. Zubkov has passed to our Rostov correspondent Yu. Bespalov a document stamped "For Official Use Only", circulated by Rostov CPSU Obkom [oblast party committee] among the oblast's party aktiv. We cite excerpts from it.

From an analytical note by Rostov CPSU Obkom Information Analysis Center:

"The Rostov CPSU Obkom Information Analysis Center conducted a sociological poll aimed at elucidating the public reaction to the speech made by B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, on Central Television 19 February.

"...A positive attitude towards B.N. Yeltsin both as a man and as a politician is prevalent among the population... About 60 percent of respondents support his political line. About 19 percent of respondents consider themselves his political opponents.

"...Public opinion gives an inappropriate assessment of the main purpose of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman's speech. The dominant opinion among the majority is that the main aim of B.N. Yeltsin's television speech was to extricate the country from the crisis (27 percent), while 6 percent of respondents mentioned the intensification of political confrontation in the country as its goal... Consequently, a distorted idea is prevalent in public opinion that it is possible to extricate the country from the crisis only through political confrontation.

"...About 60 percent of respondents support the anticonstitutional suggestion made in the speech that the USSR president should resign and power be handed over to the Federation Council. Only one-fifth of respondents (21 percent) expressed an unambiguously negative attitude to such a proposal.

"...The impression that middle-aged women are significantly prevalent among B.N. Yeltsin's supporters proved groundless.

"...CPSU membership had only an insignificant effect on the nature of assessments. Thus whereas 64 percent of nonparty citizens consider themselves supporters of B.N. Yeltsin, the figure among CPSU members is 46 percent. A significantly powerful polarization of opinion among communist respondents can be seen on the issue of the USSR president's resignation. Forty-three percent of polled Communists expressed support for this proposal, while 46 percent responded negatively.

"...At the present time there are disagreements among various social categories of the population on the question of the assessment of B.N. Yeltsin's political role. The greatest rejection of this political figure is typical of leaders at different levels, and also of workers. Some 35 percent of leaders and 29 percent of workers polled gave a negative assessment of B.N. Yeltsin's political activity in their replies. B.N. Yeltsin enjoys greatest popularity among representatives of the humanitarian intelligentsia, with his rating in this population group standing at 70 percent.

"...The overall conclusion from this research is that B.N. Yeltsin's high popularity among the population is determined mainly by his populist image as fighter for justice and defender of ordinary people, an image which is sufficiently firmly rooted in people's minds, and by growing dissatisfaction with the policy of the Union center and the USSR president.

"The research enables us to formulate several very general recommendations for the organization and conduct of political and ideological work among Communists and the population... Attention in work with Communists should focus on the political aspects of B.N. Yeltsin's activity, stressing in this his desire to exacerbate confrontation and political struggle... It would be expedient for attention in work with nonparty members to concentrate mainly on the possible consequences of the resignation of the Union organs of power, proposed by B.N. Yeltsin in contravention of the USSR Constitution. It is necessary to show that, in the conditions of weakening Union power, such a path of development may have catastrophic consequences.

"...Noisy propaganda campaigns, and especially accusations against B.N. Yeltsin, should be avoided in the immediate future as these may have the opposite effect. At the same time, it is expedient to draw the attention of public opinion to the hysterical nature, inconsistency, and inclination to authoritarianism in both the character and the activity of this political leader..."

Isayev Interviewed on Criticism of Yeltsin

91UN1123A Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 2

[Interview with B. Isayev, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by SELSKAYA ZHIZN staff; place and date not given: "The Responsibility of a Leader"]

[Text] **B.M. Isayev, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, answers the questions of readers of SELSKAYA ZHIZN.**

In the days that preceded the referendum, many SELSKAYA ZHIZN readers called the telephone number announced by the editorial office and asked questions that troubled them in conjunction with events taking place in the country. In the "Thank You!" notice on 16 March we thanked our readers and promised that the newspaper would respond later to the questions they had asked. In particular, many asked for an explanation of the political situation which exists in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet and for more details on the need for the 28 March convocation of the extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies and on the fight taking place in the Russian parliament. At the request of SELSKAYA ZHIZN correspondents, one of the members of the Russian Supreme Soviet Presidium, who signed the Political Statement, responds to these questions.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Boris Mikhaylovich, what served as the basis for the adoption of a ruling that is so unexpected and far-reaching in its consequences—the convocation of an extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies?

[Isayev] Indeed, this ruling is exceptionally important and it really does have far-reaching consequences. But I would like to stress that this ruling did not come out of the blue; the foundations were laid by all the preceding activities of the Russian Supreme Soviet and its supreme administrative structure, the Presidium.

Our differences with B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet, have especially begun to grow recently. They have formed around a whole circle of quite important issues, beginning with the style and methods of leadership and ending with the fundamental strategic issues of the activities of the Russian Supreme Soviet.

For myself, I believe that the present position of the Russian Federation may be characterized as one of crisis. There is reason to ask why this is happening and what role the Supreme Soviet and its leader should have played in correcting this situation.

I would especially like to emphasize that I personally am not an enemy of the market and of the transaction to market relations, and although my opponents, of course, are currently trying to hang the label of a conservative on me, I stand by my beliefs.

The market is really quite unavoidable. But the strategy and tactics for the transition to the market should, in my opinion, be completely different from those that the respected B.N. Yeltsin supports.

I believe that there will be an extremely complicated and long transition period on the path to market relations. It is impossible to move such an enormous republic or, for example, the Union from one system to another in a very short period of time. That is utopia, and a criminal utopia at that. Based on this, it is necessary to build a political and economic line of conduct whose main feature will be an exceptionally well-considered, thoughtful rejection of what we had previously. This rejection should be carried out only to the extent that new structures are created. If we move too quickly on this, the situation will be fraught with difficult consequences such as those we are seeing even now.

A second fundamental point. We believe that during this worsening crisis which now involves our entire Union, including the Russian Federation, the question of consolidating all healthy forces is fundamentally important. We believe that confrontation with the center and confrontation with legal structures of the Union inflicts exceptionally grave damage on the common cause and that it is simply intolerable. It can lead to nothing but a "war of laws" and the economic chaos that results. Naturally this disenfranchises and stirs up people, and their motivation to work weakens, with all the negative consequences that ensue from that.

Despite the existing situation, B.N. Yeltsin, especially recently, has set a course for harsh, uncompromising confrontation with the center and with M.S. Gorbachev that I consider completely intolerable.

I would also like to mention the international aspect of the so-called "war of laws" and the aggravation of economic instability connected with it. It is quite clear that a fundamental improvement in the entire sociopolitical situation within the RSFSR and in the USSR as a whole will unavoidably be connected with the broad, judicious attraction of foreign capital and foreign aid. After all, it is no secret that American, German, and British businessmen are quite clear about the main reason for their lowered interest in cooperation with us: It is the increase in instability and, primarily, the aggravation of the confrontation between the two leaders, B.N. Yeltsin and M.S. Gorbachev.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] One can understand the Western businessmen. But we would like to return to our internal affairs...

[Isayev] I agree, let us return to Russian affairs. A subject of especially bitter dispute in its political aspect and in the economic one as well is the work on the new Russian Constitution. Of course, the old constitution is hopelessly out of date; some of its provisions are obsolete. Here there can be no argument. At the same time, a new constitution must nonetheless be based on the recognized values that were defined previously and should not break with them so abruptly. But that version of the constitution which is ready now, and which B.N. Yeltsin supports unambiguously, is nonetheless distinguished by an exceptionally abrupt turn and a sharp break with the very things that quite recently were the object of attention and the object of well-known pride among broad sectors of the Russian population. And a sharp break, an abrupt turn to the side of capitalism, the creation in Russia of bourgeois customs, and an abrupt abandonment of everything that previously was the life of many millions of people will not, in my opinion, be properly accepted by wide sectors of the population.

I repeat once more: I am not clinging to old, outdated dogmas and formulas, but the new should be introduced to life only to the extent that a new readiness by broad sectors of the population to accept it is created. Otherwise, I must repeat, prolonged chaos will ensue that does not promise anything positive.

The question of the activities of the Supreme Soviet Presidium is also a subject of conversation. In our political statement we noted that we have repeatedly tried to explain in a comradely fashion the most acceptable ways and methods of working together with B.N. Yeltsin. But in general our attempts have yielded nothing.

Recently the activities of B.N. Yeltsin have increasingly manifested what I would call an authoritarian style. He increasingly relies on people formed from a staff of assistants who have nothing in common with the legally elected organs of power. That is, in essence a course has been taken toward replacement of those representatives of the organs of power who have earned the trust of the congress and who should probably be working in close cooperation with the leader of the Russian Supreme Soviet. An unwarranted tendency toward undivided authority and toward the adoption of decisions that are not discussed ahead of time in the Supreme Soviet Presidium and which are not preceded by any collective discussion of the situation inevitably puts the majority of the members of the Presidium, to put it mildly, in a very difficult situation. And, naturally, it does not contribute to friendly, fruitful work in the highest echelon of the Russian administration. Certainly we can hardly agree with this. And, of course, it is not a question of ambitions but of our common duty to find the most acceptable solutions.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] Boris Mikhaylovich, for broad circles of the Russian population you—please do not be offended—are a relatively little-known figure. After your election as deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet we often saw you in the Presidium for the most part holding your peace, so to speak. How should we evaluate your previous silence? Were you really biding your time and do you now believe that it has arrived, as your opponents say of you?

[Isayev] Well, by temperament I am not the type of person to seek out a microphone and broadcast my position without careful, comprehensive, judicious meditation on each issue... And I consider what I have said in relation to the political statement to have been carefully thought through. In general I must say that I speak out against any excess politicization of the activities of the Supreme Soviet.

Of course the Supreme Soviet is a political organ and it should be involved with these issues, but in the process one should probably not completely repudiate vitally important economic issues which, if ignored, might cause irrecoverable damage to the general political situation in Russia. I would like to cite a specific example from the current situation.

It is no secret to anyone that the sowing is coming up soon. If we do not mobilize our forces right away and if we do not conduct the sowing in an appropriate manner, then naturally we will not get the harvest we need. Under conditions of the present instability, under conditions of a "goods famine," the slightest interruption in the sowing will affect the harvest very negatively.

This year, of course, has been marked by great difficulties in supplying the population with food, but for the most part these difficulties are connected with its distribution and redistribution between regions. In principle, after all, there is food in Russia; it is simply that we have not been able to, so to say, dispose of it. But if we ruin the present sowing campaign, we will be threatened in the coming year, and in this year as well, with an absence of food—there will simply be nothing to distribute.

[SELSKAYA ZHIZN] In conjunction with this we would like to mention the accusations against "the six" by the "democrats" that your statement may be hindering coordinated work.

[Isayev] To be frank, I do not completely understand the reaction of the "democrats" and the so-called independent press.

If one evaluates our actions on the basis of democratic principles generally acknowledged in the modern world, then nothing special has happened. A certain portion of the Presidium did not agree with the forms, methods, and leadership style of our leader and they openly, honestly, and publicly offered a critical evaluation of his actions.

In my opinion, this is a common democratic step which is used fairly widely throughout the civilized world. Why should the situation be dramatized? But how many epithets and how many labels have been printed by the "democratic" press! They reproach us, for instance, for the fact that it was done in Boris Nikolayevich's absence. But it was not timed that way intentionally, it just happened that way—B.N. Yeltsin left Moscow unexpectedly.

Incidentally, I would like to mention that in his television speech, B.N. Yeltsin called for the president's resignation. It seems that for Boris Nikolayevich, this action is quite permissible—he publicly and openly called for the resignation of the legally elected president and the supreme power of the Union. And us? We did not even call for Boris Nikolayevich's resignation. We honestly and directly spoke out with a criticism of his actions. And to this step, so widely applied in the democratic world, there was harsh reaction from the democratic side.

What is happening? It is permissible for the democrats, but all the rest are forbidden such actions? Does this tally with true democracy? I think not.

I consider it necessary to express my opinion concerning one more important issue. It is a question of the personnel policy of B.N. Yeltsin. I think it is clear to many people that the emphasis put on democratically-minded young cadres over five to six months has turned out to be completely unwarranted. I believe this example demonstrates a certain haste which, in my opinion, is natural to B.N. Yeltsin.

The economic processes in the Russian Federation are notable for their exceptional complexity. As a result, in addition to youth and democratic convictions, the leaders of the appropriate Russian structures, committees, and ministries, and of the Russian Council of Ministers must also possess the necessary experience—I stress this—experience in working in higher economic echelons.

In general I would like to say that I am not satisfied with the actions of the Russian administration. I believe that the ineffectiveness of its operations and its inability to cope with the demands of the times is predetermined for the most part by the absence of the necessary competence and the necessary experience.

True, in my opinion I. Silayev has recently realized this. In particular, two very important appointments by him testify to this: R. Batkayev to the post of minister of labor and I. Lazarev to the post of minister of finances. These are people who have the necessary experience and knowledge of the subject. And their appointment has in general immediately stabilized activities in these areas of operations to some degree.

In conclusion I will repeat: Life demands not confrontation at the highest echelon of power but very responsible and coordinated actions.

Appeal Condemns Goryacheva Blacklisting

PM2003164591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 20 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Women's Council representatives' Appeal: "To the Third Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, People's Deputies"]

[Text] Esteemed People's Deputies!

Representatives from RSFSR republic, kray, and oblast women's councils are submitting this appeal to you. We, your electors, are deeply concerned about the situation developing around Deputy S.P. Goryacheva and others who support her views. Can it be that now, in the 1990's, a speech criticizing B.N. Yeltsin can put an individual—a woman!—onto the enemy blacklist? We do not see the need to prove each individual's right to their own point of view, their own assessment of our Russia's state of affairs. This is not treason but a wholly natural demand on the part of a citizen and deputy to express and staunchly defend a personal position.

We are not asking—we are demanding that you, our elected representatives, put a stop to this injustice, this distortion of high democratic principles. We have no doubt that the people's deputies will stand up for Goryacheva and will succeed in defending that democracy without which the constructive activity of our republic's highest organ of power is meaningless. [Signed] Andryushina (Samara)

Afanasyeva (Ivanovo)

Baranova (Penza), and others.

A total of 88 signatures.

Goryacheva's Media Access Questioned

91UN1105A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 11, Mar 91 p 3

[Unattributed report: "So This Is Pluralism"]

[Text] A group of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] deputies and members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet (see ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 9, 1991) has leveled accusations at me, and also at five officials of the Supreme Soviet who signed the Political Statement. The essence of the accusation is that we have abused our official position and managed to have my statement presented at the morning session of the Supreme Soviet on 21 February 1991, broadcast directly on radio and television.

In this connection I beg leave to ask the following:

1) On which radio and television channels was my statement relayed on 21 February 1991? 2) Was there a direct relay of the text of the statement?

[Signed]) S.P. Goryacheva

This request was submitted on 1 March to the chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, L. Kravchenko, who on 2 March gave the following response.

I report that the text of the statement by six deputies and members of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet that was made public at the 21 February 1991 third session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet by S.P. Goryacheva was broadcast on the same day as a recording on Central Television's First Program in parts of the television service news (at 1200 and 1500), and also in the program "Vremya."

A recording of the text of the statement was also broadcast on All-Union Radio on the First Program at 1200 and 1300, and on "Mayak" at 1100.

I can inform you that the above-mentioned decision was reached at the initiative of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting without any request from the deputies of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] L. Kravchenko

It is hardly likely that the correspondence of S. Goryacheva is of interest to most of our more than 12 million readers. But we publish it only as a graphic illustration of the typical situation in which tendentiousness substitutes for pluralism. They give "their own people" unlimited air time even if they do not request it, but for "the others" things just get worse.

A maximum of 2,000 people heard B. Yeltsin at the House of Cinema, but millions participated in the discussion of it thanks to the program "Vremya." We note that the discussion was presented in a hurried fashion, without familiarity with the subject of the debate. But why not present the speech itself on that same "Vremya" or "Mayak" for the listeners and viewers themselves to judge?

Polozkov in 'Most Difficult' Arctic Tour Meeting

PM2003114791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Mar 91 Second Edition p 1

[TASS correspondent V. Belousov report: "Meetings in the Polar Region"]

[Text] Murmansk, 15 Mar—Possibly the most difficult of all the meetings that Russian Republic Communists' leader I.K. Polozkov has had in the Kola Peninsula was today's meeting with metal workers at the "Severonikel" combine.

The Arctic metal industry workers directly associate the breaking of contract commitments by the collectives of the Bereznikovskiy and Crimea "Soda" production associations and the Sterlitamak petrochemists with the chaos in the economy which has become particularly obvious recently.

Answering these and a number of other questions, the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee first secretary named many of those who, in his opinion, are slowing perestroyka and using the democratization of society for mercenary ends. On this occasion, he repeated what had been said at a meeting the previous day by Northern Fleet party conference delegates at Severomorsk to the effect that the underlying blame for the collapse of the republic's and the country's economy lies with the so-called democrats. I.K. Polozkov was sharply critical of the Shatalin-Yavlinskiy program. This program, he stressed, would lead not to building but to the ruin and squandering of what had been established over the decades by the Soviet people.

In I.K. Polozkov's opinion, the stabilization of the situation in the RSFSR and in the country as a whole is impossible without strengthening ties between union republics. Consequently he called on northerners to vote "yes" to the Union Treaty in the upcoming referendum and to express their opposition to the introduction of a presidential administration in the republic.

On Friday evening I.K. Polozkov met with the Murmansk Oblast party organization aktiv. The talk with the polar region communists lasted three hours.

Food Supply Problem 'Extreme' in Komi SSR

LD1903231491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1657 GMT 19 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Viktor Makarov]

[Text] Syktyvkar, 19 Mar (TASS)—The latest session of the Komi Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet began today with a discussion of urgent measures for stabilizing the provision of foodstuffs. The deputies called the situation concerning the provision of foodstuffs to the republic's population extreme. It was proposed to set up a commission with special powers and also to appeal to the USSR president and the governments of the country and Russia with a number of proposals, which on the whole can be called an ultimatum. The fact is that the republic plans to take retaliatory measures if the suppliers of foodstuffs to the Komi SSR are not fulfilling deliveries according to the plan. For example, it is being proposed that a portion of raw material resources extracted here will not be sent to consumers in accordance with the state order, but exchanged for required foodstuffs and consumer goods.

The session plans to discuss a whole number of topical issues and also to examine a draft Union Treaty.

Report on Karelian Supplies 'Flight of Fancy'

PM2003163591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Mar 91 p 1

[IMA-PRESS Karelian Department report: "Sausage Theme Becomes a Fixation"]

[Text] In mid-March, Central Television ran an item on how the food problem has been solved in one Karelian city, namely Lakhdenpokhya. The counters of the local "Kooperator" store piled high with beef and various sausages sailed across television screens. The reporter's confident voice announced that up to 18 varieties are turned out at the sausage-making section of the Lakhdenpokhya consumer cooperative. Unfortunately, everything the television showed turned out to be an artistic flight of fancy. It came to light that, the day before the film was shot, meat products were hurriedly brought into the aforementioned store (to be fair, let us note that it was also possible to obtain sausage here before, not 18 but two varieties, though: Priced at 20 and 22 rubles per kilogram). Soon after filming was over, the "abundance" was bought up. The people of Lakhdenpokhya are thinking of asking the Central Television workers to come to their town again and do this more often.

Special Militia Unit Sent To Komsomolsk

PM2003162591 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 p 2

[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Have You Heard? Did You Read?"]

[Text] Yesterday 35 members of the Special Purpose Militia Detachment were sent urgently by helicopter to Komsomolsk-na-Amure. The kray internal affairs administration took this step because of an unusually sharp increase in the number of robberies in this city.

Square in Groznyy Named for Nikita Khrushchev

PM2003144191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 Second Edition p 6

[TASS report: "Named for Khrushchev"]

[Text] Groznyy, 18 Mar—The Oktyabrskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee in Groznyy has decided to name one of the city's squares for N.S. Khrushchev. In this way the deputies expressed their attitude toward a man who, in their opinion, made a great contribution to the liberation of peoples who were repressed during the years of Stalin's terror.

As is well known, in 1944 the Chechen and Ingush peoples were deported to the Central Asian republics and settled there without the right to communicate with each other, without basic civil liberties, and with the shameful tag of having been "specially resettled." It was only in 1957, at the start of the "Khrushchev thaw," that they were allowed to return to their historic homeland.

'Ideological Germanization' in Kaliningrad Decried

PM2003153391 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Captain Second Rank G. Valeryev report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Start of Germanization?"]

[Text] A new newspaper, KENISBERGSKIY VESTNIK, has appeared in Kaliningrad's kiosks. The name alone smacks of ideological subversion and its content is simply provocative. After all, from the legal viewpoint Koenigsberg [old name of Kaliningrad when under control of East Prussia] no longer exists. There is no such city on the world map. But heralds [kuryer—pun on German "Kurier" and Russian "vestnik" meaning herald, messenger] have already announced their presence. Along with the fact that the publication is designed for "compatriots." The newspaper's founder is the International Compatriots' Fund (Moscow). "Compatriots" in Moscow already have Kaliningrad Oblast under their control. The newspaper's back page was published in German.

Boris Yeltsin himself appeared in this publication like the appearance of Jesus Christ—a full front-page picture and dozens of photographs in all poses and from all angles. "We didn't even have such portrait galleries of the 'leader' during the era of stagnation," Vice Admiral A. Korniyenko, chief of the fleet military-political directorate, said.

One might not have paid this newspaper such close attention—there are lots of press publications in the kiosks today. But clearly actions were well-coordinated here. Thus, a newspaper has also been published in German in Klaipeda and there too the name Memel appeared instead of Klaipeda. The newspaper DEMOKRATICHESKIY TILZIT has been published in Sovetsk in Kaliningrad Oblast. It is easy to guess the aims of this kind of publication. The ideological Germanization of the oblast has begun.

Western Republics

Snegur Chairs Moldova Government Session

LD2003141691 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1835 GMT 19 Mar 91

[Text] Kishinev, 19 Mar (TASS)—An open session of the Moldovan Government, conducted by President Mircha Snegur, took place here today. This is the first sitting of the government since the institution of Presidency in the republic.

Giving an appraisal of the referendum held on 17 March, Mircha Snegur said that as MOLDOVA-PRES correspondents Aleksandr Golya and Aleksandr Tanas report, "its results testify to popular support for the parliament and Government of Moldova. Only 28 percent of the population took part in the plebiscite on the future of the USSR".

During the session, the issues of stabilizing the situation on the consumer market and price hikes for goods and public services were discussed. A decision was adopted stating that the population of Moldova will receive 65 rubles each month in the form of compensation.

The Moldovan president leveled criticism at the heads of ministries, departments, and enterprises for not hastening to dispatch ready products for sale in anticipation of the wholesale and retail price hikes. "The egoistic interests of many," stressed Mircha Snegur, "have brought about a situation in which it is hard to find goods for the coupons and vouchers issued to the population."

Alarming data on the rate of growth of pay were cited at the session. The earnings' curve is rising not as a result of an increase in labor productivity and volumes of production, but as a result of the rise of contractual prices for goods and public services. Evidence of this is the rise in deposits made by the population into savings banks. This year the size of deposits will reach 2 billion rubles and more, whereas last year the level of deposits was 1 billion.

ROMPRES Report on Session

AU2003124391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1148 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/03/1991—The government of the Republic of Moldova gathered in Chisinau [Kishinev] in an open session also attended, beside the government's members, by the chairmen of the Standing Commissions of the Supreme Soviet, of the Town Soviets of People's Deputies, executives of enterprises and organizations.

The meeting was chaired by the president of the Republic of Moldova, Mircea Snegur, who emphasized: "Despite the fact that the military stirred up the spirits during the referendum, its results clearly prove that the parliament and the government of the Republic of Moldova have the people's support."

While examining the problems concerning the stabilization of the situation on a consumer market, the increase of prices at various products and at the services to the population, a resolution was adopted according to which the Moldova citizens would be paid 65-ruble compensations every month.

The president of the Republic of Moldova criticized executives of ministries, departments and enterprises who, waiting for the increase of the retail prices, did not supply the commercial network with finite products. "The selfish interests of several relevant factors Mr. Mircea Snegur underscored brought us to the situation in which no commodities could be bought even with the tickets given to the population."

Moldova Leadership Meets Press on Referendum

AU2003142391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1253 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 20/3/1991—A news conference of the leadership of Moldova was held at the Moscow representation of the Republic.

On opening the press conference Ion Hadarca, first vice president of the Supreme Soviet of Moldova, made a detailed presentation of the circumstances under which the so-called referendum for the conservation of the USSR was held in the republic. The speaker gave numerous examples attesting to the character of a script written by the Center of this drive carried into effect by the military and the pro imperial forces in the republic to the end of further destabilizing the socio-political situation and worsening the confrontation among various groups of the population.

Among other things Mr. Ion Hadarca mentioned that were one to believe the organizers of the referendum, about 28 per cent of the population of the republic took part in that farce. But there are facts which prove that results had been forged and grossly distorted by those trying to maintain the present union by all means, he said.

Similar examples were given by the First Deputy Prime Minister of the Republic Constantin Oboroc who stressed that the referendum was a defying provocation of the Defense Ministry of the USSR to the end of instituting a state of emergency in Moldova, a fact noted also at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR when an official request was made for the application of that measure.

A documentary film was shown at the press conference presenting most serious violations of legislation and the international law during the referendum in Moldova, Moldova Pres news agency informs.

Ukraine Communist Party Leader on Referendum

LD2003111991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1845 GMT 19 Mar 91

[By UKRINFORN-TASS correspondent Ivan Sayko]

[Text] Kiev, 19 Mar (TASS)—The results of the referendum held in the Ukraine convincingly testify that most citizens of the republic have expressed themselves in favor of the preservation of a Union in which the Ukraine's sovereignty could be implemented as fully as possible, Stanislav Gurenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee stated today at a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists: 70.5 percent of all those taking part in the voting said "yes" on the Union ballot. The political leader also noted the great political activity of the population and the interest it had shown in the referendum.

Simultaneously, a republican poll was held in the Ukraine. Its participants were handed another ballot with the question: "Do you agree that the Ukraine should form part of a Union of Soviet sovereign states on the principles of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine?" Agreement with this idea was expressed by 80.2 percent of those voting. Speaking of the comparatively small difference in the results of the voting on the referendum and the poll, Stanislav Gurenko pointed out that this testifies to the failure of those forces that were trying to set one ballot paper against the other.

He said the next tasks will be work on the draft treaty on the USSR and measures for social protection of the population during the transition to the market economy.

Caucasus

S. Ossetia Clashes Continue Despite Cease-Fire

LD2003181591 Moscow TASS in English 1748 GMT 20 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—Clashes between opposing sides in Tskhinvali, South Ossetia, have continued for the fifth consecutive day with the sides using submachine-guns, machine-guns, grenade-throwers and unguided jet shells [as received]. A regional hospital has been shelled again, a spokesman for the emergency committee at the Presidium of the North Ossetian parliament told TASS.

A Soviet Interior Ministry spokesman told TASS that leaders of Georgian and Ossetian units at their recent meeting decided to cease fire and organize permanent radio communications between the conflicting sides.

Ingush Appeal for 'Statehood' Criticized

LD2003231991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1937 GMT 20 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz, 20 Mar (TASS)—A decision in connection with the appeal to the republic's Supreme Soviet by USSR People's Deputy Kh. Fargiyev was adopted at today's session of the Supreme Soviet of the North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR]. On behalf of those attending the nationwide rally of Ingushes in the town of Nazran, he demands the holding of an emergency session of the Supreme Soviet on the question of the restoration of Ingush statehood, with its administrative and cultural center in Vladikavkaz; on rescinding the decree on the moratorium on registration for residence; on ending the accommodating of refugees from South Ossetia in a suburban area of North Ossetia; on the creation of a most favored status for citizens of Ingush nationality in economic, political and sociocultural development; and on setting up a commission for reimbursement for property confiscated during the period of their deportation.

Having considered the questions posed, the Supreme Soviet notes that the appeal is aimed at further aggravating interethnic relations and the socio-political situation, and runs counter to the USSR law on the status of USSR people's deputies. The matters raised in the appeal were previously examined by the legislatures of the country, Russia and North Ossetia, and appropriate decisions were taken on them.

The decision says that, proceeding from current legislation, the question of the restoration of Ingush statehood lies outside the competence of the Supreme Soviet of the

North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic. It is also emphasized that all peoples living on the territory of North Ossetia enjoy equal rights, and the demand that special conditions should be created for persons of Ingush nationality is unlawful.

Georgia Government Decree on Local Elections

91US0376B Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 1

[Decree issued by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet in Tbilisi; date not given]

[Text] In accordance with part 5 of paragraph 1 of article 5 of the Republic of Georgia Law "On Local Administration in the Transition Period," the prefects of rayons and cities under republic (autonomous republic) jurisdiction, by agreement with the Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia, are appointed and dismissed by the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium on the basis of a representation of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic.

In conjunction with the fact that in some rayons of an autonomous republic and in cities under republic (autonomous republic) jurisdiction, appointments to the post of prefect have been delayed in view of the nonrepresentation of appropriate candidacies, the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet decrees:

To explain that if the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of an autonomous republic does not submit a candidacy for the post of prefect that has been coordinated with the Council of Ministers of the autonomous republic and the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia, the chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet, by agreement with the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia, will present the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet Presidium with a candidacy for appointment to the post of prefect of the rayon of an autonomous republic and of a city under republic (autonomous republic) jurisdiction.

Georgian Decree on Abkhazian Elections

91US0376A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian 28 Feb 91 p 1

[Decree on Elections to the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet issued by the Georgian Supreme Soviet in Tbilisi on 27 February]

[Text] The term of office of the Abkhazian ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet in fact ran out on 25 February 1990.

According to the decree of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet dated 18 November 1989 "On a Procedure for Implementing the Georgian SSR Law 'On Amendments and Supplements to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Georgian SSR,'" the powers of the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet were retained until new elections to the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet.

In accordance with Article 75 of the Constitution of the Abkhazian ASSR, as worded by the law of 4 December 1990, extension of the term of office of the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet is permitted only in exceptional circumstances and not for more than six months.

Despite that, the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet has not extended its term of office, has not adopted a law on elections of the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet, and, as a result, has not designated elections to the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet.

Based on the aforementioned, the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. To propose that the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet: conduct elections to the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet no later than 1 October 1991;
prior to 15 March of this year, in accordance with Article 75 of the Abkhazian ASSR Constitution, extend its term of office.

2. In view of the fact that according to the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, the term of office of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet is defined as five years and the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet has been operating for more than six years, nonfulfillment of the first article of this decree will entail suspension of the powers of the present session of the Abkhazian ASSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Republic of Georgia Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Tbilisi, 27 February 1991

Georgia Accuses Foreign Media of 'Bias'

LD1803223891 Moscow TASS in English 2129 GMT 18 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Albert Kochetkov]

[Text] Tbilisi March 18 TASS—Georgia has launched a campaign against foreign media, accusing them of bias in their coverage of the political and inter-ethnic situation in this Transcaucasian republic.

VESTNIK GRUZII, newspaper of the republican parliament, lambasts the U.S. WALL STREET JOURNAL for a reportage by its special correspondent Frederick Kemp. A local journalist accuses his U.S. counterpart of bias and hints that Kemp receives fee for his articles not only in New York but also—in Moscow.

Soviet journalists are referred to as "agents of the Kremlin" in Georgian official propaganda parlance if their points of view differ from the opinion of Georgian Parliament President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.

Ever since he took office in November last year, the local press has been constantly accusing newspapers, magazines and television of Moscow of an "information war" against Georgia.

But Gamsakhurdia also launched attacks on "foreign agents of the Kremlin". He began with Liberty radio station, describing it as traitorous, although it is known that it receives appropriations from the U.S. Congress, not the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Then the attention of Gamskhurdia's entourage in their search for foreign "agents of the Kremlin" turned to Italy. Giulietto Chiesa, special correspondent of LA STAMPA, for his reportage from Georgia, was labelled by his Caucasian counterparts as a "minor assistant in Moscow's political games".

Manayenkov at Transcaucasus MD Party Meeting

PM2003140591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[SAKINFORM-TASS report: "Party Conference of Transcaucasus Servicemen"]

[Text] Transcaucasus Military District, 18 Mar—The progress of perestroyka in party work and measures to ensure the organizational and political strengthening of the district's primary party organizations have been discussed at the district party conference in Tbilisi.

The delegates heard and discussed the organizational committee's report on the reform of the Transcaucasus Military District's party structures and the report from the district military-political administration party commission.

Yu. Manayenkov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, district commander, took part in the debates.

The district's party committee and control commission were elected.

Armenian Cabinet Decision on Non-State Schools

NC1503141491 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1630 GMT 14 Mar 91

[Text] The Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers has accepted a decision on the registration laws of non-state higher education institutions in the Republic. According to the decision, non-state higher education institutions will be created and registered by the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers at the joint proposal of the State Committee for Higher Education and Science and the State Economy Committee.

Armenian Supreme Soviet Censures Group

NC2103103691 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1730 GMT 19 Mar 91

[Report by Mavr Danielyan from the extraordinary session of the Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet in Yerevan on 19 March]

[Excerpts] [Danielyan] The Armenian Republic Supreme Soviet held an extraordinary session today under the chairmanship of Levon Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet. He said that an extraordinary meeting of the republic's Supreme Soviet Presidium was convened because of the explosive situation that had developed the previous night. That meeting decided the following:

1. To look at the report of the republic's Internal Affairs Ministry on illegal acts committed in recent days by the National Self-Determination Association, which are destabilizing the situation in the republic.

2. Under the existing conditions, to consent to the measures adopted by the Internal Affairs Ministry.

3. To convene an extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet at 1100 on 19 March 1991 with the following agenda: the tense situation in the republic because of the activities of the National Self-Determination Association.

The podium was then turned over to Ashot Manucharyan, the interim acting minister of internal affairs, to deliver a report. He said:

[Begin Manucharyan recording] In this situation it is our goal to do everything to stabilize the situation so that the republic can function properly and remain united. Many of us work in this direction. Unfortunately, this does not apply to this organization. They began their acts with the barbarism committed against monuments. A number of monuments and statues were smashed in our city's streets. This was followed by the occupation of buildings—first the Glavlit building and then the building housing the party city committee. This is establishing a very dangerous precedent: the occupation of buildings might continue. This means that laws are disregarded in the republic.

These actions were soon followed by a youth organization's encroachment on the [word indistinct] building. A few other such infringements also followed. That is, destabilization set in again in the republic. The next was the action against the radio broadcasting committee. The National Self-Determination Association demanded air time to express its position. All right, but there are ways to demand such things. Instead, they surrounded the building, invited in and then hurt the feelings of the chairman, and then declared that the next day they would meet again and dissolve the radio broadcasting committee unless given air time.

At the same time, they launched a campaign on cars. All the cars of the National Self-Determination Association, some of which had been given to them, have special license plates. When the head of Yerevan's Kay district asked them to stop this practice immediately, Paruyr Ayrikyan [leader of this organization] retorted that this was necessary for us, that while you could constantly tail us, we would go on doing what we want to. Finally, they initiated the following operation, which was the most serious because it involved the security of the republic:

It is obvious to everyone that Azerbaijan, agreeing with the central authorities, is organizing the draft on a large scale on its own territory, with the result that 40 percent of the Fourth Army is made up of Azerbaijanis, a figure that rises to 50 to 60 percent in the border regions. On the one side are the Soviet Army armored cars—manned by Azerbaijanis—and against them are our battalions armed with automatic weapons, and constant attempts are being made to provoke them. It is obvious which side will have the casualties. (?The frightening thing) is that today we do not have armored cars because we have few people who can handle them. Our Seventh Army, already two to two-and-half times smaller than the Fourth Army, is not even manned to half its capacity because we have to provide the additional men. We have not done this because we are evading army service. Because we think that we could set up an independent army and arm it, not tomorrow nor in 10 years but today, and then defend our borders. A more irresponsible, even criminal, act could not be imagined under these circumstances.

They commit acts intended to undermine the army and the draft. They are doing special work with the draftees. They visit draftees' houses and tell them they will defend them. They invite the draftees to the rallies and constantly tell them: Do not enter this army and we will protect you. I ask: Who is then going to defend the borders? Is the National Self-Determination Association going to do that?

All of this is being done by an organization on whose emblem is written: Independence, Freedom, and Statehood. I consider this doubly immoral, for they have dragged 18-20 year-olds into these activities. That is, National Self-Determination Association's foundations are being built on immature young people 18 to 20 years old. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Danielyan] Levon Ter-Petrosyan then read the draft decision of the Supreme Soviet:

[Begin Ter-Petrosyan recording] The decision of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet on the activities of the National Self-Determination Asspociation: The Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet decides [passage indistinct].

1. To warn the National Self-Determination Association about its illegal actions. These acts contribute to the destabilization of the political life in the republic and to the failure of the defense of the republic, and they can have serious consequences.

2. To propose—and here we are again giving them the opportunity not to force our hand—to the Armenian Republic's Council of Ministers that it consider rescinding its decision on the legalization of the constitution of the National Self-Determination Association if such unlawful acts continue.

This National Self-Determination Association was registered according to the previous law. [words indistinct] If necessary, the organization could be suspended and re-registered if its activities comply (?with the law).

3. To approve the measures adopted by the Armenian Republic's Internal Affairs Ministry to stabilize the situation in the republic.

4. This could be regarded as a separate decision [words indistinct]: Those Armenian draftees who have abandoned their army units stationed on the territory of the Armenian Republic and who fail to return to their army units by 1800 on 26 March 1991, that is within a week, to continue their service, will then be considered deserters and will be penalized according to the law. [end recording]

[Danielyan] The decision was adopted with the necessary amount of votes. The extraordinary session of the Armenian Republic's Supreme Soviet then ended.